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An Interview with Jeremiah Pangloss-A Prelude to
the Constitutional Debate
Ovid C. Lewis*
Given the complex nature of nuclear weapons strategy for institut-
ing W.W. II,-a subject (survival) for which most of us display in-
tense feelings that tend to cloud our objectivity-I decided to ask my
illustrious friend Dr. Jeremiah Pangloss, to write an introductory piece
for this symposium. I know no more versatile dilettante. Not weighted
down with the myopic effect of very much knowledge, he is able to see
the big picture, identifying the worst and the best in any given scenario
by employing the simple Procrustean strategy of ignoring the finer
points of argumentation. Also, I knew that his distress over the death in
1876 of the last Tasmanian, Lalla Rookh,--an event he perceived as a
manifestation of the global movement toward cultural homogeneity and
concomitant loss of alternative cultures-made him acutely sensitive to
the nuclear threat to our collective existence.1 Unfortunately, I was un-
able to convince him to write an introduction but he did read the sym-
posium articles and was willing to permit publication of our subsequent
discussion.
OL: Dr. Pangloss, what makes you think that you possess the requisite
expertise to evaluate something as technologically complex as nuclear
weapons strategy?2
JP: Well, first I would point out that my legal education has enhanced
* Dean, Center for the Study of Law, Nova University.
1. See Lewis, Universal Functional Requisites of Society: The Unending Quest,
3 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 360 (1970).
2. The problem of evaluating the risks in nuclear power generation is equally
complex.
Even if the complex facts [concerning nuclear power] were completely ex-
posed and explained by a neutral group of experts, there is little indication
that the public could develop a consensus. For example, little capability
exists to weigh the tradeoffs between cheaper electricity produced by nu-
4
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my analytical skills and sense of relevance-especially the capacity to
take both sides of any question. And as you know, the legally trained
generalist displays the capacity to think of something inextricably con-
nected to something else without thinking about what it is connected
to. In this sense, legal analysis is value free.' Thus, I can analyze nu-
clear strategy without thinking about the obscene and grotesque conse-
quences of a nuclear blast for the three hundred million individuals
killed or tortured by the blast. The Justices of the Supreme Court have
frequently provided evidence of this capacity by employing neutral
principles that transcend the immediate result achieved in a particu-
larly hard case.4
OL: Are you suggesting that there are two sides to the question of
survival? I thought that all sane persons agreed that survival is a mini-
mal value without which no other value artifacts can exist! Certified
geniuses from Aristotle to H.L.A. Hart have agreed on that!
JP: Well, consider Woody Allen's assessment that mankind is at the
crossroads-one road leading to despair and hopelessness, the other to
extinction. It's pretty much a Hobson's choice .
OL: But we have made considerable progress since Eve ate from the
tree of knowledge, especially if progress is measured by the availability
of conceptual schemes for ordering reality. We have solved some of our
perennial problems and generally improved our problem-solving capac-
ity. Consider Robert Nozick's assessment:
clear power reactors and the small probability of a major catastrophe. Nor
does society have the experience to address the delicate question of
whether or not any technology that includes a very small attached risk of
catastrophe is acceptable. In addition, if all competing values could be
completely explicated, no mechanisms are available for resolving strongly
held preferences.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIES, PANEL ON SCI-
ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: PROMISES AND DANGERS IN THE EIGHTIES 58 (1981).
3. See generally Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960).
4. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1959). See, e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8
(1977).
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7:1982 A Prelude to the Constitution Debate 3
The great reductionist views of Freud and Marx, computer model-
ing and neurophysiological reduction, behavioral psychology and
economic analyses, just join and extend the long list of human ac-
complishments, striving, and excellence: Shakespeare and Kant and
Plato and Goethe and Gandhi and the Baal Shem-Tov and Newton
and Picasso and Homer and Rembrandt and Turner and George
Eliot and Galileo and Tolstoy and Aurobinde and Weber and Bach
and Garrison and the authors of the Hebrew Bible and Sophocles.5
The fact is that there "has been striking progress in the control of dis-
ease, in the methods of farming, in material productivity, in the reduc-
tion of backbreaking labor, in the techniques of rapid mass communi-
cation, in the spread of literacy and probably in the reduction in the
amount of violence in everyday life."'
JP: Actually, there really is no basis for assuming progress. Our exoso-
matic evolution-autos, telephones, telescopes, computers, etc.-has
brought us to what Arthur Miller elsewhere has described as a "cli-
macteric" or convergence of crises. We are drowning in a sea of infor-
mation. So even with this "progress," or because of it our survival is at
best problematical. Probably the most comprehensive statement of the
climacteric is provided by Kirkpatrick Sale:
An imperilled ecology, irremediable pollution of atmosphere and
ocean, overpopulation, world hunger and starvation, the depletion
of resources, environmental diseases, the vanishing wilderness, un-
controlled technologies, chemical toxins in water, air and foods,
and endangered species on land and sea.
A deepening suspicion of authority, distrust of established institu-
tions, breakdown of family ties, decline of community, erosion of
religious commitment, contempt for law, disregard for tradition,
ethical and moral confusion, cultural ignorance, artistic chaos, and
aesthetic uncertainty.
Deteriorating cities, megalopolitan sprawls, stifling ghettoes, over-
5. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL INvESTIGATIONS 644 (1981).
6. Frankel, The Idea of Progress, 6 THiE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 483,
486 (1967). The criteria for judging progress are not self-evident. See Ginsberg, Pro-
gress in the Modern Era, 3 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 633, 649 (1973).
6
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crowding, traffic congestion, untreated wastes, smog and soot,
budget insolvency, inadequate schools, mounting illiteracy, declin-
ing university standards, dehumanizing welfare systems, police bru-
tality, overcrowded hospitals, clogged court calendars, inhumane
prisons, racial injustice, sex discrimination, poverty, crime and van-
dalism, and fear.
The growth of loneliness, powerlessness, insecurity, anxiety, ano-
mie, boredom, bewilderment, alienation, rudeness, suicide, mental
illness, alcoholism, drug usage, divorce, violence, and sexual
dysfunction.
Political alienation and discontent, bureaucratic rigidification, ad-
ministrative inefficiency, legislative ineptitude, judicial inequity,
bribery and corruption, inadequate government regulations and en-
forcement, the use of repressive machinery, abuses of power, in-
eradicable national debt, collapse of the two-party system, defense
overspending, nuclear proliferation, the arms race and arms sales,
and the threat of nuclear annihilation.
Economic uncertainty, unemployment, inflation, devaluation and
displacement of the dollar, capital shortages, the energy crises, ab-
senteeism, employee sabotage and theft, corporate mismanage-
ment, industrial espionage, business payoffs and bribes, white-collar
criminality, shoddy goods, waste and inefficiency, planned obsoles-
cence, fraudulent and incessant advertising, mounting personal
debt, and the maldistribution of wealth.
International instability, worldwide inflation, national and civil
warfare, arms buildups, nuclear reactors, plutonium stockpiles, dis-
putes over laws of the sea, inadequate international law, the failure
of the United Nations, multinational exploitation, Third World
poverty and unrepayable debt, and the end of the American impe-
rial arrangement.
Or to put it another way:
Vietnam, Watergate, New York City bankruptcy, gas lines, Mirex,
Equity Funding, ITT, riots, Medicaid fraud, redlining, CIA, drug-
testing, hostages, price fixing, Vesco, nursing homes, coffee prices,
product recalls, assassinations, heroin, the Middle East, Rio
Rancho, Kepone, skyjacking, the SLA, Hustler, Spiro Agnew,
Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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saccharin, the square tomato, Harlequin books, Los Angeles,
OPEC, Wilbur Mills, power failures, My Lai, Charles Manson,
PCB, the SST, Andy Warhol, Appalachia, organized crime, Three
Mile Island, Valium, the Wilmington 10, REITs, TV violence,
strip-mining, FBI break-ins, the Sahel, microwaves, McDonald's,
Kent State, Penn Central, Attica, the Torrey Canyon, psychosur-
gery, mercury, and Chile ...
OL: But then the dilemma confronting us is of our own making. We
have developed a honeycombed store of knowledge, with disciplines seg-
regated to the extent that experts are afflicted with specialized deaf-
ness. We question whether it is even possible to see the big picture
while applying the knowledge and techniques of the diverse and sophis-
ticated disciplines required to resolve the complex problems of our cli-
macteric era.
Moreover, the classical boundaries of the earth sciences-geology,
meteorology, oceanography, and so on-are being eroded and re-
placed by a planetary multidisciplinary view. For example, portray-
ing and understanding the long-term evolution of climat6 depends
on understanding the movement of crustal plates and the interpre-
tation of deep-sea cores and sediment samples. Understanding and
predicting the shorter period changes in climate depends on knowl-
edge of the oceans, their temperature, currents, ability to act as a
reservoir, and their role in the global energy cycle.
A central theme is that the new knowledge gained by the vigor of
earth sciences and by pertinent technology is now vital to the wise
management of our planet. Plate tectonics is essential to the effort
to understand and predict earthquakes and to improve reconnais-
sance for new mineral deposits. Atmospheric chemistry enables us
to make a reasoned estimate of the likely future effects of trace
amounts of chlorofluoromethanes on trace amounts of ozone in the
stratosphere. Basic work in marine biology and ecology is indispen-
sable to structuring effective policies for managing the living re-
sources of the seas. Research on the chemistry of ocean Water will
enable us to fix more precisely the role of the oceans as a reservoir
for C02 , helping to yield, in time, precise estimates of the climatic
effects of CO2 and a more rational base on which to plan the future
7. K. SALE, HUMAN SCALE 21-22 (1980).
7:1982
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/16
6 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
use of fossil fuels.
Our appraisal of recent trends in the earth sciences is dominated
by the role of technology and the approach to planetary problems
through organized and collaborative efforts of institutions and
scientists-big science. There is a current question about big sci-
ence and its relation to the science of individual investigators. It
should be noted that the big science effort described here grew
from little science-the ideas of individuals-and provide to indi-
vidual scientists data that could be obtained in no other way.8
JP: The best response to the question you posed concerning my compe-
tence in matters as complex as nuclear weapons strategy was supplied
by the physicist Erwin Schrodinger: "I can see no escape from this di-
lemma . . . than that some of us should venture to embark on a syn-
thesis of facts and theories, albeit with second-hand and incomplete
knowledge of some of them-and at the risk of making fools of
ourselves." 9
OL: And what then is your assessment of the current state of affairs?
JP: I think the big picture comes into focus by telescoping our finite
existence on this globe into a thirty-day span. During the first 29 days,
22-1/ hours, mankind was a nomadic predator. Only during the last
hour and 25 minutes did he settle into framing and in the last five
minutes he finally moved to an urban setting. Within this time frame
the Renaissance consumed 4 minutes, the Industrial Revolution 1-
minutes, and the Electronic Era 10 seconds. 10 The acceleration in rate
of change and technological capacity is quite apparent. During the last
moments of our 30 days, the ineluctable movement toward annihilation
8. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 50 (National Academy of Sciences 1979). It is
suggested that international as well as interdisciplinary collaboration is also necessary
for progress. See id. at 14-15.
9. E. SCHRODINGER, WHAT is LIE? vii (1945).
10. There is considerable disagreement among anthropologists concerning man's
first appearance on this planet. "Lucy" appeared 3.5 million years ago, and other
hominids over 5 million years ago. See evolutionary chart in D. JOHANSON & M. EDEY,
Lucy: THE BEGINNINGS OF HUMANKIND 10-11 (1982). Compare the earlier (and now
obviously erroneous) chart in 1 W. DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: OUR ORI-
ENTAL HERITAGE 90 (1954).
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of the human species is equally obvious. How clear it now appears,
even though each early step was at the time taken, apparently innocu-
ous. Consider the following annihilation schedule:
ANNIHILATION SCHEDULE
1300: Cannon
1440: Printing Press
1500: Rifle
1776: Submarine
1835: Revolver
1863: TNT
1896: Radio-Telegraph
1903: Airplane
1905: Einstein proposes theory for transformation
of matter into energy: E = mc2
1926: Liquid Fuel Rocket
1928: Mechanical Computer
1933: Harold Urey isolates heavy hydrogen
1939: Fission in uranium discovered
1942: First nuclear chain reaction in the Chicago
pile
1945: First test of A-bomb at Alamorgorda, New
Mexico
August 6, 1945: First obscene use of A-bomb at Hiroshima
1946: Electronic numerical integrator and
calculator (ENIAC), first all-electronic
computer
1952: H-bomb tested at Eniwetok
1954: H-bomb exploded producing twice
anticipated destructive effect. John Foster
Dulles propounds strategy of massive
retaliation.
October 4, 1957: Sputnik I
10
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1960: Era of nuclear plenty (more than 1000
nuclear weapons available). Atlas Missile
has CEP (circular error probable
indicating the radius of the circle within
which 50% of missiles will land) of several
miles.
December, 1960: SIOP (single integrated operational plan)
requires all-cities strategy with estimated
death toll of 360-450 million people in
communist sphere.
June, 1962: SIOP II adopts more flexible nuclear
strategy of escalation of destruction.
July 8, 1962: 1.4 Megaton H-bomb 248 miles over
Johnson Island generates EMP
(electromagnetic pulse) of peak 6
megawatts/sq. meter.
October, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis
1969: NIE (CIA's National Intelligence Estimate
of Soviet Nuclear strike capability)
assumes parity. Russian SS-9s (armed with
3 warheads each with 7-10 megaton force)
are aimed at U.S. LCCs (launch control
centers) in the Midwest.
1970: U.S. develops MIRVs (multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles).
1974: NSDM 242 (National Security decision
memorandum) propounds Schlesinger
doctrine of limited nuclear war.
1975: NIE assumes nuclear parity not attained
by Russians until mid-1980s. U.S.
Minuteman III Missile with Mark 12A
warhead (350 kiloton force) has CEP of
one tenth of a nautical mile.
1977: Russia develops MIRVs with low CEP.
Window of vulnerability develops.
11
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July, 1980: PD 59 (presidential directive) sets forth
nuclear war strategies.
1982: Russian SS-19s acquire new front end with
90% PK (probability of kill) on minuteman
missile silos. Opens wider window of
vulnerability.
November 22, 1982: MX dense pack strategy adopted.
The inventiveness of homo faciens has produced better and better
means of assuring our destruction. But while technological exosomatic
evolution has occurred, the human nature of homo sapiens has re-
mained unchanged-and in his natural state we know that "the life of
man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."11 The combination
of MIRVs with a low CEP and high PK produced a situation that com-
pelled Carter to issue PD 59, rejecting a MAD strategy in favor of a
policy requiring the U.S. military "to be able to undertake precise, lim-
ited nuclear strikes against military facilities in the Soviet Union, in-
cluding missile bases and troop concentration, [and] to develop the ca-
pacity to threaten Soviet political leaders in their underground shelters
in time of war." 12
OL: But that sounds as though fighting a nuclear war is considered a
reasonable option? I would have thought no sane person would even
consider that. Do you really believe the leader of a State would initiate
a nuclear war and thereby risk destruction of our civilization?
JP: Well, Harry Truman [who authorized Hiroshima's destruction]
was sane and he, at the time of the Korean War, contemplated a nu-
clear attack, although he had removed General MacArthur for urging
all-out war. Truman wrote in a January 27, 1952, memorandum:
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultima-
tum with a 10-day expiration limit, informing Moscow that we in-
tend to blockade the China coast from the Korean border to Indo-
china, and that we intend to destroy every military base in
11. T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHON OR THE MATTER, FORME & POWER OF A COMMON-
WEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVILL *62.
12. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
12
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Manchuria by means now in our control-and if there is further
interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to ac-
complish our purposes.
This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg,
Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien,
Odessa, Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and
the Soviet Union will be eliminated."3
There were, of course, other times when we came close-with Eisen-
hower in 1953 (Korean War), Kennedy in 1962 (Cuban Missile Cri-
sis), Kissinger in 1973 (Arab-Israeli October War), and Carter in 1979
(Iran Crisis). The fact is that we could end up with a war because of
computer error. Tom Wicker recently reported that there were "151
computer false alarms in an 18 month period" and that one false alarm
"had American forces on alert for a full six minutes before the error
was discovered."' 4 Add more powerful missiles and more countries with
nuclear weapons and the outcome is bleak at best.15
OL: But our civilization would not survive-at least not in any form
identifiable by us.
JP: Edward Teller doesn't think a nuclear war would be all that bad.
He suggests that we certainly could survive-as long as we acted ra-
tionally-including wiping the fallout ash from our skin.' 6
OL: But what about the effects of the EMP?
JP: I suppose all data encoded on microchips would disappear. Given
the extent to which our society relies on an information network using
microchips, that could be somewhat disastrous.1 7 Of course, the mili-
13. N.Y. Times, Sunday, Aug. 3, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
14. N.Y. Times, Sunday, Nov. 21, 1982, at EY21, col. 1. Defense experts sug-
gest that the Russian detection systems are even more prone to error. Whew!
15. For an apocalypt's view see H. LINDSEY, THE 1980's: COUNTDOWN TO AR-
MAGEDDON (1980).
16. "Skin contact with fallout is not necessarily fatal-depending on the inten-
sity of the radiation and the precautions taken. Injuries can be reduced simply by
washing off the ash." Teller, Dangerous Myths About Nuclear Arms, READERS DI-
GEST, Nov. 1982, at 139, 141.
17. Daniel Bell reports that by 1980, 51.3 percent of our experienced civilian
1 10 Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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tary has taken measures to protect the C' of C31 (command, control,
communication, and intelligence) from EMP. I think Thomas Powers'
assessment is more accurate than that of Teller:
Strategic planners hesitate to say what the world would be like af-
ter a nuclear war. There are too many variables. But they
agree-for planning purposes, at any rate-that both sides would
"recover," and that the most probable result of a general nuclear
war would be a race to prepare for a second general nuclear war.
As a practical matter, then, a general nuclear war would not end
the threat of nuclear war. That threat, in fact would be one of the
very few things the pre-war and post-war worlds would have in
common.I S
OL: It seems almost inevitable that given our organization for nuclear
war, that it will surely occur. There are several haunting stanzas in the
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam that I can't help bur recall:
We are no other than a moving row
of magic shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the sun-illmin'd lantern held
In midnight by the master of the show;
But helpless pieces of the game he plays
Upon this checquer-board of nights and days;
Hither and thither moves and checks and slays,
and one by one back in the closet lays.19
Do you believe that the probability of nuclear war would be reduced if
the Supreme Court persuasively propounded a doctrine that there is a
workforce was involved in the information business. Further, that the "axial principles
of the post-industrial society, however, is the centrality of theoretical knowledge and its
new role, when codified, as the director of social change." Bell, The Social Framework
of the Information Society, in THE MICROELECTRONIcs REVOLUTION 500 (T. Forester
ed. 1980).
18. Powers, Choosing a Strategy for World War III, 250 THE ATLANTIC, No. 5,
Nov. 1982, at 82, 110.
19. THE RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM (E. Fitzgerald trans. 1859).
14
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constitutional duty to avoid a nuclear war?
JP: Well, that question is almost too speculative for me to answer.
First, what constitutional provision would impose such a duty? I can
agree that a natural law proponent could contend that there is a duty
to seek survival. One of the clearest statements appears in the Summa
Theologica, where St. Thomas states that "the natural law contains all
that makes for the preservation of human life, and all that is opposed
to its dissolution. '20 But even for the Thomistic natural law proponent,
20. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 123 (A. D'Entreves ed. 1959). Note: Interestingly, the Summa Theologica was
incorporated into Catholic doctrine by an encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. See C. MORRIS,
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 57 (1959). Catholics are thus bound, at least in
theory, to St. Thomas' call for an active opposition to "dissolution." Catholics do ap-
pear to support opposition to nuclear weapons more frequently than Non-Catholics. A
recent Gallup Poll indicates the following:
Unilateral Nuclear Freeze
"Do you favor or oppose a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons whether or not the
Soviet Union agrees to do the same?"
Favor Oppose
National 45 55
Catholics 47 53
Non-Catholics 45 55
Dilateral Nuclear Freeze
"Do you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union not
to build any more nuclear weapons in the future?"
Favor Oppose No Opinion
National 77 17 6
Catholics 82 13 5
Non-Catholics 76 18 6
Reduce Nuclear Arsenals
"Would you approve or disapprove if President Reagan made a proposal to the Soviet
Union that both countries reduce their present stock of nuclear weapons by 50 per cent?"
Favor Oppos No Opinion
National 76 19 5
Catholics 81 16 3
Non-Catholics 73 21 6
15
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there would be many troubling issues before exercising a duty to resist
positive law supporting nuclear strike capability.21 Aquinas' theory of
resistance requires only that where positive law is contrary to the com-
mon good, it is not to be obeyed unless the disobedience is more oner-
ous than the evil occasioned by obedience to an unjust law. Of course,
if the Divine law is violated then one must resist-and perhaps survival
of God's creation is mandated by the Divine Law requiring man to be
"fruitful and multiply. '22 But which nuclear weapon strategy will deter
a war is a subject of considerable debate. Agreeing to do good and
avoid evil is far easier than determining what particular acts will fur-
ther this primary precept. The same is true for survival.
OL: But what about a constitutional duty? Do you see any realistic
argument for establishing such a duty?
JP: There are a number of difficulties. First, what provision in the Con-
stitution is available for serving as a basis for such a duty? Recall that
the Court in the Rodriguez case stated that only rights explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution are to be considered funda-
mental enough to impose the strict scrutiny standard of review.23
OL: If interstate travel, privacy, procreation, voting, and education are
fundamental rights implicit in the constitution, then why not a right of
Destroy Present Weapons
"Would you favor or oppose an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to de-
stroy all nuclear weapons that have already been built?"
Favor Oppose No Opinion
National 47 44 9
Catholics 50 42 8
Non-Catholics 46 44 10
Catholics back stand on Missiles, Miami Herald, Sunday, Nov. 21, 1982, at A32, col. 1.
21. Concerning the ambiguities and difficulties inherent in a natural law
approach see Kelsen, Plato and the Natural Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 23 (1960);
Neilsen, An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law, 4
NATURAL L.F. 44 (1959). See infra note 38.
22. Genesis 2:28 (King James).
23. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
1 7:98
13 1
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survival?
JP: You are forgetting that the threat to survival is not a personal
right, but one shared by everyone. The Court probably would deny
standing to even raise the issue-whether in the context of failure to
comply with the "law" on the part of the executive or legislative
branch or infringement on the assumed [arguendo] right of survival.
Recall the recent statement by the Court:
[The] requirements of standing are not satisfied by "the abstract
injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by . . . citi-
zens." Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418
U.S. at 223, n. 13, 94 S. Ct., at 2933, n. 13 (1974). This Court
repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on "'the
right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be
administered according to law. . . .. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126, 129 [42 S. Ct. 274, 275, 66 L. Ed. 499] [1922]." Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208, 82 S. Ct. 691, 705 L. Ed. 2d 663
(1962). See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,
supra, 418 U.S. at 216-222, 94 S. Ct. at 2929-2932; Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 2318, 33 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1972); Ex
parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 58 S. Ct. 1, 82 L. Ed. 493 (1937). Such
claims amount to little more than attempts "to employ a federal
court as a forum in which to air.. . . generalized grievances about
the conduct of government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 106, 88
S. Ct., at 1956.24
If standing was found, then the Court still might refuse to reach the
merits finding that the issue is a political question because such a case
would present either, in the Court's words-
24. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 752, 764 (1982). Another varia-
tion on the standing theme relates to the requirement that the judicial resolution
of the constitutional issue will produce the relief desired by the plaintiff. See
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973). Imposing a duty on our
government to eliminate the threat of nuclear war would not eliminate the threat
from other countries, and indeed, some would contend, would only heighten the
likelihood of the apocalypse. One can hear Chairman Andropov paraphrasing
President Jackson: "The Court has made its decision. Let it enforce it."
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a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question. 5
Or, given the complexity of the issue and expertise required to appreci-
ate the nuances involved, the Court could invoke some variation of the
abstention doctrine. After all, in Horowitz, the Court admitted "courts
are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance."2 A
fortiori-nuclear weapons strategy! The Court has frequently mani-
fested deference to the Executive Branch in matters of national
security.
OL: But assuming, arguendo, that the Court would hear the case, why
wouldn't the Justices agree that there is a constitutional duty based on
the fundamental right of survival.
JP: Frankly, I don't think the predicate exists for establishing such a
right. Consider the length of time and number of incremental steps in-
volved in the evolution of constitutional rights of privacy28 and inter-
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974). The Court would probably apply the same
doctrine to arguments of invalid delegation of legislative power to the executive
in the area of foreign affairs and national security. Given the temporal proximity
to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) of Pan-
ama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), it appears the Court has assumed that even
if the delegation doctrine was applicable in other contexts, it would not apply in
the area of foreign affairs. Of course, more recently the Court has upheld ex-
tremely broad delegations of legislative authority. See, e.g., Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
26. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-07 (1974); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
28. For discussion see Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
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state travel.2 9 And the right of procreation you mentioned is considered
as "among the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitu-
tion."30 By the way, the right to vote in state elections is not a funda-
mental right. The Court on numerous occasions has indicated that the
federal Constitution "does not confer the right of suffrage upon any
one." '3 1 Of course, where the state does grant the right to vote, it must
do so on an equal basis. 2 The Court applies a strict scrutiny test in
such circumstances because it views the franchise once granted, as
"preservative of all [other] rights."' 33
OL: But I recall that the Court actually stated in Yick Wo that the
political franchise of voting is "a fundamental right because preserva-
tive of all rights" and in 1964 in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court reaf-
firmed the same idea, stating:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise
L. REV. 193 (1890); Note, The Right to Privacy Today, 43 HARV. L. REV. 297
(1929); Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1937); Nizer, The
Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526
(1941); Feinberg, Recent Development in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L.
REV. 713 (1948). The Court's discussion of judicial antecedents appears in the
various opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A similar in-
cremental sequence occurred in the development of the fundamental right to
marry. See Zablocki v. R&dhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978). Concerning the
development of the fundamental right of personal choice in matters of family
life, see Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
29. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. Cal-
ifornia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
30. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.76 (1973).
31. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875), quoted with
approval in Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct.
2194, 2199 (1982). In Rodriguez, the Court observed that "the right to vote, per
se, is not a constitutionally protected right." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
32. Of course the same is true of the right to an appeal. See Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In situations abridging rights which where
granted are subject to heightened analysis, the Court often requires that the
right be absolutely denied to justify relief. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974); Plyler v. Doe, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
33. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized."'
Isn't this true of the right to survive? After all, if we cease to exist, no
rights-voting, expression, etc.-are preserved. And given this, why not
an implied constitutional duty to eliminate the threat to survival
now-since it is absurd to wait until our extinction is certain to occur.3 5
JP: Your analysis might apply in cases where the state grants a right
not naturally held by its citizens and where there is a nexus between
that right and exercise of other constitutional rights. The Court re-
cently has gone one step further, holding that deprivation of access to a
basic education (also not a fundamental right) in certain contexts, is
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny." But there, as in the case of
voting, a substantive nexus was found between the right granted and
other explicit rights in the Constitution---e.g., freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment. There simply is no substantive
connection between your proposed right of survival and any existing
constitutional rights. Further, your existence is not granted by the
State, but is acquired through natural processes beyond the control of
the State.37 Aren't we back to a natural law argument?38
34. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). See also Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
35. In another context, less fraught with an imminent threat to national
security, the Court adopted the gravity of the evil test, which mutatis mutandis,
appears applicable here. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
This test was most recently used by Justice Burger in Nebraska Press Assn. v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
36. Where children of aliens unlawfully present in the United States were
absolutely denied access to public education, the Court in Plyler v. Doe, - U.S.
, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) appears to apply the middle level review utilized in
gender discrimination, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, - U.S. ... , 102 S.Ct. 3331 (1982), and illegitimacy-
legitimacy classifications. Mills v. Habluetzel, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 1549
(1982).
37. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. Of course, in earlier times incorporation of natural law into our juris-
prudence was not unusual. See generally Corwin, The "'Higher Law" Back-
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OL: I suggest that there is a clear nexus to the explicit guarantee of a
right to life, which cannot be taken without affording due process of
law. Further, life cannot be taken in a manner that violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments. The
Court has held invalid imposition of capital punishment on a robber,
even when he is present at a roblbery where a murder is committed,
since robbery is not a crime "so grievous an affront to humanity that
the only' response may be the penalty of death."3 9 We bave not even
committed a crime. Where is our due process? Isn't imposition of ex-
tinction cruel and unusual? Isn't the psychological torment of a nuclear
sword of Damocles itself a cruel and unusual punishment?
JP: The short of it is that the state is not imposing any punishment on
anyone. All the provisions you cite were not designed to protect survival
of the species. The Court's resolution of the arguments you raise is
adumbrated in its opinion in the student paddling (beating) case hold-
ing the Eighth Amendment not applicable.
The prisoner and the school child stand in wholly different circum-
stances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and in-
carceration. The prisoner's conviction entitles the State to classify
him as a "criminal," and his incarceration deprives him of the free-
dom "to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). 40
I think you can see the difference. It's like the black citizen subjected
to the existence of a racially segregated park (unconstitutional),' 41 as
ground of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928), 42
HARV. L. REV. 365 (1929). This is no longer fashionable. Today "no one wants
to be called a natural lawyer. Natural law insists that what the law is depends in
some way on what the law should be. This seems metaphysical or at least
vaguely religious. In any case it seems plainly wrong." Dworkin, "Natural" Law
Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
39. Enmund v. Florida, - U.S. _ 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3377 (1982) (quot-
ing from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976)). See also Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
40. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977).
41. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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opposed to having no park at all (constitutional).42 But even if I were to
agree that there was a fundamental right somehow involved, and a con-
comitant duty to eliminate a threat to our individual and collective ex-
istence, that would at best only impose a standard of strict scrutiny.
This is not an absolute and automatic test invalidating government ac-
tion or inaction. And in every instance where the state considers its
very existence in peril, the Court has found a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to justify subordination of any right pro-
posed-whether under the First Amendment, 43 privacy44 or even the
right not to be subjected to invidious racial classifications subsumed
within the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.45 As a noted
constitutional scholar has concluded: "The Court has never ruled
against the state in any matter of consequence. '46
And so, my friend, our conclusion is that the Court will not involve
42. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
43. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). A national
security interest can justify even a prior restraint. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is interesting that the Court in
Roe cited favorably Jacobson and Bell:
[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted ... that one has an unlim-
ited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to
the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The
Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 49 L. Ed. 643, 255 S. Ct. 358
(1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 71 L. Ed. 1000, 47 S.
Ct. 584 (1927) (sterilization).
410 U.S. at 154.
45. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits invidious discrimi-
nation. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Accordingly, strict scrutiny is
applied where racial classifications are employed-a doctrine that also was developed
only incrementally over a considerable period of time. See Powell, Carolene Products
Revisited, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972). Even so, the Court justified severe restrictions on the rights of citizens
of Japanese ancestry during World War II based on "pressing public necessity" and
"the military urgency of the situation." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216, 223 (1944).
46. A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP 194 (1981).
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itself in this dispute. This choice is really ours to make. The bottom
line is eloquently expressed by Jonathan Schell:
One day-and it is hard to believe that it will not be soon-we will
make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it
all or, as I trust and believe, we will awaken to the truth of our
peril, a truth as great as life itself, and, like a person who has swal-
lowed a lethal poison but shakes off his stupor at the last moment
and vomits the poison up, we will break through the layers of our
denials, put aside our fainthearted excuses, and rise up to cleanse
the earth of nuclear weapons.47
47. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 231 (1982).
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Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law
Arthur S. Miller*
Introduction
The time has come for lawyers to confront the question of whether
nuclear weapons-their manufacture, deployment, and use-can be
justified under either constitutional or international law. Since the ex-
plosions of primitive atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945
it has been assumed, without much thought, that there is nothing un-
lawful about those weapons. This paper is a preliminary statement that
suggests the contrary. It is predicated on two observations of Alfred
North Whitehead: "The doctrines which best repay critical examina-
tions are those which for the longest period have remained unques-
tioned;" 1 and "almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of fool-
ishness when they are first presented."2 What follows is a brief outline
in which I contend that it is not really foolish for law and lawyers to
contribute to the growing debate about nuclear war.
People throughout the world live today under the threat of a nu-
clear arms "race" that is madly out of control. That peril has at long
last-almost forty years after the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki-percolated into the thinking of growing numbers of men
and women who have swelled into a spontaneous popular movement
against the ultimate danger. Their motivations, as perceived by Ambas-
sador George Kennan, include:
* Leo Goodwin, Sr., Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Center for the
Study of Law, Nova University; Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington Uni-
versity. This essay is based on the author's work in progress, a book tentatively entitled
GETTING THERE FROM HERE: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FOR A SUSTAINABLE
SOCIETY.
1. Whitehead, as quoted in Miller, A Note on the Criticism of Supreme Court
Decisions, 10 J. PUB. L. 139 (1961).
2. Whitehead, as quoted in A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS
OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT 262 (1959) (paperback ed. 1967).
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a growing appreciation by many people of the true horrors of a
nuclear war; a determination not to see their children deprived of
life, or their civilization destroyed, by a holocaust of this nature;
and finally . ., a very real exasperation with their governments
for the rigidity and traditionalism that cause those governments to
ignore the fundamental distinction between conventional weapons
and weapons of mass destruction and prevents them from finding,
or even seriously seeking, ways of escape from the fearful trap into
which the cultivation of nuclear weapons is leading us.3
Members of the clergy, physicians, scientists, and businessmen have
grasped and sought to show to others the meaning of nuclear war.
With rare exceptions, lawyers until very recent times have been
mute. They have assumed, if they thought about it, that nuclear weap-
ons are just another means of killing-a bit more powerful but not es-
sentially different from the long bow, the machine gun, the tank, and
the airplane. That assumption is simply not accurate.
Some lawyers, mainly those in international law, have begun to
challenge the assumption of legality of nuclear weaponry. The Lawyers
Committee on Nuclear Policy has recently been formed, with head-
quarters in New York City. The Committee's position is that nuclear
weapons are incompatible "with the core precepts of international
law." 4 The Committee believes that "nuclear warfare would lead to re-
sults incompatible with fundamental rules of international law, elemen-
tary morality, and contrary to any rational conception of national inter-
est and world order. . . . The very nature of nuclear warfare is
destructive of all the values which law obligates us to preserve." 5
3. Kennan, On Nuclear War, THE N.Y. REVIEW, Jan. 21, 1982, at 8. See Mo-
lander, How I Learned to Start Worrying About Nukes, Manchester Guardian
Weekly, April 4, 1982, at 17 (reprint from the Washington Post). For the view of
physicians, see Kerzner, The Last Epidemic, Miami Herald, March 7, 1982, at El, col.
1 where it states, "Nuclear war could be the last epidemic our civilization will know.
Hundreds of millions of people would be killed or injured, and the economic, ecological
and social fabric on which human life depends would be shattered."
4. Weston, Clergy, Doctors, Business-and now the Lawyers, Des Moines Regis-
ter, March 27, 1982, at A9, col. 1. Professor Weston of the University of Iowa quotes
Chicago banker Ervin Salk to the effect that the nuclear arms race "is tearing the guts
out of our economy just like Vietnam did."
5. LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR POLICY, STATEMENT ON THE ILLEGALITY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7 (undated). The Committee's purpose is to initiate a dialogue
22
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No one has yet asked the constitutional question: Does the manu-
facture, deployment, and "possible-even probable-use of nuclear
weapons contravene the Constitution? This paper is a preliminary in-
quiry into that question. It is an outline, presenting possible constitu-
tional arguments, rather than a full-dress exposition. In the well-known
but little heeded words of Albert Einstein, "the unleashed power of the
atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus
drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."' So we do: I contend in this
brief paper that the time has come-indeed, it is long past-to change
"our modes of thinking" about the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons.
My conclusion may be simply stated: An argument based on the
goal-seeking nature of constitutionalism, together with at least four
other constitutional arguments, invalidate the presumption of constitu-
tionality. These arguments will be discussed in detail later. This is not
to say that the Supreme Court would sustain these arguments, were a
case to be brought. Rather, it is to say that as a part of the dialogue
that is beginning about the legality of nuclear weapons the dimension
of constitutional law cannot be ignored-it is not enough to argue that
those weapons are incompatible with international law-as surely they
are.
At the outset, I readily concede the jurisprudential problem of
whether legal norms (rights) can exist absent a means of enforcement.
That, however, should not stay the inquiry into the relevance of consti-
tutional prescriptions to the nuclear threat. As long ago as 1803, in the
famous case of Marbury v. Madison7 that established the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review, Chief Justice John Marshall acknowl-
edged that Mr. Marbury was entitled to his commission as a justice of
the peace but went on to assert that there could be no judicial enforce-
ment of that right. Congress, Marshall held, had constitutionally erred
in trying to enlarge upon the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, until recent decades, a number of now-recognized
regarding the legitimacy of nuclear weapons under international law. (The present es-
say seeks to expand that focus to encompass constitutional law.) The Committee's ad-
dress is 777 United Nations Plaza (5th Floor), New York, N.Y. 10017. (In the inter-
ests of disclosure, I am a member of the Consultative Council of the Committee.)
6. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 188 (1982).
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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constitutional rights such as the right to privacy, one person/one vote,
and racial desegregation were not given judicial cognizance. The his-
tory of American constitutional law is one of an expanding number of
rights brought into being, in one way or another, by the Supreme Court
or other constitutional decisionmakers. In philosophic terms,
law-including constitutional law-has always been instrumental.
Rather than being a fixed body of pre-existing immutable principles, it
is goal-seeking, purposive-a type of human activity that exists for
identifiable ends. In addition, constitutional law has been and is relative
to circumstances. Necessity is the mother of constitutional law which is
constantly in a state of "becoming. '"8
More than 40,000 nuclear weapons now exist, and more are being
produced each week. Russia has enough to wipe out every American
city of 1500 or more people. The United States has an even larger
stockpile. And nuclear capacity is proliferating. France, Great Britain,
India, China, for certain, and Israel, South Africa and perhaps Brazil
also have significant nuclear weaponry. Enough "overkill" already ex-
ists in amounts sufficient to vaporize every living human being on earth
today. And yet political officers in the world's capitals continue a mad
"race" for supremacy.
This essay is emphatically not a plea for unilateral disarmament.
We live in a Hobbesian world, a condition not at all likely to change.
The essence of my argument is that those who wield both formal au-
thority and effective control in the American constitutional order have
a duty to take action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat through-
out the world. The duty, I maintain, is of constitutional dimension. The
ultimate goal has been stated recently by Billy Graham as the elimina-
tion of every weapon of mass destruction in the world.
The Philosophical Basis of Constitutionalism
The text of the ensuing discussion comes from Justice Felix Frank-
furter and the French legal philosopher, Leon Duguit. Said Frankfurter
in 1949: "It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its
8. For discussion, see A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT
CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981); A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL Ac-
TIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
24 Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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standards of what is deemed reasonable and right."9 Said Duguit in
1919: "Any system of public law can be vital only so far as it is based
on a given sanction to the following rules: First, the holders of power
cannot do certain things; second, there are certain things they must
do."10
This, then, is an exercise in American constitutionalism. As a con-
cept, constitutionalism has usually had, at least in the United States, a
normative connotation, as witness the following definitions. "Constitu-
tionalism," Friedrich Hayek maintains,
means that all power rests on the understanding that it will be ex-
ercised in accordance with commonly accepted principles, that the
persons on whom power is conferred are selected because it is
thought that they are most likely to do what is right, not in order
that whatever they do should be right."
To Daniel Bell it is "the common respect for the framework of law, and
acceptance of outcomes under due process."1 2 Walter F. Murphy main-
tains that "[t]he fundamental value that constitutionalism protects is
human dignity." ' And to Charles McIlwain "constitutionalism has one
essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government."14 In sum, con-
stitutionalism in America is more than a process-more than procedure
alone-but has a substantive, normative, content looking toward the
responsibility, as McIlwain put it, of government to the governed.
James Madison said it well in The Federalist No. 51: "In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."15
As "officers of the courts" lawyers have a quasi-governmental sta-
9. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
10. L. DUGUIT, LAw IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski trans. 1919).
11. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 181 (1960).
12. Bell, The End of American Exceptionalism, 41 PUB. INTEREST 193 (1975).
13. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 758
(1980).
14. C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 21 (rev. ed.
1947). Mcllwain also said: "All constitutional government is by definition limited gov-
ernment." Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tus. As such, they should no longer remain on the sidelines, taking no
action to seek and, one hopes, to find what Kennan calls "ways of es-
cape." 16 The full force of law, feeble though it may be, should be
brought to bear upon the growing peril. Law, to be sure, has shortcom-
ings as a principle of social order. It cannot do everything; there are
limits to its effectiveness in changing either the attitudes or behavior of
people. But that does not mean that the effort should not be made.
Chief Justice Earl Warren once remarked that "law floats in a sea of
ethics."117 So it does: law can be a powerful educational force that will
create the climate so necessary to move away from the abyss.
A persuasive case can be made for the proposition that nuclear
weapons should be considered to be unlawful under both international
law and constitutional law. Since law is instrumental, and a reflection
of the circumstances in which it exists, the nuclear peril presents it
with a challenge and an opportunity. In the United States, the ultimate
purpose of law is human survival under conditions that allow human
dignity to be maximized. In familiar legal terms, nuclear weapons are a
clear and present danger both to survival and especially to achievement
of human dignity. Senator J. W. Fulbright, then chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, stated the point in 1967 in these
well-chosen words: The President, he said,
by acquiring the authority to commit the country to war, now exer-
cises something approaching absolute power over the life or death
of every American-to say nothing of millions of other people all
over the world. . . . No human being or group [is] wise and com-
petent enough to be entrusted with such vast power. Plenary pow-
ers in the hand of any man or group threatens all other men with
tyranny or disaster. 18
So it does-whether such a power resides in the Kremlin or the White
House. The well-known statement of military scientist Karl von Clause-
16. See Kennan, supra note 3, at 8.
17. Address by Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
at the Louis Marshall Award Dinner of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America
in New York City (Nov. 11, 1962).
18. Fried, War-Exclusive and War-Inclusive Style in International Conduct, 11
TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 26 (1976) (quoting from S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1,
26 (1967)).
7:19821
29
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law
7:1982
witz, that "war is diplomacy carried on by other means,"1 9 may well
have been accurate when made early in the nineteenth century; but it
no longer is. Unleashing the atom invalidated it.
Nuclear war cannot by any criterion be "deemed reasonable and
right"--to use Justice Frankfurter's words. Not for the United States.
Not for the Soviet Union. Nor for any nation. International law merges
with constitutional law to proscribe use of such weapons. Once that is
seen, afortiori their manufacture and deployment are also outlawed.
Constitutional Challenges to Nuclear Weapons: The Goals of
the Preamble
The purposive-goal-seeking-dimension of constitutionalism sug-
gests this argument: the preamble to the Constitution states the ends of
government--"to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the gen-
eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity." Nuclear weapons and the delicate balance of terror jeopard-
ize each of those goals; and nuclear war would eradicate them. Surely
the framers could not have contemplated such a consequence either for
themselves or their posterity.
We are that posterity. The time has come to think seriously about
giving substantive content to the preamble. Strictly speaking, to be
sure, the preamble is not part of the Constitution. It precedes it. The
preamble has never been held to sustain a specific claim of governmen-
tal power or of private right. As Justice Joseph Story said in his Com-
mentaries, "Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and ap-
plication of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not
substantively to create them."20 In other words, the preamble sets the
tone for the meanings to be given to the specific provisions of the Docu-
ment of 1787.
Those meanings, first, should be derived from a correct apprecia-
tion of present conditions and with the avowed goal of meeting current
problems. To quote Chief Justice Marshall's well-known words in Mc-
19. K. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR - (J. Graham trans., F. Maude ed. 1968).
20. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION bk. 3, § 462, at 361 (5th
ed. 1981) (1st ed. 1833).
27 1
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Culloch v. Maryland, "The subject is the execution of those great pow-
ers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. . . .This pro-
vision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 'crises' of human af-
fairs. '21 The import of that statement, the most important ever uttered
on the theory of constitutional interpretation, is clear: The Constitution
may validly be considered to be a tacit delegation of power by the
framers to enable succeeding generations of Americans to write their
own fundamental law-to meet, that is, the exigencies of their-not
the framers'-times.
The Constitution was drafted for the benefit of "ourselves and our
posterity." Since nuclear weapons threaten the goals of the preamble,
the meaning is that there will be no posterity left to pick up the pieces
after the bombs have exploded. Not only will the constitutional order
have vanished, but quite possibly civilization itself. No one can validly
argue that threatening the very existence of "posterity" can be consti-
tutional. Posterity has its claims under the Constitution. That is partic-
ularly true because the rapid rate of social change, brought about by
the scientific-technological revolution, means that most people alive to-
day will be their own posterity. (Those who ask, "what has posterity
done for me?", should constantly keep in mind that they are their own
posterity.)
I do not suggest, of course, that in and of itself the preamble can
be invoked to persuade anyone that nuclear weapons are unconstitu-
tional per se. However, the preamble does provide an initial entry point
into a more detailed and more specific analysis. The implication here is
that, as William Seward once said, "there is a higher law than the
Constitution"; or as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Fletcher v. Peck,22
Georgia's attempt to revoke a fraudulent land grant disregarded "cer-
tain great principles of natural justice. '2 Therefore, Georgia was re-
strained "either by general principles which are common to our free
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 216, 421 (1819). See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 2 (A. Chase & C. Ducat 13th ed. 1973) where it states,
"the Constitution. . .should be interpreted in the light of present conditions and with
a view to meeting present problems."
22. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
23. Id. at 133.
!
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institutions, or by the particular provisions of the Constitution. 24 Mar-
shall's colleague, Justice William Johnson, went even further, asserting
that "a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a princi-
ple which will impose laws even on the deity"2 5 invalidated the at-
tempted rescission. In sum, can a principle of natural justice-a con-
cept that has greater currency in Great Britain-be employed to
determine the validity of nuclear weapons? The answer can only be
"yes." In the language of the famous "Martens Clause" of the fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, when no treaty provision specifically for-
bids a new tactic or weapon, combatants and non-combatants remain
nonetheless protected by legal principles derived "from the usages es-
tablished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience. '"28
Without going further into the complex question of natural justice,
what particular provisions of the Constitution are conceivably relevant
to the nuclear weapons situation? I suggest the following, each of
which would require creativity or innovation by a constitutional deci-
sion-maker. The points are listed as questions requiring exploration, not
as established doctrines. Taken together, however, they point in only
one direction: the illegality of nuclear weapons.
The Congressional War Power
First: Can Congress delegate, tacitly or expressly, its war-making
power? That there has been a tacit delegation to the President admits
of no doubt (as Senator Fulbright said). It is even possible to perceive
an express delegation in the War Powers Resolution of 1973, enacted
into law over President Richard Nixon's veto, which ironically was in-
tended to place limits over presidential power.2¢
Presidents beginning with George Washington have unilaterally
employed -violence. All of those instances, however, save perhaps for
24. Id. at 139.
25. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
26. 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309 (L. Friedman ed.
1972); R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 15 (Occasional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program, Center
of International Studies, Princeton University (1981)).
27. See Fried, supra note 18.
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President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, were for limited
goals. They were taken in accordance with the Principle of the Econ-
omy of Means: just enough violence to meet the situation adequately.28
That Principle is simply not applicable in the age of nuclear warfare.
By definition, use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited. Once em-
ployed, sooner or later the conflict will escalate into all-out war. The
meaning for present purposes is that it is one thing for a President to
use limited violence, but that it is quite another thing for the Chief
Executive to have absolute power of life and death in the nuclear age.
Insofar as there is a constitutional doctrine about delegation of legisla-
tive powers, certainly it does not extend to the power to threaten civili-
zation itself.
During the Civil War, the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases2"
sustained Lincoln's actions to meet the emergency: "The President was
bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for
Congress to baptize it with a name, and no name given to it by him or
them could change the fact."30 (What the Court did not say was that
Lincoln made absolutely no attempt to call Congress into session to
consider a response to Fort Sumter's hostilities; in fact, he waited al-
most three months-from April until July-before formally telling
Congress what was going on.) The most that can be said for the deci-
sion in the Prize Cases is that the Supreme Court came close to being
an arm of the Executive. That decision, furthermore, at best stands for
the proposition that a President can respond to emergency situations.
By no means does it mean that the President can commence a war.
First-strike use of nuclear weapons should, as former high officials
Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Gerard Smith and George Ken-
nan recently argued in Foreign Affairs, be dropped as a policy option.31
The so-called doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, taken pursuant
to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, was cited by American
lawyers during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (wrongly, in my judg-
ment). That episode is proof positive about the enormity of Congress
28. For discussion, see A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT
CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981).
29. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
30. Id. at 699.
31. McNamara, Bundy, Smith & Kennan, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance, 60 FOREIGN Arr. 753 (Spring 1982).
30 Nova Law Journal
7:19821
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allowing one man to have the power to eliminate human life. Clearly,
the framers did not want the wealth and blood of the nation to be com-
mitted by one person (as The Federalist No. 69 evidences)-even in a
day before the invention of such conventional weapons as the machine
gun and the tank! During the 1787 Convention, Elbridge Gerry re-
marked that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to em-
power the President alone to declare war."32
We deal, however, with one of the greatest silences of the Consti-
tution; the principle of constitutional reason of State (raison d'etat),
defined as "the doctrine that whatever is required to insure the survival
of the State must be done by the individuals responsible for it, no mat-
ter how repugnant such an act may be to them in their private capacity
as decent and moral men. '13 3 Political officers of American government
have never hesitated to employ that principle-to invoke a constitu-
tional silence-both in external and wholly domestic matter, when they
believed that conditions warranted. Franz Neumann put it well:
No society in recorded history has ever been able to dispense with
political power. This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as
true of laissez faire as of an interventionist state. No greater disser-
vice has been rendered to political science than the statement that
the liberal state was a "weak" state. It was precisely as strong as it
needed to be in the circumstances. It acquired substantial colonial
empires, waged wars, held down internal disorders, and stabilized
itself over long periods of time.34
Neumann surely was correct on the historical record. Said another
way, the Constitution has never been a barrier to what those who wield
effective control over governmental actions wanted to do.
Circumstances have changed so radically since 1787, and even
since the first primitive atom bombs were exploded in 1945, that old
practices and old modes of thinking about constitutional propriety must
be re-examined. New doctrine must be discovered: The government
32. 2 M. FARRAND: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
318 (1911).
33. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 4-5 (1957).
34. F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 8 (1957).
See Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MiNN. L.
REv. 585 (1980).
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/16
132 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
must be obliged, as Madison said, to control itself.3 5
The Bill of Rights was a conscious attempt to resolve the dilemma
that raison d'etat presented to policy-makers. The first ten amendments
were inserted for the people's security, to counterbalance extravagant
claims of State security. The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were
not naive. They knew history and they knew the dark side of man.
They opted to make "reasons of freedom and of personal security" ex-
plicit, leaving "reason of state" unexpressed. Nuclear warfare means
that both personal and national security are threatened; neither can
long exist while nuclear weapons proliferate. To permit the President
alone to have the power to trigger thermonuclear war is contrary both
to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The failure of Congress
to retrieve its war-making authority can no longer be tolerated. In fact,
the power to commit the nation to nuclear war is not only presidential;
it has actually been delegated to subordinate officers-and on a number
of occasions to the vagaries of a computer interpreting radar messages.
That is an intolerable situation.
The Congressional Power to Punish Offenses
Second: Can Congress neglect to exercise a delegated power? We
have already mentioned the war-making power. Under article I, section
8, clause 10 of the Constitution, Congress has power to punish offenses
against "the law of nations." In his famous Commentaries on Ameri-
can Law, Chancellor Kent wrote in 1826:
"When the United States ceased to be a part of the British empire,
and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became
subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and custom
had established among civilized nations of Europe, as their public
law .... The faithful observance of this law is essential to na-
tional character. ... 6
If, then, it can be shown that international law makes nuclear
weaponry illegal, a duty is imposed upon the United States (and other
nations) to adhere to that principle.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
36. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1826).
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The argument would go like this: Congress having been delegated
the power to define and punish offenses against international law, has a
duty to carry out that power. In United States v. Arjona,37 the Su-
preme Court said that international law places a duty on every govern-
ment to prevent a wrong being done within its borders to another na-
tion with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof. That of course is
scant legal authority, as lawyers understand authority, to sustain an
argument that Congress has a duty to determine the state of interna-
tional legal norms concerning nuclear warfare and act in pursuance
thereof. But the Arjona decision does provide a point of entry into a
systematic inquiry into the problem. Richard Falk and colleagues have
concluded in their monograph Nuclear Weapons and International
Law that "any threat or contemplated use of nuclear weapons is con-
trary to the dictates of international law and constitutes a crime of
state."3 8 If that be so, then the duty that American government has, in
all of its branches, becomes clear: to take action to help prevent that
"crime of state." As the United Nations has repeatedly said, the threat
or use of nuclear weapons is a "crime against mankind and
civilization. 39
The Constitution and International Law
Third: Is international law a part of the corpus of "laws" that the
President must faithfully execute (pursuant to Article II of the Consti-
tution)? No one has ever fully explicated the meaning of the word
"laws". Usually it is thought of as Congressional statutes. Arguably,
however, it has a wider compass. For example, in recent years the Su-
preme Court has maintained, successfully, that its decisions are the law
37. 120 U.S. 479 (1887). The Arjona principle was employed by the Supreme
Court to hold that Congress may set up a military commission "as it had previously
existed in United States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of war." In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Compare A. REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL
YAmASHITA (1949) with T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY (1970).
38. See supra note 26, at 60.
39. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961).
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of the land4°--thus presenting the question of whether the President
has a constitutional duty to faithfully execute them. That question is
not only unanswered in constitutional theory; it is little discussed in the
scholarly literature. If, however, the Supreme Court is correct in its
perception of the thrust of its decisions, then the word "laws" must
include more than Congressional enactments. If that is so for the Su-
preme Court, it requires no large mental jump to say the same for
norms of "the law of nations."
Imposing duties upon the President is such a new concept that
very few judicial decisions are apposite. Since Mississippi v. Johnson,"1
it was thought that the writ of courts did not run against the Chief
Executive. That, however, changed in 1974 when President Nixon was
required to relinquish the infamous White House tapes.42 Lawsuits
against the President have become, if not routine, then certainly not
rare.43 (Even so, litigants tend to hale subordinate executive officers
into court, rather than the Chief Executive--as, for example, in the
Iranian Hostage Case."
A concept of constitutional duty is slowly being developed in
American constitutional law. Since Cooper v. Aaron,5 the Justices
have maintained that their decisions are "the law of the land." The
Justices have more than an umpire's function, as Justice William Bren-
nan noted:
Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own
sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government. While in-
dividual cases turn upon controversies between parties, or involve
particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical
40. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
42. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
43. E.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Goldwater v. Carter, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded,
444 U.S. 996 (1979). See generally STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT IDENTIFYING COURT PROCEEDINGS AND ACTIONS OF
VITAL INTEREST TO THE CONGRESS 11 (Comm. Print 1981).
44. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Regan is the current Sec-
retary of the Treasury). See Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by
a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1104 (1982).
45. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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consequences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of construing and
securing constitutional rights ...
The interpretation and application of constitutional and statu-
tory law, while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is
subject to special constraints and informed by unique considera-
tions. Guided and confined by the Constitution and pertinent stat-
utes, judges are obliged to be discerning, to exercise judgment, and
to prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges wield considerable au-
thority to formulate legal policy in designated areas.4"
My suggestion is that Supreme Court Justices should grasp the nettle
and point out to the Executive and the Congress that officials in those
branches are charged with a constitutional duty to take action to elimi-
nate threats to the lives, liberties, and properties of the citizenry. Those
threats emanate from nuclear weaponry.
The Affirmative Duties of the Federal Government
Fourth: That suggestion of a pervasive governmental duty runs not
only to the express provision that the President must faithfully execute
the laws but to Congress as well to define and deal with the law of
nations and also to the Supreme Court-to make international legal
norms judicially cognizable. Of even more importance, a due process
question is presented: Does due process of law have a third dimen-
sion-in addition to its procedural and substative aspects-that places
affirmative duties upon the federal government?
The answer can only be "yes." Some Supreme Court decisions
point in that direction. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish"" for exam-
ple, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the Court that "the
liberty safeguarded. . .(by the Constitution) is liberty in a social or-
ganization which requires the protection of law against the evils which
menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.148 That
statement seems to fit the nuclear weapons situation exactly. And in
46. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 & n.20 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
47. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
48. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
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Green v. County School Board of Kent,49 the court held that local
school boards were "charged with the affirmative duty"50 to integrate
public schools. Professor Thomas Emerson has argued that the first
amendment has an affirmative dimension.5 1 The point is that American
constitutional law should include not only what governments can and
cannot do but also, as Duguit said, 52 what they must do if constitution-
alism is to survive; and there is precedent for that conclusion.
The argument, in sum, is that the Constitution imposes duties and
obligations upon government to control itself-and thus to protect the
citizenry. Those obligations run to the American people-the "We, the
people . . ." of the preamble. They can be inferred from the Constitu-
tion itself, from certain statutes, and from some Supreme Court deci-
sions. The emergent duty that should be recognized is for government
officers not to take actions that jeopardize the well-being of the popu-
lace, or the well-being of "posterity," or indeed, the well-being of peo-
ples of other nations. Nuclear weapons so endanger the lives, liberties,
and property of all Americans that they should be considered to be a
deprivation contrary to due process.
Conclusion
It would be naive to expect the Supreme Court to intervene in
matters such as are discussed above. In general, judges are timorous
officers of government. They look upon requests to go beyond the famil-
iar and the expected as "frightful occasions."53 Judges, however, are
not the only guardians of the Constitution. Their reluctance should not
foreclose a growing dialogue about the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons. Constitutional lawyers and political scientists can no longer
remain aloof from the ultimate terror. Political means must be invented
by which "the world can peacefully settle the issues that throughout
49. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
50. Id. at 437.
51. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795
(1981).
52. See supra note 10.
53. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964), particularly at 101-02. See also J. STONE,
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (1966).
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history it has settled by war.'" That is the challenge that nuclear
weapons presents to the constitutional lawyer. No more important task
exists.
54. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE.EARTH 227 (1982).
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Protecting Posterity
Aviam Soifer*
Professor Arthur S. Miller, a master of the genre of creative con-
stitutionalism, contributes an impressive example in his article, Nuclear
Weapons and Constitutional Law. He advances several provocative ar-
guments for possible constitutional limits on United States participa-
tion in the nuclear arms race; these arguments, undoubtedly, will stim-
ulate much thought and development-unless a nuclear catastrophe
intervenes.
Miller identifies a particular kind of complacency or cynicism
among lawyers that allows many of us to assume that nuclear weapons
simply are more powerful ways to kill people. It is surely important to
challenge this assumption. On a more basic level, the threat of nuclear
disaster invites all citizens-not merely lawyers and judges-to con-
sider and to construe the text and meaning of the United States
Constitution.
Law unquestionably serves as a secular religion in our democracy1
and de Tocqueville's recognition that important political issues tend to
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This sketch is dedicated to
my son Raphael Moshe. In one year he already has given his parents much to consider
and to hope for the future. I would also like to express gratitude to the W.K. Kellogg
Foundation. A Kellogg National Fellowship allowed me time to read and think about
the issues explored below.
1. See generally C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
170-88 (1969); M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 442-43 (1957); Corwin, The
Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1071 (1936); T.
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 59-71 (1935) and Llewellyn, The Constitu-
tion as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). Of course, much of Arthur S.
Miller's impressive output is also directly on point.
As a young man, Abraham Lincoln urged other young men of Springfield, Illinois
to let reverence for law "become the political religion of the nation. . . ." R. HOF-
STADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 103 (1948). Alexis de Tocqueville,
writing at the same time, but with a bit less reverence, called law in England and
America "an occult science." A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 287 (P.
Bradley ed. 1945).
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end up in court is even more accurate today.' Our survival and that of
our constitutional faith may depend on our willingness to consider the
nexus between constitutional values and protecting our posterity.
In the past, slavery, civil rights and, more recently, abortion were
the kinds of issues important enough to provoke many people to supple-
ment the views of lawyers with their own constitutional judgments. To
the horror of many of those learned in the law, precedential baggage
has sometimes been jettisoned in the process. In trying times, judges
and their colleagues sometimes behave more like strict constrictionists
than strict constructionists.
Realistically, of course, no one today should entertain the notion
that a legal challenge to the United States' role in the spread of nu-
clear weapons is likely to produce an enthusiastic response from the
United States Supreme Court. Yet the threat of nuclear conflagration
might be just the type of issue to move citizens to seek connections
between constitutional language and contemporary values.
Just as it would be a mistake to leave constitutional values entirely
to those with legal training, it would also be unwise to ignore the rele-
vance of constitutional language and structure to such a debate.
Plainly, as Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott decision tragically demon-
strated,3 there are difficulties and dangers in constitutionalizing debate
over public issues. But if the Constitution is relevant to such a debate,
attention must be paid.
Miller's article suggests two different kinds of expansive interpre-
tation of constitutional language. The first, more formal type concerns
his arguments for the binding nature of international law and for the
possible invocation of the non-delegation doctrine, which constitution-
ally limits the extent to which a branch of government may delegate its
powers. Both these lines of analysis involve important legal arguments
about the separation of powers in our national government. Miller is a
2. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 290. See also id. at 102-09. For an intro-
duction to the voluminous recent literature on the litigiousness of Americans, and our
propensity to resort to courtroom battles and judicial orders to resolve all manner of
disputes, see J. LIBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our
National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767 (1977).
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For a general discus-
sion of this case, its context and its consequences, see D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
SCOTT CASE (1978).
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leading constitutional law expert on this topic; his thoughts on the sub-
ject are surely worthy of consideration. I leave it to others to debate
how convincing Miller's specific arguments are.
What interests me more is Miller's second category of argument.
Here he suggests that the phrase in the Preamble to the United States
Constitution that concerns securing "the Blessing of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity" may be a meaningful-perhaps even a legally
enforceable - concept.
That the Preamble expresses a common theme is underscored
when one considers the context in which early state constitutions as
well as the federal document were composed and ratified. Those who
precipitated a Revolutionary War and established a nation on an inno-
vative constitutional scaffolding inteided federal and state governments
to provide for and protect not only themselves, but the generations to
follow. The influential Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, for ex-
ample, began with the following brave proclamation about equality and
the rights of men:
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.4
A Republican government was formed to secure the happiness and
safety of the founders and of their posterity. As Thomas Jefferson ar-
gued, the living hold the earth in usufruct for future generations.5 Each
4. 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (W.
Swindler ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Virginia retains this language as Article I of her
Bill of Rights.
5. Jefferson's assertion "that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living" appears
in his letter to James Madison, written September 6, 1789 but not mailed until January
9, 1790. That letter, and the exchange it provoked between Madison and Jefferson, is
discussed in illuminating fashion in A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON 62-96 (1950).
See also D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 179, 291 (1951). Jefferson
was sufficiently serious about the obligations of those living to those to follow that he
proposed specific legal contraints to guard against waste and other violations of the
natural law duty he believed to be owed by the present generation.
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generation is morally bound to preserve the inheritance of those to fol-
low. This concept of a responsibility to preserve the earth for the future
was a central tenet in the consciousness and the constitution-making of
the period. It does not take too much stretching across the intervening
two hundred years to see how the early hope and effort of the founders
to preserve and protect their political experiment for posterity is rele-
vant to the threat of nuclear catastrophe today. Provoked in a positive
sense by Miller's analysis, I now turn to an exploration of that idea,
which I will call constitutional protection of posterity. My discussion is
divided into three categories: Preamble, Protection, and Posterity.
Preamble
What legal weight should be accorded the Preamble to the Consti-
tution? This question has seldom been explored in American constitu-
tional law.' Like motherhood, the flag, and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the Preamble is honored more by invocation than by observance.
The language of the Preamble is generally relegated to misty patriotic
incantations - appropriate for introductions at political gatherings and
the socialization of immigrants, schoolchildren and the like, but not for
the hardheaded business of those trained in the law. But when debate
about constitutional text becomes particularly heated and spills out into
the streets, as it did in the context of antislavery agitation prior to the
Civil War, for example, citizens-in-the-street often begin to proclaim in
plain language their understanding of the Preamble.7 Indeed, this ten-
dency helps to explain why the Preamble figures so infrequently in the
constitutional discourse of judges, lawyers and legal scholars. If the
public may parse the Preamble, it begins to appear hopelessly and dan-
gerously open-ended.
The clear possibility of imminent nuclear danger is the appropriate
occasion for reconsideration of what constitutional weight the Preamble
should bear. A full exploration of the issue must await more time and
6. A suggestive recent exception appears in Black, A Round Trip to Eire: Two
Books on the Irish Constitution, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 391 (1981) Black's argu-
ment concerning application of the Ninth Amendment clearly relates to, and rein-
forces, the themes sketched in this essay.
7. See, e.g., W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977) and my review at 56 TEx. L. REV. 1319 (1978).
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space; however, Miller makes a significant start. Yet Miller may have
dismissed the legal importance of the Preamble a bit too quickly; he
also seems not to have weighed adequately the possibility of internally
inconsistent commands within the Preamble itself. Miller points to the
textual provision about securing the blessings of liberty not merely for
ourselves, but also for our posterity. He then quickly moves to a discus-
sion of the concept of natural justice. Thus Miller does not wrestle with
other language in the Preamble that commits our government "to pro-
vide for the common defence" and to "insure domestic Tranquility."
Those who would expand or maintain our nuclear arsenal could cer-
tainly argue that the task they have set for themselves is to carry out
those directives.
The possibility that both sides might invoke the Preamble in a con-
stitutional argument about nuclear weapons does not make it irrele-
vant. Internal contradition in the constitutional text is neither as silly
nor as strange as it might first appear. Indeed, the phenomenon of con-
flicting claims, all premised on constitutional language, is a frequent,
even prevalent mode of constitutional law argument. The possibility
that the Constitution itself contains inconsistent commands and con-
flicting rights and obligations is an idea not yet adequately explored. 8 A
reading of our constitutional history compels recognition of just such
problematic interpretations. It also forces those would construe the
Constitution's language to consider the structure as well as the words
of the document.
In many ways, the Preamble is the obvious place to begin. Its clear
indication of transgenerational concern should not be ignored. At a
minimum, the Preamble suggests that constitutional meaning should be
derived with an eye to the future as well as to the past. Brief considera-
tion of both the specific language and the structure of the Constitution,
as they pertain to the obligation of government to protect the populace,
illustrates my point that the Preamble suggests the Constitution should
be discussed as if posterity were eavesdropping.
8. For useful initial forays, see generally Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Con-
stitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978) and C. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
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Protection
Miller provides a summary of a few recent and controversial deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court which, taken together, sug-
gest an ill-defined constitutional right to privacy and autonomy. Such a
constitutional right, now generally conceded to be a right derived from
a revised or revisited idea of substantive due process,9 could conceiva-
bly be extended dramatically to encompass the family of man.
Such a concept of family exceeds the grand old American nuclear
family and even the extended family, whose vital role in the American
past was essential to the Court's decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.10 It is too grandiose a gambit, however, to leap from the
Court's groping efforts to define some right to intimate associations", to
a claim of constitutional contraints that may be invoked to promote
group survival.
This jump is troublesome for several reasons. First, most of the
Court's recent decisions are premised on a highly individualistic notion
of procreative and familial roles. Additionally, the "bad press" that
protection of intimate relationships received from the public as well as
from constitutional experts soon after its discovery by the Supreme
Court makes this particular constitutional claim a somewhat shaky
platform upon which to construct an edifice for constitutional
protections.
Finally, it is somewhat anomalous to premise an argument advo-
cating constitutional concern for future generations on decisions that
are particularly troublesome precisely because, in invalidating state
barriers to abortions, the Supreme Court appeared to ignore the future-
oriented claim that could be made on behalf of fetuses. This claim im-
plies that the fetus, more than the pregnant woman, is a direct link to
future generations; it alleges that the state, as surrogate for and protec-
tor of the fetus, best represents posterity.
Needless to say, the nexus between the fetus and the future has
9. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-04 (1977); Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
10. 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977).
11. The most thoughtful effort, generally to accept and to develop the implica-
tions of the new privacy may be found in Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
7:19821
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not been a central element of the debate swirling around abortion. But
such a connection might be a way to rethink, perhaps even to begin to
justify, some of the curious judicial line-drawing in the abortion deci-
sions, even as it suggests new difficulties in Roe v. Wade12 and its mis-
named "progeny."
The "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, though not mentioned by Miller, is perhaps more promising, in
part, because the meaning of that clause has scarcely ever been ex-
plored. The United States Supreme Court vitiated any discernible orig-
inal intent behind its words in the Slaughter-House Cases,13 which
narrowed this protection of the rights of citizens to redundancy and
oblivion. But the reasons for disuse of the privileges or immunities
clause since that 1873 decision go beyond the burden of distinguishing,
overruling or ignoring the Court's dubious initial interpretation. They
include the apparent limitation of the phrase to the protection of "citi-
zens" and not - as with other fourteenth amendment protections -
protection of" all persons. Existing judicial constructions of the seem-
ingly parallel privileges and immunities provision in Article IV of the
United States Constitution also complicate new interpretations of the
fourteenth amendment language. In recent years, however, a surprising
number of constitutional scholars of divergent ideologies have sug-
gested that the hour for privileges or immunities protection has come
round at last.1 4
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
14. See, e.g., Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: 'Its Hour Come
Round at Last,' 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30,
98 (1980). It may be worth noting that Professor Kurland's literary reference is to
William Butler Yeats's poem, The Second Coming, in which Yeats appears not entirely
sanguine about that vision. In fact, the poem may be read as somewhat prophetic on
the subject of nuclear annihilation. Perhaps Yeats suggests something emerging from
the apocalypse, but he writes of a time when
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 184 (De-
45 1
47
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
46 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
Although the idea that all citizens should share in the constitu-
tional privileges or immunities enjoyed by each citizen is provocative in
itself, it is even more so when future citizens are included in the consti-
tutional equation. Yet the Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immu-
nities clause was derived most immediately from the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. It is relatively clear that the men of the 39th Congress sought to
mandate government protection from grievous harms and to guarantee
rights they deemed essential to security.15 The notion that privileges or
immunities has something to do with freedom to choose the means of
individual survival, as well as the assurance of minimal personal and
group security, merits further attention.
Even more promising, I believe, is the argument that the constitu-
tional text and structure combine to impose a duty on government to
guarantee a certain threshold of security to all citizens. This interpreta-
tion, while connected to what I suggested about the Preamble, relies
primarily upon the package of constitutional amendments ratified in
the wake of the Civil War. Elsewhere, I have sought to demonstrate
that the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments intended to alter existing notions of federalism and to guarantee
a range of basic individual rights.1 They sought to narrow or to elimi-
nate the gap - starkly illustrated for most of them by constitutional
protection of slavery - between what they deemed to .be natural rights
not previously protected, and what the federal Constitution now should
and could protect.
Those who wrote, passed, and ratified this second Constitution
finitive ed. 1956). A "rough beast," with "gaze blank and pitiless as the sun," now
"Slouches toward Bethelehem to be born." After "twenty centuries of stony sleep...
vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle," it is this rough beast's hour which is now
"come round at last." Id.
15. For an elaboration of this theme, and its historical context, see Soifer, Pro-
tecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651
(1979); see also Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimi-
nation Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist
Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982). Raoul Berger's rather vehement response to
my article is in, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REv. 427 (1981). For
another recent statement of a viewpoint opposed to my own, see dictum concerning the
negative Constitution in Bowers v. DeVito, 51 U.S.L.W. 2163 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 1982)
(Posner, J.).
16. Soifer, supra note 15, at 686-96, 700-06.
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hoped that state governments would adequately protect the civil and
political rights the federal Constitution now established. By constitu-
tional amendment and by statute, they attempted to assure federal pro-
tection in the event that the states failed in their duty to guarantee
these newly-recognized rights. To those who sought to constitutionalize
the outcome of the Civil War, it was clear that allegiance to govern-
ment compelled a reciprocal governmental duty to protect basic rights.
As they articulated the promise of the second Constitution, they repeat-
edly included the safety and security of all inhabitants. If the states
failed in their obligation to protect those within their borders, it was
the federal government's duty to intervene to secure the basic rights of
all.
Too frequently, the lawyer's stock-in-trade is a tendency to focus
on a single word or phrase to construe a constitutional text. This tech-
nique often misses the central message of the constitutional medium.
Charles Black made this point convincingly years ago, and it has been
developed by several others since." A single example, derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment, will illustrate.
In recent years, and for very good reasons, we have devoted pri-
mary attention to the "equal" part of "equal protection." Many strug-
gled valiantly, and struggle still, to determine when racial stereotypes
and their ilk should be constitutionally forbidden. In this process, the
"protection" element of the constitutional text often is ignored. A few
scholars have begun to develop the theme of constitutional protection
for rights or processes they regard as fundamental, such as the right to
political participation and minimal social welfare.18 Thus far, however,
equality remains the dominant motif, and protection is seldom identi-
fied as an overarching problem.
I do not mean to suggest that protection is a self-explanatory term,
nor that an inquiry about the concept will yield easy answers. Else-
where I have begun to consider the two-edged nature of arguments
about governmental duty to protect. The concept includes both the pos-
17. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969); Ely, supra note 9, at 73-104; Monaghan, Of 'Liberty' and 'Property,' 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
18. See Ely, supra note 9 (equality in the political process); Michelman, On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969)
(threshold of necessities).
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sibility of paternalism, in a pejorative sense, and of parentalism, a more
positive counterpart.19 It can be demonstrated, I believe, that those who
wrote and adopted both the initial Constitution and the constitutional
innovations after the Civil War operated in contexts that encouraged
them to envision something of each kind of protection, without distin-
guishing clearly between the two.
A right to basic protection can be turned on its head, of course, by
those who assert that foreign domination constitutes the vital threat to
American security. Even this claim does not easily or convincingly ex-
tend to a defense of nuclear weapons proliferation, however. The asser-
tion that in protecting something, we must set in motion the means to
destroy it, is familiar enough after Vietnam. By now, such familiarity
should breed contempt, not nuclear arms.
My claim is that the threat of nuclear annihilation-like a board
bashed across the muzzle of a mule-should be sufficient to get our
attention. We may then begin to consider exactly what kinds of obliga-
tion to the population we consider essential to the constitutive core of
our republican form of government. We will have to confront the vex-
ing issue of how to include posterity in our own generation's
calculations.
Posterity
To begin to grapple with the issue of how to deal with our issue,
we must wrestle anew with a perplexing philosophic and practical prob-
lem, and with a dilemma that deeply concerned eminent American
thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Even to define
posterity is a challenge, as Jefferson discovered when he set out to cal-
culate the lifespan of a generation. He tried to use his generational
concept to create a legal system to assure that the earth would belong
to the living and their posterity, rather than be ruled by the dead hand
of the past. Precision about generations was and remains terribly elu-
sive, however. Therefore, Jefferson's more pragmatic friend, James
Madison, argued that "the present generation is inorally bound to re-
spect the natural rights - the basic needs - of coming generations,
however much positive laws in any given society may depart from the
19. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at B10, col. 6.
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moral ideal."20
Concern for future generations was an integral part of constitu-
tion-making in the nation's formative years. Koch summarized her dis-
cussion of the exchange between Jefferson and Madison as follows: "In
general, the fundamental features of the theory that proved acceptable
to both Jefferson and Madison were forward-looking and generous in
their regard for the liberty and welfare of generations to come in
America. '"21
The difficulty of determining exactly what this concern entails re-
mains with us. Neither rights theorists nor utilitarians have met the
challenge yet. The nearly total absence of posterity in the calculus done
within the school of law and economics is one of the most striking limi-
tations of this new orthodoxy.22 The challenge of somehow acknowledg-
ing and providing for the future is vital, however, and starkly presented
through intensified awareness of nuclear terror.
.Most judicial analysis employs present presumptions and fact-find-
ing to determine something concrete about the past and to serve a re-
medial or punitive end. But in constitutional law, the perspective is
more often both forward and backward looking. One can lose all sense
of balance, of course, in such Janus-like contortions. Yet even self-pro-
claimed strict constructionists usually acknowledge that the Constitu-
tion is a document designed for the future, meant to create a structure
for an ongoing Great Experiment. As Chief Justice John Marshall put
it, the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come."'23
Failure to heed this future-oriented aspect of American constitu-
tionalism is commonplace. It is particularly glaring, for example, in the
20. Koch, supra note 5, at 74.
21. Id.
22. For philosophic discussions about possible claims upon contemporaries by
those to follow, see, e.g., OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (R. Sikora and B.
Barry eds. 1978); Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
93 (1981) and Parfit, Future Generations: Future Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
113; B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
The best critical discussion I know about the generational problem in the context
of the law and economics debate is found in Heller, The Importance of Narrative Deci-
sion-Making: The Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurispru-
dence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 WIs.
L. REV. 385, 459-68.
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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recent efforts by the Supreme Court to make proof of past discrimina-
tory racial motivation a necessary precondition before courts may rec-
ognize violations of rights guaranteed by the Civil War Amendments.
This generally serves, as a practical matter, to constitutionalize the sta-
tus quo.2 4 It appears to reject the vital combination of symbolic and
pragmatic roles the Court often played in the past.
Virtually anything that exists is said to be legitimate under this
approach. Existence is viewed as a race of life, which the Court deems
to be a fair contest. The nuclear arms race may be perceived in much
the same way. Legal protection can be invoked only upon a clear show-
ing of overt, official and effective mistreatment. Victimization alone,
even racial victimization, is not sufficient. Exceptions will be made only
for those who can actually prove bad motive.
Since the central defense of the expansion of nuclear arms is de-
fense - not only a proper motive, but even an admirable one - an
actual constitutional claim that nuclear proliferation endangers rather
than enhances the security of ourselves and our posterity appears
doomed. If it ever got that far, the current Court would easily dismiss
the argument as simply a matter of the claimants' perception of the
problem.25
Such a response-the idea that any actual harm is simply a matter
of one's own subjective perception - is a paraphrase of the way the
Court answered the argument in Plessy v. Ferguson26 that to require
segregated streetcars was a denial of constitutional rights. Like racial
stigma, the danger of nuclear conflagration can be passed over as some-
24. For an initial stab at this theme, see Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional
Law, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 383 (1981). See also Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
25. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). A disturbing echo of the reasoning in Plessy may be
found in City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955
(1981). Here, too, the United States Supreme Court seemed to believe that any stigma
associated with blocking off a street where it traversed a black neighborhood, as it ran
from a prosperous white neighborhood to a public park, was to be found only in the
perception of the black plaintiffs. After all, Justice Stevens argued, the blacks who
complained did not show that blacks ever sought to have streets blocked, only to be
refused. Any disparate impact "could not, in any event, be fairly characterized as a
badge or incident of slavery." Id. at 126.
Nova Law Journal
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thing merely in the eyes of the beholder. This is particularly true today,
when the Social Darwiniah notion of independent individuals freely
choosing their own fate again dominates judicial interpretation of con-
stitutional law. Only if we begin to explore and to heed the constitu-
tional directive to protect our posterity, and begin to include future
generations in our own constitutional calibrations, can we hope to make
certain that the dreaded dead hand of the past does not clasp a future
universe full of dead hands.
Exactly where greater recognition of the claims of posterity would
lead constitutional law is unclear. It is uncommonly important, though,
to consider the organic, direct connection of our founders to subsequent
constitutionalists - including ourselves. In turn, we are inevitably the
parents and preservers of our posterity. This continuity, and the goal of
protecting posterity established in the constitutional framework, sug-
gest that it is neither far-fetched nor unproductive to explore how con-
stitutional values are relevant to the contemporary threat of immediate
nuclear annihilation.
Conclusion
The practical visionaries of the past surely could not have antici-
pated our modern folly. Yet themes of optimistic anticipation and con-
cern for future generations echo through the constitutional scheme they
established. The words of 1787 and 1868 provide no crisp, clean an-
swers to any cases and controversies that might be framed to challenge
the spread of nuclear weapons. But they do bequeath a still, small call
to reason and to hope - for ourselves and for our posterity.
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Nuclear War: The End of Law
Milner S. Ball*
Professor Miller summons us to consider the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons. In doing so, he has made an original, provocative con-
tribution to constitutional jurisprudence as well as the humanizing
politics of nuclear arms control. He speaks with scholarly responsibility
on a subject that has heretofore engendered either silence or nonsense
and bombast.
Introduction
By raising the question about the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons, Professor Miller augments understanding of constitutional
law and how constitutional law is done. Constitutional lawyers take far
too crabbed a view of their subject when they merely sift through past
court decisions and speculate on how the Supreme Court might decide
a case in future. Consideration of the legality of nuclear arms leads
Professor Miller to point out that the constitution is not limited to what
the Court has said or may say. It includes, he reminds us, the great
political realities which are brought partially to textual expression in
the preamble and which can be fully satisfied not by judicial opinions
but only by the people's decisions and actions and by the operations of
all our institutions. To begin with, then, nuclear war violates constitu-
tional law in the Miller dimension, which embraces systemic justice
and the fundamental nature of government by the people.'
Equally enlarging is Professor Miller's introduction of arguments
drawn from specific constitutional provisions. First he exhumes and
gives life to the doctrine of delegation, not presently favored in federal
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law
1. It is to be remembered that Abraham Lincoln characteristically referred to
the Declaration of Independence rather than to the Constitution when he addressed the
fundamental nature of the American people.
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litigation and not before given such expansive, refreshing expression. 2
Article 1, section 8, clause 2 commits to Congress the power to declare
war. Presidents, acting without such congressional declarations have,
from time to time, authorized responsive, limited military action. Pro-
fessor Miller proposes that, because limits cannot be maintained once
nuclear weapons are employed, Congress may not delegate decisions
about their use to the President or to computers and glitsches.3
Second, having called attention to the restrictions of delegation,
Professor Miller takes note o'f its responsibilities. Congress may not fail
to exercise the powers delegated to it by the constitution. Article I,
section 8, clause 10 grants to Congress the power to punish offenses
against the law of nations. Accordingly, says Professor Miller, Con-
gress must combat the international crime of threatened or contem-
plated use of nuclear weapons.4
Third, the President has an affirmative constitutional duty similar
to that imposed upon Congress. Article II, section 3 directs the chief
executive to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The word
"laws" comprehends international law by implication, analogy or ne-
cessity, and so places the President under a duty matching that of Con-
gress. He, too, must act. to remove the forbidden threat of nuclear
2. Pre-1937 decisions of the Supreme Court occasionally relied upon the doctrine
of non-delegation of legislative powers in striking down actions of Congress. See, e.g.,
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). More re-
cently, the Court has avoided invocation of the doctrine by the device of narrow con-
struction of a tested delegation. See, e.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976). For a judicial expression of interest in resurrecting the doc-
trine see Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The
doctrine of non-delegation has found a readier audience in state courts where it appears
to be alive and well. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).
3. There is a prior question here about whether Congress itself has the power to
declare nuclear war. See infra p. 61. If war ever had a human scale, that possibility has
grown increasingly remote since the beginning of World War I when technology was
let loose relentlessly to grind human life and human flesh.
4. I have reservations about this argument. It may be that legislatures are
designed, mercifully, exactly to do nothing. See, e.g., R. NEELY, How COURTS Gov-
ERN AMERICA 47-78 (1981). Perhaps the only affirmative duty of Congress that we
may safely press is that of the oath of office to support the Constitution (art. VI, § 3).
To cite but one example, I think it best that the congressional power to declare war not
be viewed as carrying with it an affirmative duty. We want no zealous exercises of that
power.
55
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Nuclear War: The End of LawS7:1982
arms.5
Last, Professor Miller argues that the due process clause places
upon all three branches the requirement actively to prevent nuclear
deprivation of life, liberty and property.6 He then ends as he began: he
challenges lawyers to take up the problem of nuclear weapons because
it is a matter of law for lawyers, not some distant activity above and
beyond the calling of the bar.
The Constitutional Aspects of Nuclear Weapons
If my views diverge from Professor Miller's at certain points, the
variance should not be misinterpreted. I wish to pay tribute to him and
to do so by heeding his call to speak. How better to express thanks than
to do exactly as he urges and take up the debate?
Professor Miller offers his essay as a preliminary exploration of
possibilities. My response is in kind. I want to raise some questions
about the agenda for discussion of the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons.
5. This argument has several steps. There must be an affirmative duty; interna-
tional law must be included in this duty; nuclear weapons must be a violation of inter-
national law; the Court must have power to declare the duty. I do not think the argu-
ment unworthy of pursuit. But each of its elements will have to be established, and I do
not think that an easy task.
6. Such a federal police power might be seen as having two components: an af-
firmative duty abroad to labor for mutual disarmament and a domestic self-policing
duty not to do those things which may trigger nuclear war.
Perhaps the growing interest in an expansion of the public trust doctrine might
afford a preferred ground upon which to build the desired affirmative duty.
It is also to be asked if the affirmative duty of government might not include some
form of unilateral disarmament. Professor Miller says that his essay is not a plea for
selective unilateral disarmament. I would like at least to reserve judgment on the issue
of unilateral disarmament. On the one hand, I can imagine a type of selective unilat-
eral disarmament that might be plain, good military policy and actually strengthen our
defense posture. On the other hand, as Professor Miller points out, ideas may appear
foolish only because they are new and challenge received ways of thinking. Miller,
Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982).
1I :1 8
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A. Unconstitutional: Is the Characterization of Nuclear Weap-
ons as Constitutional Adequate?
Fear and befuddlement prevent action. If we are so afraid of the
bomb that we suffer ethical paralysis or are so overwhelmed by the
claimed complexities of disarmament that we cannot grasp them, then
the arms race will run on toward the finish of nuclear apocalypse. Pro-
fessor Miller cuts the dragon down to size. He gives us hope. He shows
us that we can take action, can process the dragon into links of sau-
sage. This is a very lawyerlike approach. It encourages lawyers to un-
derstand that nuclear war is something that they can and should pre-
vent. We are enabled to subject the bomb to arguments about
constitutional validity the way lawyers reduce any volatile issue to
manageable parts bearing blackletter labels.
This is a good and commendable undertaking. Nevertheless there
is considerable risk in initiating a dialogue about the legality of nuclear
arms. Lawyers suffer a vocational disadvantage in this regard not
shared by their colleagues in the medical profession. When a physician
describes the effects of a nuclear attack - massive death, mutilated
bodies, unbearable suffering, endless contamination - we are horror
struck.7 None but a madman would argue that nuclear war is healthy.
7. Physicians are as diverse in their political and social views as any other
large group of citizens and rarely speak in unison on matters of public
policy. But today they are virtually united in their effort to convey a sim-
ple, urgent message about nuclear war to the American public and the
Administration. The message is this: Nuclear war-any kind bf nuclear
war-would cause death and suffering on a scale never seen before in all
of history, and modern medicine with all its skills could do little or nothing
to help ...
Most physicians are convinced that nuclear war is the greatest threat to
health and survival that society has ever faced. It would indeed be the
'final epidemic,' for which medicine has no treatment. When there exists
no cure for a disease, the only course is to take preventive measures. That
is why physicians believe it is their professional responsibility to urge their
fellow citizens and their Government to make certain that nuclear weapons
are never used. Unlike natural catastrophes, over which man has no con-
trol, nuclear war would be a disaster of man's making. It should be
preventable.
Realm & Leaf, Doctors: No Rx's In a War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1982, at A23, col.
57
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Nuclear War: The End of Law1 7:1982
Not so when our political rather than physical constitution is the sub-
ject. No sooner does one lawyer argue that nuclear weapons are not
constitutional than another lawyer ventures the counter-argument that
they are constitutional.8 Arguments on both sides of any issue are our
professional stock-in-trade. To introduce the subject of nuclear weapons
into such argumentation is to take the chance that this exercise may,
against our deepest wishes, lend nuclear weapons an unwarranted air of
legitimacy.9 Quite apart from any authoritative decision, lawyers' argu-
ments might domesticate the nuclear issue, remove its urgency as well
as its terror, and make it, catastrophically, familiar.
Nuclear weapons are monstrous. They may also be illegal. But we
dare not lose sight of their unnatural monstrocity. Of course lawyers
should address prevention of nuclear war. The assignment is to keep
the blasphemy of nuclear war clearly in focus at the same time that we
find means for lawyers to reckon with it in lawyerlike ways.
Instead of talking about the unconstitutionality of nuclear weap-
ons, would we not be better advised to describe them as deconstitution-
alizing or anti-constitutional?
Professor Miller's own comments - about nuclear war's destruc-
tion of underlying values - indicate how we might proceed. Like doc-
tors we would attempt to depict the aftermath of nuclear war. But,
8. The arguments in favor of constitutionality are easily imaginable: preambular
citation of the need for common defense, Article I delegation of the powers to raise and
support armies and to provide for the common defense, Article II delegation of certain
foreign affairs responsibilities and of command of the armed forces, Articles III limita-
tions of judicial review, etc.
9. Undeniably, nuclear weapons exist. But that certainly does not mean that they
are legitimate. Professor Miller refers to an "assumption of constitutionality" of nu-
clear weapons. Miller, supra note 6, at 22. I am not prepared to make or grant that
assumption.
Secretary of Energy, James B. Edwards, not only assumes the legitimacy of nu-
clear weapons but celebrates them. In an unparalleled display of callousness--or was it
cynicism?-Secretary Edwards said that he found "exciting" a nuclear bomb exploded
on the eve of the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. "Cabinet Officer says U.S.
will continue Atom Arms Testing," N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1. Secretary
Edwards seems to regard nuclear arms as an adjunct of the first amendment: the nu-
clear bomb "is the weapon that can preserve their ability for free political discussion."
Id. at B4, col. 6. It is an alarming point of view and helps to indicate why I wish to
overthrow the ideological statement that we live in a Hobbesian world. See infra note
10.
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instead of taking up the medical consequences, we would address the
legal consequences.
For example: What would become of western legal order? Would
there be a legal system? How would it function? Would there be gov-
ernment? Would there be courts? What of police? What would happen
to the practice of law? Would there be law schools left? What would
legal education become when all the major law schools in major urban
target areas had been destroyed? And what of democratic government?
Is it not likely that any surviving remnant would find abhorrent and
reject our way of life and Constitution that had permitted this thing to
happen?10
These are the kinds of questions that might be taken up and de-
bated if we realized that nuclear weapons are de-constitutionalizing.
We would be asked to portray those things known to us as lawyers that
would be lost. Lawyerly argument would then be stripped of its poten-
tial to legitimate nuclear weapons for the arguments would proceed
from the premise of destruction. The subject for debate would be not
whether nuclear weapons are legal, but rather, the extent to which they
destroy law and lawyers.
10. Professor Miller says that we live in a Hobbesian world. Miller, supra note 6,
at 24. I disagree for two reasons. First, a Hobbesian world is what we would have after
nuclear war. Hobbes' account is sobering:
In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof
is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodius build-
ing; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much
force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts;
no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger
of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962). That is a pretty fair description
of a post-nuclear war world, not the one we have now, and it serves to help us under-
stand what we would lose.
The second reason for disagreeing with the statement that we live in a Hobbesian
world is this: We are made to believe that we live in a Hobbesian world through propa-
ganda and ideology, and it is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. We need desperately to
find a more satisfactory description for reality, one that would not lead us to accept as
rational the self-contradictory statement that we must have nuclear arms if we are to
survive.
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B. Decision-Makers: The Nuclear Problem as an Opportunity
for Popular Revolution.
Professor Miller, with his strategy of hope, points out that nuclear
weapons present us with an opportunity. He makes of them an opportu-
nity for broadening and deepening our conception of constitutional ju-
risprudence and for heightening our sense of legal ethics. May there
not be another opportunity in the making, opportunity for a kind of
positive democratic revolution?
Thomas Jefferson had thought that liberty in America might be
enriched by a revolution every generation. Nuclear arms may provide
occasion for this generation's revolution if the growing disarmament
movement among the people continues.'
Professor Miller makes reference to those who have authority and
control in the government and their duty to take action. And he says
that lawyers are no longer on the sidelines because they have quasi-
governmental status and a share in the action. This is to accept the fact
of government by an elite and to say that lawyers have some attach-
ment to that elite.
The problem of truly popular government is one that we have not
solved. We have done a more or less satisfactory job of providing gov-
ernment of and for the people. We do not provide government by the
people. Periodic elections, polls and interest groups are means of bring-
ing influence to bear upon government. They are not a participation in
government. The nearest thing the people have .to a place within gov-
ernment is the street - marches and rallies before the United Nations,
below the Washington monument, etc. The street is not a satisfactory
forum for the formation and expression of opinion.
It is in this sense that nuclear weapons and the people's movement
to control them offers a governmental opportunity, the opportunity to
think about and explore government by the people.
President Eisenhower pointed to the gap between what the govern-
ment is planning and doing and what the people are dreaming and hop-
ing. He said that the people want peace so much that one day govern-
11. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W. S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) in THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 356-57 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). See also THE LIFE AND SE-
LECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488, 492, 674-75, 714 (A. Koch & W.
Peden eds. 1944).
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ments "had better get out of their way and let them have it."12 We
keep reciting the refrain that in this government the people are sover-
eign. If the people are indeed the governors as well as the governed,
then they and not an elite should be the decision-makers with the duty
to act. Perhaps the issue of nuclear arms control will bring the day for
piercing the veil of rhetoric and reaching the reality of popular govern-
ment. At least we are given the opportunity to consider it.
Lawyers have a critical role to play in the democratic governing of
affairs, especially nuclear affairs. 13 They have this role not because of
ties to a governing elite but because of their original ties to the people.
If we have governmental status with responsibility to act, then this is so
because as officers of the court we have a singular duty in generally-
shared citizenship.
With respect to the nuclear disarmament opportunity, lawyers
might wish to reflect upon and develop juridical means for giving ex-
pression to what the people are dreaming and hoping. We might also
wish to consider whether conceptions of how to train lawyers in the
skills of representation have been too narrowly confined. Legal repre-
sentation of the people may entail something altogether different from
(and in addition to) courtroom advocacy, negotiation, drafting, etc.
Would this be subject matter for a professional skills course? Constitu-
tional law? Some other? As a minimum, lawyers ought to be asked to
devise, for a matter as urgent and immediate as nuclear war, a more
efficacious mode of participation than polls, litigation, demonstrations,
or a letter to one's congressman. (The force of such a letter is fully
spent in triggering a machine-extruded standard-form response bearing
a machine-impressed signature.)
C. Process: Are the Procedures Leading Up To and Resulting
From Nuclear War Constitutional?
Professor Miller observes that constitutionalism in the United
12. D. EISENHOWER, THE QUOTABLE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 55 (1967); B.
COOK, THE DECLASSIFIED EISENHOWER 149 (1981) (quoting a statement of Eisen-
hower to Harold Macmillan in a televised talk, London (Sept. 6, 1959)).
13. I am a member of the Lawyer's Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control. I do not
represent or speak for this organization. My opinions led me to join this group; my
membership did not lead me to hold these opinions.
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States is more than process, i.e. law has normative content. This may
well be true. But are there not procedural issues yet to be fully
exploited?
(1) If we project the aftermath of a hypothetical nuclear war (as-
suming there would be an aftermath), the barren legal landscape ex-
hibits several procedural features. One of these is the absence of appeal
or recourse.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,14 the Supreme Court held that the Presi-
dent is absolutely immune from damage suits for actions taken in con-
nection with official duty. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell averred
that the Court had not placed the President above the law.1 5 He said
that the possibility that the President was above the law was a chilling
but unjustified contention."6 He said that it was unjustified because
there remains the remedy of impeachment. Regardless of what one
thinks about Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it does help us to see the chilling fact
that nuclear war would put the President above the law, and above
politics for that matter. There would be no legal or political redress.
Impeachment would have no materiality or relevance. Elections, if they
were ever held again, would not recall the devastation.
We can see that Congress cannot delegate to the President such an
unlimited power. But then we can also see that Congress cannot exer-
cise this power either. In fact, the real reason that Congress cannot
delegate this power is that it does not have such a power. The essence
of constitutionalism, says Professor Miller is limited government. Arti-
cle I of the Constitution does not contain the grant of unlimited power.
When we committed to Congress the power to declare war, we did not
grant the power to declare Armageddon. There would be no appeal
from such a declaration. We have given neither the President nor the
Congress the right to use unbounded violence or violence without legal
and political control. Self-destruction, if it is a right, is one retained by
the people.
(2) If we start with nuclear war and think back rather than be-
yond, we find other procedural issues. For example, what is the process
14. 50 U.S.L.W. 4797 (U.S. June 24, 1982).
15. Id. at 4804 & n.41.
16. Id. at 4804 n.41.
17. Id. at 4804.
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by which nuclear war comes about? Research on this subject by consti-
tutional scholars could be divided into two phases: one from the present
back to the origin of the nuclear possibility; the other forward to a
projected hypothetical nuclear war.
With respect to phase one: How has today's situation come to be?
Through what processes was our policy or lack of policy given shape?
What defaults in constitutional process does this history expose? With
respect to phase two: What exactly are the procedures by which nu-
clear war happens? Do these procedures entail nuclear war, or do
faulty procedures allow nuclear strikes to take place in constitutionally
suspect ways? (I hazard the guess that secrecy in these areas - such
as chains of command - has far less legitimate scope than we are led
to suppose.)
(3) If there are procedural arguments and procedural research re-
maining to be pursued, are there not also procedural actions to be con-
sidered? In addition to debating the subject, what ought lawyers do?
What judicial, political or other steps should we take? For a start,
would it not be lawyerlike to press for the procedural device of requir-
ing impact statements detailing the effects of nuclear war and the arms
race upon the environment?
Conclusion
Professor Miller's essay precipitates a final, unresolved thought:
What if nuclear weapons are constitutional and nuclear war is legal?
What might that reveal to us about our constitution? About our legal-
political system? About ourselves? All the answers within range of my
powers of vision appear utterly joyless. Ultimate honesty compels us to
face those answers howsoever bitterly we may rue their content.18
18. Such honesty would be the contemporary form of repentance. As such, it
would not be easily accomplished. One of the difficulties is the way in which people use
God. As George Kennan has noted, during this century's world wars, both sides ap-
pealed to God for support of their military efforts. Kennan, A Christian View of the
Arms Race, THEOLOGY TODAY 162, 170 (July, 1982). Howsoever questionable "this
combination of religious faith and secular chauvinism. . . in those past instances" and
howsoever it may appear that "modern military technology has now created conditions
which allow only one (godly) answer to the possibility of a Soviet-American war," Id. I
believe that history offers every reason to suppose that some people will nevertheless
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appeal to God in support of even nuclear arms. There has long been an intimate in-
volvement of religion in both American constitutionalism and warfare. This is neither
the place nor the forum for trying to confront that controversial, complicated involve-
ment. However, these matters are an issue in the question of the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons. Suffice it to say here that the honesty necessary to face the answers to
the questions posed in the text seems to me available only in the context of the biblical
faith. But I also believe that the biblical tradition is to be understood by us in non-
religious terms. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer proposed: "Man's religiosity makes him look in
his distress to the power of God in the world: God is deus ex machina. The bible
directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can help." D.
BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 197 (E. Bethge ed. 1967). A deus ex
machina is the ally of nuclear weaponry; the suffering God is the ally of its victims.
(My own attempts at a theological understanding of law, first addressed in M. BALL,
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW (1981), are the subject for continued exploration in
another book now in progress.)
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THE FRAIL CONSTITUTION OF GOOD INTENTIONS
Stanley C. Brubaker*
If I understand the architecture of Professor Miller's argument
correctly, his lofty conclusion rests on two pillars, either of which he
regards as adequate to support it; these pillars in turn arise from a
single foundational premise. The conclusion, of course, is that the man-
ufacture, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons is unconstitutional.
The premise is that nuclear war is "[b]y definition" unlimited.1 The
first pillar is constructed from clauses of the Constitution reinforced
with good intentions. The second is of similar construction, but is also
girded by a novel interpretation of international law.
His essay is admittedly only a "preliminary inquiry" 2 into the con-
stitutionality of nuclear weapons, but the architectural design must be
examined to see if it affords any reasonable hope of supporting his
conclusion.
Pillar I: The Well Intended Constitution
It is the leitmotif of Professor Miller's argument that the Constitu-
tion is not to be interpreted simply according to the terms of its text,
but informed by the Constitution's intentions.3 These intentions, we
learn, are not simply those of the people who wrote the text, but also,
and primarily, those present and future generations who live under its
authority.4 The ultimate end-stated vaguely enough to spark little op-
position--emerges as "human survival under conditions that allow
human dignity to be maximized."5 But the proper and good intention
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University.
1. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NovA L.J. 21, 30
(1982).
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. at 27.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 26.
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accompanying this end is to be found among the "clergy, physicians,
scientists, and businessmen [who] have grasped and [seek] to show
others the meaning of nuclear war."6 Lawyers are thus invited to share
their intentions and, so inspired, to read the text of the Constitution.
Three aspects of the Constitution contribute to the first pillar of
support-the Preamble, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Due Pro-
cess clause. Apparently Professor Miller believes each is independently
capable of supporting his conclusion, for he does not indicate how they
fit together except that they are each to be read with the Constitution's
"intention" in mind.
The most curious of these is the nondelegation doctrine. Professor
Miller suggests that it is unconstitutional for Congress "tacitly or ex-
pressly" to delegate the authority to the President to declare nuclear
war. One must wonder from what use of the nondelegation doctrine
Professor Miller expects to draw support. The oldest and most straight-
forward use of the nondelegation doctrine is, as the term implies, to
require that certain decisions can be made by Congress alone, that it
cannot delegate these to any other body." But this argument can pro-
vide no support for Professor Miller's conclusion that nuclear weapons
are unconstitutional because it implies that Congress does have the
constitutional authority to manufacture, deploy, and use nuclear
weapons.
Perhaps Professor Miller has in mind a more recent use of the
nondelegation doctrine, one which hinges on individual rights rather
than congressional duty." It implies that an individual has a right to the
careful reflection of Congress before his or her liberty is abridged. Con-
ceivably that liberty could be expanded to the liberty to be free from
nuclear threat. This use of the nondelegation doctrine could, like the
first use, imply that Congress does have the authority to wage nuclear
war. But the doctrine so used, unlike the first use, usually harbors a
serious reservation about the power that Congress has exercised. While
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 29.
8. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) and The Brig Aurora v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 383 (1813). On the nondelegation doctrine generally, see S.
BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
(1975).
9. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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an actual constitutional limit to that power must be established inde-
pendently of the nondelegation doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine is
at least supposed to elevate the sensitivity, or "raise the consciousness,"
of Congress to constitutional limitations.10 Again, however, the
nondelegation doctrine offers no support, in itself, for Professor Miller's
conclusion.
And one must further wonder how this use of the nondelegation
doctrine could function towards "consciousness raising." Following a
nuclear exchange should the Supreme Court declare the war to have
been unconstitutional? If Professor Miller is serious about his funda-
mental premise that nuclear war is by definition unlimited, then there
would be no Congress left to have its consciousness raised. But perhaps
the remedy lies in equity rather than in law. Should an injunction be
issued to halt the President from contemplating a nuclear exchange un-
til Congress explicitly assumes its constitutional obligation to set forth
the conditions, if any, in which it thinks nuclear war proper? Until
Congress makes up its mind, nuclear war would be limited, assuming
improbably that the President heeds the injunction, but hardly in a way
that Professor Miller or most any United States citizen can think
desirable."1
There is a third use of the nondelegation doctrine that might be
thought to question the constitutionality of nuclear weapons, which
would run as follows: only the President can act quickly enough to use
nuclear weapons; only Congress can decide in each instance whether
that use is justified. Aside from its wholly disingenuous use of the
nondelegation doctrine, this argument requires propositions of fact and
value that Professor Miller does not even assert, much less establish.
Thus, under any of the three possible uses of the nondelegation doc-
trine, it lends no support to his conclusion and must be regarded as
mere facade.
Infused with good intentions, the Preamble and the Due Process
clause are also pressed into impossible duties. "Nuclear weapons and
the delicate balance of terror jeopardize,"1 2 he tells us, each of the
10. It is used, as Professor Alexander Bickel has noted, "in the candid service of
avoiding a serious constitutional doubt." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
165 (1962) (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953)).
11. Miller, supra note 1.
12. Id. at 27.
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goals of the Preamble, especially in the sense that there might be no
"posterity" remaining to enjoy them. Similarly, "[n]uclear weapons so
endanger the lives, liberties, and properties of all Americans that they
should be considered to be a deprivation contrary to Due Process." 18
No doubt nuclear weapons do in some way jeopardize our goals and do
endanger our lives, liberties, and properties. But we have to ask, com-
pared to what?
Compared to a world in which there are only conventional weap-
ons? Clearly this is what Professor Miller hopes for, but our posterity
and our lives, liberties, and properties would not necessarily be ren-
dered more secure. One must discount the gravity of nuclear war by its
improbability,1 4 and one must remember that it was with conventional
weapons that Rome lowered Carthage to dust.
But let's grant the preferability of a world without nuclear weap-
ons. Can one discover a course of constitutionally mandated action?
Professor Miller declares that guiding the course is a "duty to take
action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world." '15 One might wonder how Professor Miller can leap from the
Constitution's rights and goals to world duties, but if the United States
had sovereignty commensurate with that duty throughout the world,
the duty would not be difficult to follow. The problem, of course, is that
such authority is lacking. What then can the United States do? We can
unilaterally disarm and achieve peace through submission. But Profes-
sor Miller implicitly agrees that while this might eliminate the nuclear
threat, it would sacrifice the nation's goals. We could take the initiative
in reducing our forces, but there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union
would follow suit and thus the delicate balance of terror could be ren-
dered an indelicate imbalance. We could negotiate in good faith, but
again there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union would do likewise.
Finally the United States could attempt to achieve nuclear superiority
and either negotiate from strength or, with a clear superiority, force the
Soviet Union into submission. Professor Miller might wish the courts to
appoint a special master to oversee the SALT negotiations, but what
13. Id. at 36.
14. Apologies to then Chief Judge Learned Hand, United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
15. Miller, supra note 1, at 24.
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course of action that court appointee would mandate is far from clear.
In short, all that this pillar can support is a requirement to make a
good faith effort to reduce the risk of nuclear war while not jeopardiz-
ing the nation's way of life. By no means is this a trivial obligation. But
first, it does not differ in kind from the sort of duty we have assumed
the Constitution to place on our public officials concerning conventional
- weapons, and second, the duty, involving in its essence questions of pru-
dence and discretion, is wholly improper for judicial enforcement.
Pillar II: The Constitution Girded with International Law
Perhaps the most creative aspect of Professor Miller's argument is
found in the construction of this second pillar where he attempts to
argue that the Constitution imports a duty, to be judicially enforced, to
obey international law, which he asserts is "surely"' 16 incompatible with
nuclear weapons. The argument begins with the proposition that "Con-
gress having been delegated the power to define and punish offenses
against international law, has a duty to carry out that power."' 7 The
thought continues that the President also might as well be assigned a
duty "faithfully to execute" international law.' 8 And then why not have
the Supreme Court "grasp the nettle and point out to the Executive
and the Congress that officials in those branches are charged with
[this] constitutional duty"?'19
Putting aside the question of whether what is called international
law, lacking both an authoritative interpreter and a means of enforce-
ment, can be considered law-putting aside the fact that it is only in
the recent writings of a few academic commentators that nuclear weap-
ons are regarded as contrary to international law 20---putting aside all of
16. Id.at 23.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 35.
20. Professor Miller is apparently depending on the work of R. FALK, L.
MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oc-
casional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program, Center of International Studies,
Princeton University (1981)). Other than this work, it is hard to discover muoch that
can be used to support Professor Miller's claim that nuclear weapons are unconstitu-
tional. There is the 1961 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1653, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) asserting the use of nuclear
691
69
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
this-the argument that international law has a place in the Constitu-
tion superior to ordinary legislation and presidential action is wholly
without foundation in the text of the Constitution, precedent, or the
Framers' intent. The text of the Constitution does grant Congress the
authority "to define and punish Piracies and Offenses against the Law
of Nations; ' 21 but this authority implies a duty to enforce international
law about as much as the authority of Congress to borrow money22
mandates a duty of deficit spending.
Recognizing the discretionary authority of Congress to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations and recognizing that this re-
quires the principle leges posteriores priores contraries abrogant (later
laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary to them), the Court has con-
sistently held that Congress has the authority, to which courts will give
effect, to violate international law-even treaties-the most fundamen-
tal datum of international law. What international law provides, wrote
Chief Justice John Marshall, "is a guide the sovereign follows or aban-
dons at his will. The rule is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign:
and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it
may be disregarded. s23 The fact that Congress violates international
law is, as Professor Louis Henkin has succinctly made the point, "con-
stitutionally irrelevant. '24
Nor has Professor Miller produced one shred of evidence that the
Framers wished to subordinate national sovereignty to the dictates of
international law. The wisdom of the contrary position-that occasion-
ally it is necessary to subordinate international law to national sover-
eignty-is reinforced when we see that some, such as Professor Miller,
are willing to see as a dictate of international law the freshest idealisms
weapons to be illegal (55 states voting in favor of the resolution, 20 states against, and
26 states abstaining). But as Professor Michael Akehurst points out in A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (1978 3d ed), "A General Assembly res-
olution of this type is, at most, merely evidence of customary law; but the voting figures
for this resolution show the absence of a generally accepted custom." The United
States voted no while the U.S.S.R. voted yes, possibly because of the latter's nuclear
inferiority at the time. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. Id.
23. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
24. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 410 n.l1 (1972).
170 Nova Law Journal 7:19821
70
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/16
17:1982 The Frail Constitution of Good Intentions 71
of a few academic commentators regardless of the consequences for na-
tional security.
To say that his interpretation is without foundation in conventional
construction of the Constitution may leave Professor Miller undaunted,
for again he understands the Constitution in terms of its "intentions"
and he understands these intentions to be those of the well intended
"clergy, physicians, scientists, and businessmen"2 5 rather than the more
modest ones of the Framers. If this beneficent sentiment proved insuffi-
cient to bestir the Due Process clause and the Preamble to join the
march against the bomb, perhaps it is sufficiently engaging to disarm
the world through international law. But again, even if we grant mo-
mentarily that Congressional authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations could be puffed into a duty, which the courts
could enforce, we confront the problems of limited power. Court in-
junctions could only extend to the United States government, and thus
we would simply have to return to the prudential alternatives discussed
above, running from submission to dominance.
Pursuing Professor Miller's apparent assumption that good inten-
tions make up for what, under conventional interpretations of the Con-
stitution, would be usurpation of authority, there may be, however, a
way in which the Supreme Court could grasp the nettle and eliminate
threats to the lives, liberties, and properties of the citizenry. It could
make itself the authoritative interpreter of international law. It could
secretly authorize a Super Manhattan project which would culminate
in the construction of a nuclear weapon awesome and accurate enough
to cow into submission all nuclear powers. Then the Court would be
able to give clout to the special masters it appoints to strategic negotia-
tions and to back the injunctions it would issue around the world in the
name of enforcing international law.
Other than with this reinforcement, I can see no way that the su-
perstructure of Miller's argument can withstand even minimal scrutiny.
The Foundation
My inquiry thus far has focused on the superstructure of Professor
Miller's argument, though I have indirectly touched on the adequacy of
25. Miller, supra note 1, at 22.
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its foundation. It is time to examine more closely his contention that
nuclear war is "by definition" "unlimited. ' 26 If we fully grant this pre-
mise then the superstructure becomes ironically superfluous. For if nu-
clear war is "definitionally" unlimitable, it must be obviously unlim-
itable. If it is obviously unlimitable, no one with a modicum of
intelligence and concern for self-interest would consider risking it, for
one's missiles would in effect be directed towards oneself and all that
one wishes to preserve. If such a person would not even contemplate the
use of nuclear weapons, we are rendered about as secure against nu-
clear weapons as we could ever expect to be through any judicially en-
forced pronouncements.
But only as an exercise in abstract logic should we grant Professor
Miller his premise. As a military analyst has recently argued, it is ut-
terly ridiculous to believe that generals and politicians "would become
so absorbed in the conflict-as-a-game that they would reply tit for tat,
move by move, instead of stopping the war as soon as it had become
nuclear, before it could destroy their own cities and their own fami-
lies."27 One would have to believe that mankind both in the battlefield
and in civilian authority had become robots. And if we thus reasonably
deny Professor Miller his premise, the structure of the argument
collapses.
This is not to say that in several respects, I do not share Professor
Miller's wistful yearning for a world free of nuclear weapons. There
was at least dignity in the defense of Carthage in a way there can
never be in a defense against nuclear destruction. But to allow this
yearning for dignity to inform one's interpretation of the Constitution
and judicial power, is to lay bare the frailty of good intentions.
Can Lawyers Contribute to the Debate?
Although Professor Miller urges the Supreme Court to "grasp the
nettle" 28 on the question of the constitutionality of nuclear weapons, he
realizes that it is "naive" 29 to expect the Justices presently to do so. His
26. Id. at 30.
27. Luttwak, How to Think About Nuclear War, 74 COMMENTARY 21, 26 (Aug.
1982).
28. Miller, supra note 1, at 35.
29. Id. at 36.
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apparent hope is to foster a "dialogue about the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons,"30 which in a fashion akin to the reapportionment
cases will move the Court closer to his wished for declaration. He asks
then rhetorically: "Is it really foolish to contend that law and lawyers
have something useful to contribute to the growing debate about nu-
clear war?" 31
Lawyers should be able to contribute to this debate. They should
be able to remind us of the relevance of constitutional principles to
changing circumstances. But to do so in the case of nuclear strategy,
they must not only be aware of constitutional principles and of the rele-
vance of those principles to the larger ends and limits of law and polit-
ics; they must also be knowledgeable as to the nature of those changing
circumstances, which in this case means knowledge of diplomacy and
strategy in the nuclear age. These are demanding criteria, but occa-
sionally lawyers do meet them and make valuable contributions. 32
On that concluding point I find myself in partial accord with Pro-
fessor Miller. It is not entirely foolish to contend that lawyers have
something useful to contribute to the growing debate about nuclear
war. But it is foolish to believe that many who meet the above criteria
will agree with Professor Miller.
30. Id. at 36.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Cf. S. TALBOTT, ENDGAME 20-21 (1979).
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Wisdom, Constitutionality, and Nuclear Weapons
Policy
Dean Alfange, Jr.*
In a well-known passage in his famous dissent in the flag-salute
case of 1943, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote:
Our constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation
rather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the Ameri-
can mind with a false value. The tendency of focussing attention on
constitutionality is to make constitutionality synonymous with wis-
dom, to regard a law as all right if it is constitutional. Such an
attitude is a great enemy of liberalism. . . . Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found outside
of their vindication in courts of law."
Arthur Miller does not subscribe to any such notion. For him, the prin-
cipal function of courts of law is precisely to vindicate the most pre-
cious interests of civilization. In his view, the Constitution is not a finite
set of narrow commands that establish a framework within which pol-
icy is to be determined. Rather, it is an expansive body of rules which,
at any given time, require the adoption of the specific policy choices
that would then best serve to achieve "the avowed goal of meeting cur-
rent problems. ' 2 What wisdom dictates to be the most desirable way of
attaining important social goals is what the Constitution demands.
When applied to the issue of nuclear weapons, that approach yields the
conclusion that since "the ultimate purpose of law [including constitu-
tional law] is human survival under conditions that allow human dig-
nity to be maximized" and since wisdom (indeed, common sense) tells
* Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts.
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NoVA L.J. 21, 27
(1982).
3. Id. at 26.
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us that the continued manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons
involves the increasing risk that eventually, by design or error, they will
be employed and that their use would threaten the complete destruc-
tion of human civilization, the Constitution must forbid the government
of the United States from following a policy that perpetuates the possi-
bility of such a catastrophe. In addition, the Constitution must impose
a "duty [upon the government] to take action designed to eliminate the
nuclear threat throughout the world."4
Professor Miller is, of course, well aware that, despite its substan-
tial appeal (particularly to those like me who agree as to the danger
posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the urgent
need to eliminate the threat), such a conclusion is at odds with tradi-
tional approaches to constitutional interpretation. He recognizes that
adoption of any of his points "would require creativity or innovation by
a constitutional decision-maker," and concedes it is unreasonable to
expect that they would be accepted by the Supreme Court." Indeed, the
novelty of his arguments is obvious. To Congress is delegated the power
to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and main-
tain a navy. No language in the Constitution nor any judicial decision
known to me suggests that those powers do not carry with them the
power to-select the weapons with which the armies and the navy are to
be equipped. And, however much we may pray that no President would
ever again make the choice to employ atomic or nuclear weapons in
war, surely, according to the accepted understanding of the Constitu-
tion, the authority of the Commander-in-Chief includes the power to
decide which of the weapons provided by Congress are to be employed
once hostilities have commenced.7 Moreover, much more precedent can
be marshalled against, rather than for, the proposition that the Consti-
tution obligates the three branches of the national government to ob-
4. Id. at 24.
5. Id. at 29.
6. Id. at 23.
7. The power delegated to Congress to declare war obviously limits the authority
of the President to employ weapons before hostilities have commenced. See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 80-81 (1972). But that limitation goes to
the use of any weapons; it has no special significance with respect to nuclear weapons,
even though it may apply with greater moral force where nuclear weapons are
concerned.
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serve and enforce norms of international law even where these are con-
trary to national law or national policy."
The fact that a constitutional lawyer would be strongly tempted to
employ constitutional argument to shape public policy on so vital an
issue is certainly understandable.9 But Professor Miller faces a serious
dilemma in that his argument is likely to be persuasive only to those
who already agree with his policy position. Those who hold opposing
views on the policy question are many and influential. They sincerely
believe, however misguidedly, that the maintenance of a nuclear arse-
nal and the willingness to employ it where necessary are absolutely es-
sential to the cause of peace and the security of our nation and its
allies, and can readily dismiss Miller's argument with the accurate ob-
servation that settled constitutional law is to the contrary. Even those
whose minds are not yet made up are unlikely to be won over by a
constitutional contention that can be rebutted so effectively by argu-
ments with impeccable traditional credentials.
If Professor Miller's purpose is simply to reinforce the resolve and
commitment of those who already agree with him on the policy ques-
tion by telling them that their views are not only supported by good
sense, ultimate morality, and perhaps the norms of international law,
but also reflect authentic constitutional commands, he may well be suc-
cessful. But if his purpose is to change public opinion through constitu-
tional argument, he must be able to convince his audience of the au-
thoritativeness of that argument, and the authoritativeness of a legal
argument can be demonstrated in only two ways: consensual agreement
8. See id. at 460-61 n.61. Professor Henkin flatly states that "the Constitution
does not forbid the President (or the Congress) to violate international law and the
courts will give effect to acts within the constitutional powers of the political branches
without regard to international law." Id. at 221-22. See Feinrider, International Law
as the Law of the Land, 7 NOVA L. J. 103 (1982) for opposing view.
9. The insightful observation of Felix Cohen seems squarely on point here:
Clearly, for the sanitary engineer, the existence of untreated swamps is the
cause of malaria. For the king's attendant with the palm-leaf fans, the bite
of the mosquito is the only relevant cause. For the pathologist, the effect of
the malaria virus upon red blood corpuscles is the cause. In each case the
cause is the point at which effort can be usefully applied.
Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 255 (1950). For Professor
Miller, as constitutional lawyer, the relevant cause of the nuclear weapons crisis must
be the failure to recognize and apply proper principles of constitutional law.
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among a substantial majority of those generally recognized as know-
ledgeable in the field or acceptance by a court-preferably an appellate
court and most preferably the Supreme Court. Quite plainly, Professor
Miller is in a position to make neither demonstration. Novel constitu-
tional arguments designed to win the day for the adherents of one side
of a controversial policy issue will, by their nature, be unable to com-
mand broad acceptance, and, as noted, Professor Miller concedes that
his argument will be unlikely to find judicial favor. Even a favorable
judicial ruling may, of course, be insufficient to resolve a disputed con-
stitutional issue, as long ago demonstrated by the categorical rejection
by the North of the Dred Scott decision of 1857,10 and as may clearly
be seen today in the ongoing debates over such questions as abortion
policy,11 the exclusionary rule,1 2 and school bussing for the achievement
of racial desegregation. s But the instances in which public opinion and
public policy have been changed by constitutional reasoning1 4 have nec-
essarily involved judicial pronouncements which have given moral force
to debatable constitutional arguments by converting them into rules of
law. Without such legitimation,1 5 mere argument, no matter how co-
gent and thoughtful, lacks the authority necessary to lead persons of
differing views to abandon their prior positions on policy questions.
Professor Miller is surely right in his observation that "[ilt would
be naive to expect the Supreme Court to intervene"1 on the issue of
nuclear weapons policy. But is this merely because, as he suggests,
"judges are timorous officers of government . . . [who] look upon re-
quests to go beyond the familiar and the expected as frightful occa-
10. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For a description
and discussion of the political reaction engendered by this decision, see D.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 417-567 (1978).
11. See, e.g., F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS (1981); E.
RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS 87-161 (1982).
12. See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977).
13. See, e.g., the antijudicial diatribe of L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE
(1976).
14. The paradigm case is, of course, the effect of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) in ending de jure racial segregation.
15. The classic discussion of the legitimating function of the Supreme Court is in
C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (1960).
16. Miller, supra note 2, at 36.
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sions"? 17 Is the problem really only one of judicial timidity? It does
seem severe to label as timorous a federal judiciary which has, in re-
cent years, recognized abortion as a constitutional right,18 ordered the
President of the United States to relinquish evidence that would in-
criminate him with regard to the commission of impeachable offenses,1 9
drastically curtailed the imposition of the death penalty,20 required un-
willing school boards to implement sweeping remedial plans for bring-
ing about the desegregation of public schools,2" and taken over the ad-
ministration of particular prisons or of entire prison systems in some 24
states.2 It is thus a good deal less likely that the anticipated judicial
reluctance to intervene in nuclear weapons policy is to be attributed to
the inherent timorousness of judges than to their probable views on the
proper role of courts in the governmental process and on the relation-
ship between the wisdom of a policy and its constitutionality.
This leads to the inevitable question: what is the proper relation-
ship between the wisdom of a policy and its constitutionality? Or, to
put the same question somewhat more directly, when should judges in-
sist, as a matter of constitutional law, upon the adoption of a policy
they deem wise or the rejection of a policy they deem unwise? When
should they be prepared to remove a policy issue from the political fo-
rum, where numbers count, in order to decide it in the judicial forum,
where numbers can be ignored? These issues have been exercising con-
stitutional scholars a great deal in recent years, yielding a wide variety
of answers across a spectrum that finds Arthur Miller perhaps closest
to one end23 and Raoul Berger closest to the other.24 The answers at
17. Id.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
19. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). A listing of
cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated the imposition of death sentences be-
tween 1976 and May, 1980, may be found in the concurring opinion of Justice Mar-
shall in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 438 n.5 (1980).
21. See the discussion in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-61
(1979).
22. For a comprehensive list of states in which courts had taken over the admin-
istration of prisons as of 1981 and of the decisions which brought these results about,
see the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
353-54 n.1 (1981).
23. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL AcTivisM (1982); Miller,
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the very extremes of the spectrum are "never" and "whenever they
want," but both of these are unacceptable. To answer "never" is to
oblige the judiciary to treat as constitutional such policies and practices
as "separate but equal" racial segregation, gross legislative malappor-
tionment, and the maintenance of prison systems in which inmates are
confined in conditions of ghastly and barbaric inhumanity.25 To cite the
wise counsel of Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, refraining in all cases
"from passing upon the legislative judgment 'as long as the remedial
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed'...
seems . . . no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of
the liberty of small minorities to the popular will."'26
On the other hand, to answer "whenever they want" is to maintain
that judges, rather than the branches of government responsive to the
electorate, should have the ultimate authority to decide the content of
government policy - an authority which they would exercise by invok-
ing the Constitution whenever they disagreed with the manner in which
Congress or the President proposed to deal with a national problem. It
is clear that Professor Miller does not find that answer unattractive,
nor its consequences undesirable.27 Unlike Learned Hand, he would
have no misgivings about being "ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardi-
ans," 28 for he would have no doubt that Platonic Guardians could be
counted on to do better in insuring "human survival under conditions
The Case for Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT ACTiVISM AND RESTRAINT 167
(S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 1982).
24. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). Berger's view is that judi-
cial policymaking is never legitimate, and that the only proper function of courts in
constitutional adjudication is to ascertain and faithfully (slavishly) to apply the original
intention of those who framed and ratified the constitutional provision at issue. I have
elsewhere criticized Berger's position at some length. See Alfange, Another Look at the
"Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603 (1978).
25. For a lengthy and disturbing, but not exhaustive, list of the policies and prac-
tices that would have to be constitutionally tolerated if the answer to this question were
"never," see Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
710-14 (1975).
26. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 605-06 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
27. See the works cited supra note 23.
28. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
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that allow human dignity to be maximized"29 than would individuals
whose continuation in office depends on their attentiveness to the pres-
sures of interest-group politics. Perhaps he is right. Nevertheless, that
answer has implications that are profoundly troubling.
It is likely that Platonic Guardians would be fallible; it is certain
that judges are. 0 There is no abstract reason for believing that the
policies judges might choose, after considering the arguments of law-
yers on behalf of their clients, will in fact be wiser than the policies
enacted into law by Congress after considering the representations of
interest-group spokesmen on behalf of their constituents, or than the
policies adopted by the President after considering the counsel of his
advisers. But the argument that judges should assume authority to in-
validate laws or policies they deem unwise is rarely, if ever, based on
abstract considerations. There is no mystery as to who may be expected
to advocate or oppose that argument. Those who suspect that the dem-
ocratic political process will yield policies with which they disagree,
and that, if courts were allowed to decide, more favorable policies
would be adopted, will argue for the equation of wisdom and constitu-
tionality and for judges to protect us all from the folly of majoritarian-
ism. Those who believe that the policies the political branches are likely
to adopt will be reasonably sound, and that judicial involvement will
probably result in actions that are retrogressive and unenlightened, will
argue for the strict separation of wisdom and constitutionality and for
judges to refrain from deciding constitutional questions on the basis of
their own views of wise public policy. It is thus no coincidence that in
the period from the 1880s to the New Deal, when judicial review was
perceived as a major obstacle to the cause of social and economic re-
form, liberal opinion was united in its criticism of the courts for their
failure to respect the distinction between wisdom and constitutional-
ity.81 Similarly, the enthusiasm of liberals for judicial intervention in
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30. The classic statement of this proposition is that of Justice Jackson: "We [the
Supreme Court] are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only be-
cause we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
31. As Robert Jackson noted shortly after the end of this period, the "long-
smouldering intellectual revolt against the philosophy of many of the Supreme Court's
decisions [equating wisdom and constitutionality] ... was led by outspoken and
1 7:1982
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policy matters that blossomed during the era of the Warren Court can
hardly be unrelated to their preference for the policies that present-day
judges can sometimes be persuaded to adopt.-2 Conversely, conserva-
tives, who once looked upon courts as a bastion for the protection of
property rights against legislative policies they abhorred, 3 have come
to see the virtue of distinguishing wisdom from constitutionality now
that they perceive that policies favored by the courts may be less to
their liking than those of the legislature.3 4 Over the years, the argu-
ment that courts should ignore the distinction between wisdom and
constitutionality by substituting their own policy choices for those of
the political branches has been made and opposed on behalf of causes
both noble and not so noble.
The belief that judges can reliably be counted on to share one's
own conception of wise public policy may be both rational and accurate
with regard to specific issues at specific times. It is a more dubious
basis, however, for a defense of judicial policymaking on all public
questions in all periods. Given the fact that there is no a priori reason
to assume that the policy choices of courts will be objectively better
than those of the legislature, or that judges, who vary widely in philoso-
phy and perspective, will consistently share one's values on public mat-
respected members of the Court itself ... [and was joined by] those in our universities
distinguished for disinterested legal scholarship ... many thoughtful conservatives and
practically all liberals and labor leadership." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDI-
CIAL SUPREMACY V (1941).
32. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv-v (1978).
33. The clearest statement of this view was perhaps that of Justice Brewer:
I am firmly persuaded that the salvation of the nation, the permanence of
government of and by the people, rests upon the independence and vigor of
the judiciary. To stay the waves of popular feeling, to restrain the greedy
hand of the many from filching from the few that which they have hon-
estly acquired, and to protect in every man's possession and enjoyment, be
he rich or poor, that which he hath, demands a tribunal as strong as is
consistent with the freedom of human action and as free from all influ-
ences and suggestions other than is compassed in the thought of justice, as
can be created out of the infirmities of human nature. To that end courts
exist ....
Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION 37, 47 (1893).
34. See, e.g., Graglia, In Defense of Judicial Restraint, in SUPREME COURT AC-
TIVISM AND RESTRAINT, supra note 23, at 135-37.
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ters, it would seem difficult to argue for a broad judicial policymaking
role in all areas. Certainly even the most optimistic judicial activist
today can feel no assurance that courts, given freedom to make their
own policy choices "whenever they want," will no longer use that power
to block legislative efforts at social, political, or economic reform.3 5 To
invite judges to equate their own notions of wise policy with the re-
quirements of the Constitution, and to do so on their own terms, is to
run the risk of opening a Pandora's Box of unforeseeable content.
If an understandable basis for advocating judicial activism in all
areas of policy is difficult to perceive, it is easy to see a principled justi-
fication for an across-the-board opposition to judicial policymaking-it
seems squarely inconsistent with democratic theory. As Terrance
Sandalow has written: "Reducing the influence of politics upon govern-
mental policy is, in short, a means of reducing the influence on policy
of those whose lives are affected by it.'" The observation that judicial
policymaking is antidemocratic is, of course, not new, 37 nor has it gone
unchallenged.38 The basis of the challenge, as it is most commonly
made, is that democracy, at least in its pure form, was not the form of
government chosen by the framers of the Constitution, who, through
such means as the electoral college, the imposition of constitutional re-
35. For recent examples of transparent exercises of judicial policymaking in
which legislative efforts at social, economic, or political reform were thwarted, see, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (declaring invalid, on first amendment grounds,
the critical expenditure-limitation provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974 through which the Congress had sought to protect the integrity
of the federal election process against the kinds of abuses that came to light as a result
of the Watergate scandals); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(striking down, apparently on tenth amendment grounds, the extension by Congress of
the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, to the employees
of state and local governments); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, a Massachusetts law intended to
control the impact of corporate spending on referendum elections); Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking down, on contract clause grounds,
a Minnesota law intended to protect the pension benefits of employees against the risk
of plant shutdowns prior to the establishment of their pension eligibility).
36. Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 459 (1981).
37. See, e.g., the discussion in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-
23 (1962).
38. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 15, at 179-81; Bishin, Judicial Review in
Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
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straints on certain types of majority action, and the creation of an ap-
pointed and life-tenured judiciary, sought to guarantee that the will of
the people would be held within tolerable bounds.39 Judicial review, the
argument goes, although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
is simply another of the checks in the constitutional framework. More-
over, since its exercise has been warmly accepted by the people, it must
be seen as having been approved by democratic choice, and thus cannot
be said to be undemocratic.40 In addition, it is claimed that the whole
argument that courts should defer to the policy judgments of the politi-
cal branches in order to respect the will of the majority is misconceived
because, even if it could be assumed that there is such a thing as the
majority will and that it is possible to ascertain in practice what that
will actually is, the political branches (particularly Congress) are se-
lected and organized in such a way as to insure its frustration, not its
effectuation.4
These challenges to the claim that judicial policymaking is an-
tidemocratic have been answered meticulously and effectively by Jesse
Choper,42 whose argument cannot even be summarized here. Suffice it
to say that, while one must concede the existence of myriad ways in
which the political branches can function undemocratically and escape
public accountability, Congress and the President remain vastly more
responsive to public opinion than the federal courts. And, while the
American people clearly favor judicial review and expect the courts to
hold the other branches of government within constitutional limits, it
requires an enormous jump to conclude from that observation that the
public would approve the courts' use of that power to invalidate presi-
dential or congressional action in any case in which the judges deemed
the policy underlying that action to be mistaken.43 While the framers
39. See id. at 1104-08.
40. C. BLACK, supra note 15, at 178-79, 210-12.
41. The best, and perhaps now the classic, statement of this argument is in M.
SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 17-25 (1966).
42. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 29-
59 (1980).
43. There is more than a little merit in the observation of Robert Bork:
The Supreme Court regularly insists that its results, and most particularly
its controversial results, do not spring from the mere will of the Justices in
the majority but are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understand-
7:98
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undoubtedly were uneasy about some of the possible ramifications of
majority rule and sought to guard against its potential excesses, they
did so, as Gordon Wood describes it, "without repudiating the republi-
canism and the popular basis of government that nearly all devoutly
believed in."" That the action of the people's representatives may need
to be checked from time to time and in particular ways does not render
unlimited judicial policymaking legitimate. If judges may freely substi-
tute their own policy preferences for those of the legislature, we should
no longer claim to be a democracy, and should seek to find a new name
and a new theory for the governmental system which has evolved.
If judicial policymaking-the equation of wisdom with constitu-
tionality-is sometimes imperative but not always permissible, just
when is it proper and defensible? My own choice for the proper start-
ing place in the search for the answer is Justice Stone's justly cele-
brated Carolene Products footnote of 1938."5 There Stone suggested
that the political process was the proper area for the resolution of pol-
icy questions' 6 except where effective access to it is wholly or partially
closed off to the persons affected by the policy at issue or where
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities"' seems likely to
have been the motivation for its adoption or enforcement. In those
cases, courts may legitimately view with skepticism the results arrived
at through the political process and undertake to assess for themselves
ing of the Constitution of the United States. Value choices are attributed
to the Founding Fathers, not to the Court. The way an institution adver-
tises tells you what it thinks its customers demand.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4
(1971).
44. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CON-
STITUTION? 1, 16 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980).
45. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). It
is precisely because it uses the Carolene Products footnote as the starting place in the
search for the answer that I find J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) to be the
most pregnant and insightful of the recent writings on the legitimate role of judicial
review in a democratic society. Professor Miller is, of course, not of the same opinion.
See Miller, Book Review, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 369 (1980).
46. Stone's view of the proper locus of policymaking authority in the ordinary
case was forcefully expressed in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936).
47. The term comes from the third paragraph of the Carolene Products footnote,
304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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the desirability of the policy outcome.48 The thrust of Stone's Carolene
Products approach (at least the approach described in the second and
third paragraphs of the footnote) 49 may be characterized as resting
upon a "legislative failure" theory 5 ---that is, the theory that judicial
resolution of the policy questions inherent in constitutional adjudication
becomes permissible when the political process (most commonly the
legislative process) fails adequately to perform its function of attaining
a just and fair compromise among competing interests because of im-
perfect access or prejudice.
It may be that a legislative failure theory alone is insufficient to
cover all of the circumstances in which the policy judgments of the
legislature may be judicially disregarded. Institutional considerations
may undoubtedly justify a greater role for courts in the evaluation of
procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules, 51 and there should be some
48. As Stone was to write two years after Carolene Products:
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal
liberty by the state which have not been justified. . . in the name of right-
eousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed...
at politically helpless minorities.
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
49. There is another paragraph - the first - which suggests that courts might
be justified in not accepting the policy judgments of the political branches where the
action being challenged appears to violate one of the specific prohibitions of the Consti-
tution. This paragraph was not in Justice Stone's original version of the footnote but
was added later at the urging of Chief Justice Hughes. See L. LUSKY, By WHAT
RIGHT? 108-11 (1975). It is somewhat at odds with the portion of the footnote that
Stone had conceived because it seeks to justify judicial rejection of legislative policy
judgments, not on the basis of any reason to believe that the legislative process may not
have functioned fairly, but solely on the text of the Constitution. See id. at 111-12.
Since the text is usually not self-defining, ascribing meaning to its provisions is an act
of policymaking. If, as Stone believed, courts should defer to the policy judgments of
the political branches in the ordinary case, why not in these cases as well? That is, as
long as there is no ground for suspicion that the political branches may be unjustly
disfavoring those without an effective voice in the political process or those toward
whom majoritarian prejudice may be directed.
50. It has, in fact, been so characterized by Owen Fiss. See Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1979). Professor Fiss is extremely critical
of the Carolene Products approach because he rejects its "general presumption in favor
of majoritarianism." Id. at 6.
51. Even Justice Frankfurter, who saw no room for judicial reexamination of the
substantive policy choices of the legislature as long as these choices could be said to be
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room for judicial invalidation of statutes touching on individual rights
where these cannot be said'to serve any legitimate public purpose52 or
where, in the classic formulation of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law."53 But surely the protection of
the powerless and the unrepresented from a hostile or unsympathetic
majority is manifestly the great and vital function of judicial review. It
is the fulfillment of that function that amply justifies judicial poli-
cymaking in certain situations: defending the right to hold and to ex-
press beliefs that the majority may regard as abhorrent;5' eliminating
gross legislative malapportionment 5 or discriminatory gerrymander-
ing;56 abolishing all vestiges of racial discrimination that stigmatizes its
victims; 57 taking whatever affirmative action may be required to insure
rationally related to the achievement of a proper public purpose, see, e.g., West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting), conceded the propriety of "the exercise of judgment" by courts in the evalua-
tion of procedures employed in criminal trials "to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
52. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidating Connecti-
cut's anti-contraception law. Cf. Justice Harlan's statement in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion), that due process forbids "all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints." The abortion cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 197 (1973), cannot be said to involve purposeless
restraints and thus present a far more difficult issue than Griswold. See, e.g., Epstein,
Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUPREME
COURT REvIEW 157.
53. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54. That is, the kind of protection that the Supreme Court, to its discredit, did
not provide in the years following both World Wars. See, e.g., Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Cf. Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
55. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
57. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Race-conscious legislation
that does not stigmatize those who may be adversely affected is another matter. See
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 373-76 (1978) (opinion
of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). As Laurence Tribe has noted:
"When the group in control of the political process adopts classifications which protect
or benefit a minority and burden itself, the reasons are absent for regarding the govern-
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that public school authorities meet their constitutional responsibility to
establish and maintain school systems "in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch;" 58 and guaranteeing that condi-
tions of confinement in state prisons are not so inhumane and barbaric
as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.59 At the same time, rec-
ognition that legislative failure to protect the rights of those who have
suffered from prejudice or inadequate representation provides the fun-
damental justification for judicial policymaking would spare us judicial
interference with the policy decisions of the political branches in cases
where those who seek judicial protection from the effects of those poli-
cies are themselves in command of substantial political resources and
cannot reasonably be looked upon as the targets of irrational majority
hostility.60
But under almost any theory that recognizes some limitations on
judicial discretion, it is difficult to understand how the issue of nuclear
weapons policy could be said to fall within the range of questions that
may be deemed appropriate for judicial, as opposed to political, resolu-
tion. I am not disposed to deny that the issue is one on which human
survival may ultimately depend, or that the policy of increasing our
stockpiles of missiles and warheads (while seeking to negotiate for their
overall limitation) and of maintaining a first-strike capability is one
that carries with it the terrible risk of the eradication of civilization.
mental choice with suspicion, and therefore for strictly scrutinizing the results." L.
TRIBE, suprts note 32, at 1044.
58. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
59. Prisoners clearly fall within the scope of both the second and third
paragraphs of Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote (see supra text accompany-
ing note 47). They have no access to the political process and they are a "discrete and
insular" minority. They are "voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening."
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. Among the recent judicial excrescences that might have been avoided under
a legislative failure theory are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (declaring invalid
the expenditure limitations in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, even as applied to the campaigns of the Republican and Democratic candidates
for federal office - individuals who, as a group, are probably the least lacking in politi-
cal efficacy of anyone in the country); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (declaring invalid the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
to employees of state and local governments, in disregard of what Justice Brennan, in
dissent, described as "the enormous impact of the States' political power" when exer-
cised in the federal political process. Id. at 878 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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But the urgency of the issue and the potentially frightful consequences
of mis'calculation are not what should determine whether the matter is
one for the political or the judicial process. In fact, recalling the obser-
vation of Terrance Sandalow, one might reasonably conclude that the
more urgent the issue, the more vital it is to avoid "reducing the influ-
ence on policy of those whose lives are affected by it." 1 Shifting the
question to the judicial forum converts it into a dispute to which most
of us become bystanders; leaving it in the political process can nurture
a sense of public responsibility-such as is currently being manifested
in the rapid growth of the grass-roots movement for a nuclear freeze.
Moreover, raising the issue in the courts carries its own risks, which
ought not to be minimized. As Charles Black has shown, judicial action
can do much to legitimize governmental policy.62 A ruling by the Su-
preme Court that the maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal is con-
stitutional (which is the only ruling realistically to be expected should
the question actually reach the Court and be decided on the merits)
could, in light of the public tendency noted by Justice Frankfurter "to
regard a law as all right if it is constitutional," 8 seriously undermine
the cause of opposition to nuclear weapons" by raising doubts in the
minds of many persons about the point of continuing to object to a
policy whose validity has been judicially affirmed.
Obviously, the issue of nuclear weapons policy is not one where
access to the political process is in some way closed off to those whose
interests are affected.65 Nor is it one where the government's policy is
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 15.
63. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
64. The legitimating function of the Supreme Court has already dealt a blow to
the opponents of nuclear power plants. Ignoring serious questions of standing in order
to reach the merits of a suit brought by groups seeking to block plant construction, the
Court gave advance validation to the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which limits the
total amount of a company's liability in the event of a nuclear accident. As long as the
validity of the act was an open question, companies had a strong motivation for caution
in entering the nuclear power industry. The legitimation of the act took away that need
for caution and gave the companies concerned a significant stimulus to proceed. See
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
65. Of course, human survival is not a question about which only citizens of the
United States have an interest. Every person in the world may well have a life-or-death
interest in what the policy of the United States is with regard to nuclear weapons, but
891
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aimed at, or may be expected to have its harshest effects upon, a disad-
vantaged minority. If nuclear war should come, the costs will be shared
evenly by all, including the officials responsible for developing and sup-
porting the policy that may have led to it. Judicial intervention thus
cannot be justified on the basis of a theory of legislative failure. Indeed,
the issue is not, in the traditional sense, one of individual liberties at
all. For, despite the potential costs to us all, the government is not seek-
ing to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property; it is seeking-beyond
a doubt, sincerely-to protect the nation, its people, and its allies from
a possible external threat, and, presumably, to advance the cause of
world peace through nuclear deterrence. In that regard, it cannot be
said that the government's policy is unrelated to the attainment of a
legitimate public purpose or that it is rationally insupportable. As
strongly as I believe that a policy which accepts the risk of nuclear war
is intolerable, and as easily as I may talk in private about "nuclear
madness," I would find it impossible to assert that no rational and fair
man could subscribe to the government's policy or could conscientiously
accept its assumption that the surest way of avoiding nuclear war-a
goal, I trust, that everyone shares-is to maintain a nuclear force of
sufficient strength to deter the use of such weapons by anyone else.
What is more, it is not clear what courts could do even if they
undertook to call into question the validity of the government's policy.
They could presumably hold that it is unconstitutional for the United
States to maintain nuclear weapons, but what then? Professor Miller
emphatically states that he is not advocating unilateral disarmament,
but merely urging a recognition of the government's constitutional duty
"to take action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world" 66 -which means, I presume, a duty to negotiate with other na-
tions to effect the abolition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, no court
could be expected to order unilateral disarmament; the most it could do
would be to order the government to enter into disarmament negotia-
tions. But I fail to see how such an order would markedly alter the
only United States citizens have direct access to the American political process. How-
ever, since the interest of all persons in survival is identical, the claims of nonresidents
of the United States may be fully represented by their counterparts among United
States citizens. This is a genuine class-action matter regardless of whether it is heard in
the political process or the judicial process.
66. Miller, supra note 2, at 24.
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existing situation. Nuclear weapons would continue to exist (and pre-
sumably, to be manufactured and deployed) during the course of
whatever negotiations would be held. The negotiations themselves
would be carried out by the President (for I doubt that even Professor
Miller is yet prepared to urge that federal courts oust the President
from the process and commence their own negotiations with foreign
governments), and would in all likelihood go on pretty much as at pre-
sent. Because any judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of nu-
clear weapons would have no effect until the completion of successful
negotiations, it could not be expected either to cause the government to
negotiate differently than it otherwise would or to cause the public to
put greater pressure on it to conclude an agreement. The President
would be no more willing to sign a treaty except on terms that he
would consider to be fully consistent with the security interests of the
United States and the public would be no more prepared to insist that
the government accept less than the most favorable possible agreement.
Nuclear weapons are already generally perceived as abominable; yet,
as long as they are possessed by other nations, considerations of na-
tional security make the abominable seem tolerable. It is extremely
doubtful that a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality would do
more to cancel out these national security concerns than abhorrence
already does.
In sum, regardless of the magnitude of the stakes, what our nu-
clear weapons policy should be seems clearly to be a question of wis-
dom, not of constitutionality. The policy area is one where responsibil-
ity for decision making is squarely and unequivocally delegated to the
political branches by the Constitution. The soundness of the policy
raises questions about which reasonable men may differ. The hazards
that the policy generates must be faced as fully by the policymakers
themselves as by any inadequately represented or disadvantaged minor-
ity group. All of these factors point to the appropriateness of a political
resolution, as courts undoubtedly would recognize should the issue
somehow be brought before them.
It seems likely that the ultimate purpose of Professor Miller's
breathtaking exercise in constitutional reasoning is not the futile and
misdirected effort to involve the courts in the resolution of this ques-
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tion, 7 but the generation of additional political pressure for a reversal
of current governmental policy. If that is his purpose, I wish him well.
But it is essential to remember that the horse must be kept in front of
the cart. It may well be that in some saner future, if humanity does
eventually manage to overcome the threat of nuclear devastation, it will
be the common understanding that nuclear weapons are wholly unac-
ceptable in a civilized world. That understanding may then come to be
recognized as an integral part of our constitutional law. When that
time is reached, Professor Miller's article may well be looked back
upon as the first groundbreaking step leading us to the path of higher
constitutional wisdom. But that higher constitutional wisdom will not
be achieved unless we first become convinced of the absolute necessity
of abolishing nuclear weapons as a matter of policy. Until the day has
been won on the policy question, the argument for the unconstitutional-
ity of nuclear weapons will remain a curiosity except to those who al-
ready share its underlying policy premises. It is indispensable, there-
fore, that current efforts to change national policy be directed at
persuading those who do not yet agree that continued reliance on nu-
clear weapons is unwise rather than unconstitutional.
67. It might be argued, with some merit, that the opponents of current nuclear
weapons policy have little to lose by trying to raise the issue of the constitutional merits
of that policy in the courts as well as in the political process. If they lose in the political
process, they just might win in court; on the other hand, if they win in the political
process, there is no danger that the courts would overturn that victory. It is certainly
true that courts would not overturn such a political victory as long as the traditional
limitations on judicial authority are respected. But, while fanciful, it is possible to im-
agine judges appointed by Ronald Reagan and holding the views on the scope of judi-
cial power and the concept of affirmative constitutional duty espoused by Arthur Miller
(see Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
199) who might assert that since the Constitution imposes upon the federal government
the affirmative constitutional duty to protect human dignity, and since human dignity is
only possible in a non-Communist society, the Constitution requires the United States
to maintain and deploy an arsenal of nuclear weapons sufficient to guard against the
possibility of successful Communist aggression. Why is it necessary to assume that the
policy decisions of judges will be ones that we would embrace? That was certainly not
the case prior to 1937. It is not always the case today. It need not be the case in the
future.
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II
Nuclear Weapons Policy: The Ultimate Tyranny
*Elliott L. Meyrowitz
In Foreign Affairs and The Constitution,' Professor Louis Henkin
pointed out that one of the important traditional functions of the Con-
stitution, albeit many times overlooked and ignored, has been to limit
the actions of our government in the area of foreign relations. The orig-
inal conception of democratic life rested primarily on the idea that re-
straints must be placed upon governmental leaders. The founders of the
Republic wanted to prevent the evils of absolute power in foreign af-
fairs. In fact, as Professor Henkin also pointed out,2 how the Constitu-
tion should govern the conduct of foreign affairs was a prominent con-
cern during the deliberations of the constitutional convention.
Eventually, Congress was entrusted with the responsibility to declare
war, and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, was expected to carry
out foreign policy within a framework of law.
Notwithstanding the intent of the framers of the Constitution,
courts in the United States have been extremely reluctant to examine
questions touching on foreign policy, concluding that such issues are
nonjusticiable because the subject matter of foreign relations is en-
trusted to the discretion of the executive branch of government. In the
background of this judicial thinking lurks the notion that the sovereign
has unfettered discretion in the area of foreign relations. Ironically,
those very same courts continue to uphold the idea that restraint in the
domestic sphere is necessary if the courts are to guard society from
abuse by the state.
There is no issue more central to the conduct of United States
foreign policy than the strategies associated with the threat of use or
the actual use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, for thirty-seven years,
* Elliott L. Meyrowitz is an attorney and an adjunct Professor of Law at The
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University and vice chairperson of the
lawyers' committee on Nuclear Policy.
1. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
2. Id. at vii.
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American legal institutions have been either indifferent to the impact
of the nuclear weapons structure on democratic governance or believed
that the Constitution has little, if any, role to play in areas of "high
policy" such as national security. If there has been any discussion on
this subject at all, it is generally claimed by the legal community and
policy-makers alike, that the existence of nuclear weapons under the
doctrine of deterrence is the bulwark of American freedom, which in
turn only adds to the enormous responsibilities of the President in the
area of foreign policy.
In his article, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law,3 Profes-
sor Miller has broken this profound and dangerous silence. By pointing
out the serious defects in our governing process caused by our nuclear
weapons policy, he refuses to accept the notion that the Constitution is
irrelevant to questions of momentous historic importance. His argu-
ments are built upon the idea that if the Constitution was relevant to
the formation of our government, it is equally relevant to policies which
could destroy the nation. Hence, implicit in Professor Miller's analysis
is a well justified belief that the issue of nuclear weapons is of far too
great an importance to be the preserve solely of government leaders,
foreign policy experts or military professionals. Citizens in general, and
the legal community in particular, must be involved in deciding the
momentous question of whether there are any rational or moral
grounds for using nuclear weapons. The publication of Professor
Miller's analysis is particularly gratifying because the inclusion of a
legal analysis in answering this question will help create an atmosphere
affirming the relevance of democratic standards and processes to the
issue of national security and the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
In this regard, Professor Miller's lucid presentation and probing
analysis is premised upon an important historic fact - that the most
fundamental challenges to established governmental policies have de-
pended upon prior expressions of citizen concern. Traditionally, a legal
analysis has been relevant to the scale and grounds of such concern.
Certainly, it should not be forgotten that in areas basic to democracy,
civil liberties and civil rights, a sense of constitutional entitlement un-
derlay and inspired the recourse to citizen activism which in turn sub-
sequently produced an altered climate enabling adjustments in public
3. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982).
194 7:1982 1Nova Law Journal
93
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
The Ultimate Tyranny
policy and laws.
At this juncture in my comment, I would like to focus and expand
upon two especially significant points made by Professor Miller that
concern how nuclear weapons challenge our governing process: 1.) the
abuse of state power; and 2.) the applicability of international law. For
this author, the development, possession, and deployment of nuclear
weapons and the government's willingness and readiness to use them
has severely undercut some of the most basic traditions and structures
of democratic society. This conclusion is derived from two mutually
reinforcing circumstances.
The first of these circumstances concerns assumptions of absolute
authority by our governmental leaders over the well-being of the citi-
zenry without sufficient accountability in the area of national security.
The authority of the President in the area of nuclear weapons policy
gives that office unrestrained power over human destiny- without an
equivalent in human history - that is, the power to cause a global
human apocalypse. Certainly, even the most despotic tyrant claiming to
rule by divine right never wielded such power.
To say the least, the absolute nature of the power of the President
in this area makes a mockery of our democratic standards and
processes. Given the democratic traditions of this nation, it would be
difficult to imagine a reasonably prudent citizen assenting to the grant
of such awesome power to one person or one branch of government
when the exercise of that power could spell unparalleled human death
and destruction.
Furthermore, the very nature of nuclear weapons forces us to live
constantly on the edge of war. Nuclear weapons technology is such that
human extinction is only a few minutes away. This technology and the
nuclear weapons policies that have evolved since 1945 compel our soci-
ety to live in a permanent pre-war atmosphere, a permanent state of
military mobilization to wage a nuclear conflict. It has been the con-
ventional wisdom that the President as Commander-in-Chief only exer-
cised his emergency battlefield decision-making power during wartime.
Now, the President exercises power in "peacetime" that he could only
exercise during a war. Consequently, the nuclear national security
structure that has emerged over the past thirty-seven years has had the
effect of erasing the distinction between the peacetime and wartime
powers of the President which are so fundamental to the operation of
democratic processes.
95
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Whether the nuclear national security system constructed around
deterrence gives rise to a nuclear war or not, that system has also
caused the rise of a society based on secrecy and surveillance. To ap-
preciate the incompatability of the government's nuclear weapons poli-
cies with the idea of a democratic society, one need only look at the
political repression and hysteria associated with the espionage issue of
the 1950's. One justification offered at that time by the government for
this repression was to prevent the "secret" of the atomic bomb from
falling into the hands of a hostile foreign power. How absurd this justi-
fication now appears in light of the atomic bomb that was designed as a
classroom exercise by a college student using publicly obtainable docu-
ments. Even still the government persists in withholding information
with which citizens could rationally evaluate the effects and conse-
quences of our nuclear weapons policies as well as engaging in secret
surveillance of lawful political activities by the citizenry. The effective-
ness of this repression can be evaluated by simply inquiring of the
American public whether they are aware of the numerous occasions
since 1945 when our foreign policy decision-makers seriously contem-
plated the threat of use or the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
situation.
The other circumstance which was touched upon briefly by Profes-
sor Miller, in arguing that democratic society is being seriously dam-
aged by nuclear weapons, is that nuclear weapons cannot be reconciled
with the basic principles of international law.
The prevalent belief among the general public as well as policy-
makers is that nuclear weapons are legal under international law. The
official position of the United States as found in its military manuals is
the blanket assertion that a state may do whatever it is not expressly
forbidden from doing. Therefore, the United States government argues
that since international law has not generated a duly ratified treaty,
there is no foundation for contending that nuclear weapons are illegal
or prohibited.
However, the legality of nuclear weapons cannot be judged solely
by the existence or non-existence of a treaty rule specifically prohibi-
tiong or restricting their use. Any reasonable analysis must take into
consideration all the recognized sources of international law - treaties,
custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and the writing of
qualified publicists. Of particular relevance in evaluating nuclear weap-
ons are the many treaties and conventions which limit the use of weap-
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ons in war; the fundamental distinction between combatant and non-
combatant; and the principles of humanity including the prohibition of
weapons and tactics that are especially cruel and cause unnecessary
suffering. A review of these basic principles supports the conclusion
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons pursuant to either a doctrine
of massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction, counterforce, or lim-
ited nuclear war, is illegal under international law.
Restraints on the conduct of hostilities are traditionally not limited
to those given explicit voice in specific treaty stipulations. Aware of the
continuous evolution of war technology, the 1907 Hague Regulations
contain a general yardstick intended exactly for situations where no
specific treaty rule exists to prohibit a new type of weapon or tactic. In
such cases, "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the pro-
tection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience."" Hence, this
general rule, known as the Martens Clause, makes the principles of
humanity and the dictates of public conscience obligatory by them-
selves, without the formulation of a treaty specifically prohibiting a
new weapon.
Ever since the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868,1 the princi-
ples of humanity have been asserted as a legal constraint upon military
necessity. The Declaration embodies the twin ground rules of the laws
of war: that "the right to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited"6 and that "the only legitimate object which states should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of
the enemy. ' '1
Another basic source of the laws of war is the Hague Conventions
4. 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309 (L. Friedman ed. 1972).
For a wider discussion of the Martens Clause see Fried, The Electronic Battlefield and
the Dictates of the Public Conscience, REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 431-
54 (Feb. 1972).
5. Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectices
(1868) which appears in I THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
4, at 192. See also 3 R. PHILLIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-62 (3d ed. 1885); 1
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 95 (1907).
6. See 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4.
7. Id.
971
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of 1907,8 particularly the Regulations embodied in Hague Convention
IV. These Regulations are recognized as "the foundation stones of
modern law of armed conflict." 9 A fundamental tenet of these Regula-
tions is the prohibition of weapons and tactics which cause wanton or
indiscriminate destruction.
It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons in populated areas
would result in the indiscriminate and massive slaughter of civilians.
Moreover, even if nuclear weapons were used only against an enemy's
strategic nuclear forces, the annihilation and extermination of the civil-
ian population would be an inevitable by-product. As the experiences of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki amply demonstrate, the effects of nuclear
weapons because of their very awesome nature, cannot be limited to
military targets. Consequently, the use of nuclear weapons would result
in the commission of war crimes on an enormous scale.
The effect of radioactive fallout can also be considered the func-
tional equivalent of the effects of the use of poison gas or bacteriologi-
cal weapon. The Hague Declaration (IV, 2) concerning Asphyxiating
Gases of 189910 prohibits projectiles whose sole purpose is the diffusion
of asphyxiating gases and the Geneva Gas Protocol of 192511 prohibits
the use of both poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons. A strong
case can be made that human exposure to radiation or radioactive fall-
out brings nuclear weapons within the ambit of these international con-
ventions. While it is true that nuclear weapons do not produce the bac-
teria, fungi or living organisms normally associated with bacteriological
weapons, it is indisputable that nuclear weapons do alter the chemical
structure of humans, plants and animals, as well as producing long-
8. Convention (IV) Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened
for signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT 57-92 (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds. 1973). See also 36 Stat. 2277, T.S.
No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
9. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET No. 110-31, INTERNATIONAL
LAW - THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS ch. 1, at 1 & ch.
5, at I (Washington, D.C. 1976).
10. Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (1899) in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 99-101. See also 1 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 129, 155 (1907).
11. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 109-20. (1925) See also, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061,
94 L.N.S.T. 65, 14 I.L.M. 49 (1975).
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term genetic effects.
Certainly, both bacteriological and nuclear weapons are poten-
tially weapons of mass destruction with an unprecedented capability to
destroy the physical integrity of the planet and to threaten our exis-
tence as a species. If the conscience of the international legal communi-
ty finds the scale of potential effects produced by the use of bacterio-
logical weapons inherently objectionable, then it necessarily follows
that the prohibition of their use should be extended to nuclear weapons.
In view of the similar potential of each type of weapon for far-reaching
destruction, it would be difficult to grasp the legal or moral basis for
condemning one, but tolerating the other.
Flowing logically from the requirement that weapons must be used
selectively and only against military targets, is the commitment to pro-
tect civilians and the elementary distinction between combatants and
non-combatants. The principle that civilian populations can never be
regarded as military objects is, in fact, "at the very heart of the laws of
war."' 2 Without the element of discrimination between military and
non-military targets, the fundamental distinction between combatants
and non-combatants becomes meaningless. Today, the use of nuclear
weapons pursuant to either the doctrines of mutual assured destruction,
counterforce, or limited nuclear war would result in the indiscriminate
and massive slaughter of civilian populations. To recognize the legality
of nuclear weapons, given their capacity to terrorize and destroy a civil-
ian population, would be to eliminate virtually the entire thrust and
significance of the laws of war.
The universally accepted Geneva Conventions of 1949 reaffirm the
distinction between combatant and non-combatant. In particular,
"Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War"13 imposes additional detailed obligations on all belligerents to
ensure the essential requirements for the health, safety and sustenance
of the civilian population. Given the evidence developed by doctors and
12. R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 30 (Occasional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program,
Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1981)). For a further discussion
of this point see VI The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, 153 (Yale ed. 1944).
13. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (1949), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 417-512. See also 6
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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scientists as to the medical and environmental consequences of nuclear
weapons, it is clear that it would be impossible under conditions of nu-
clear war to carry out the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, just
as it would also be impossible to live up to the dictates of the Hague
Conventions - both of which aim at preserving the minimum require-
ments for the continued survivability and viability of all societies in-
volved in armed conflict.
Complementing the distinction between combatants and noncom-
batants is the equally important principle that the international de-
struction of a group of people because of their race, religion or nation-
ality constitutes a crime under international law. This legal innovation,
which is embodied in the Nuremberg Principles14 and underlies the Ge-
nocide Convention of 1948,15 further extended the "principles of hu-
manity" which had earlier been used to determine the legality or ille-
gality of specific weapons.
The deaths resulting from an all-out nuclear exchange between the
United States and the Soviet Union are estimated, conservatively, at
more then 300 million people. Obviously, the indiscriminate human
slaughter resulting from a major nuclear war would dwarf even the
awesome genocidal policies enacted by the Nazi government during
World War II. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and
their known radioactive effects, any large-scale use of nuclear weapons
would produce consequences clearly contrary to the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Nuremberg Principles and the Genocide Convention.
On the basis of these unquestioned principles of international law
enumerated above, the United Nations has offered a legal interpreta-
tion of the status of nuclear weapons. In 1961, the General Assembly
declared in Resolution 1653(XVI) that "any state using nuclear or
thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of
the United Nations, as acting contrary to the law of humanity, and as
14. For the text of Principle VI of the Nuremberg Principles which makes pun-
ishable as an international crime "crimes against humanity," see THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 701-02. See also Report of International Law Commission,
2nd Sess. 5 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 12) at iii-22, U.N. Doe. A/13/16 (1950).
15. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 163-178. See also, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
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committing a crime against mankind and civilization."16 That Resolu-
tion was reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions in 1978 and 1980.17 As
evidenced by these actions of the General Assembly, a consensus has
been clearly emerging that the use of nuclear weapons contradicts the
fundamental humanitarian principles upon which the international law
of war is founded.
Despite the clarity of the fundamental precepts of international
law regarding nuclear weapons, there is an influential school of thought
claiming that in an era of "total war" even the most fundamental rules
can be disregarded in the name of military necessity. Ironically, this
view of international law was urged in another context by some of the
Nuremberg defendants and indignantly rejected by the International
Tribunal." The Tribunal's judgment warns that this "Nazi conception"
of total war would destroy the validity of international law altogether.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of such a view would exculpate Auschwitz.
Military necessity cannot be allowed to justify barbarism.
Even though the laws of war were violated on numerous occasions
during World War II by even the Allies, this is not sufficient reason to
abandon the laws of war. Rather than ignoring the content of interna-
tional law, the American legal community needs to restore respect for
the limits on state sovereignty set by the laws of war, not validate past
disrespect and criminality by cynical claims to the irrelevancy of inter-
national law. To that end, it is practical, not idealistic, to take interna-
tional law seriously. We would be more secure as a people, not less, if
our governmental leaders were to try to conform national policy to the
minimal obligations of international law. To assume the legality of a
weapon with the distinct capability to terrorize and to destroy an entire
civilian population makes meaningless the entire effort to limit combat
through the laws of war. Global "survivability" is so elemental that the
prohibition against nuclear weapons can be reasonably inferred from
the existing laws of war. To conclude differently would be to ignore the
16. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961).
17. Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A. Res.
33/71-B, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); G.A.
Res. 35/152-0, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
18. For the text of the Final Judgment see, 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 171 (1947).
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barbaric and nefarious character of the use of nuclear weapons. As the
laws of war embody the minimum demands of decency, exempting nu-
clear weapons from regulatory prohibition would be abandoning even
this minimum standard.
In conclusion, we have reached a dramatic stage in our history as
a nation where our foreign policy must be carried out within the re-
straints of constitutional and international law. The demand for an ef-
fective legal structure is not quixotic - it is an absolute requirement of
survival. Accordingly, a legal challenge gives our courts an important
opportunity to "check" the most dangerous of all possible excesses of
government which threatens not only the very foundations of our soci-
ety, but all humanity. Of course, neither legal argument nor legal tac-
tic is alone going to make the significant difference, especially where,
as here, they touch sensitively upon prevailing notions of national se-
curity. However, it should be remembered that constitutional and inter-
national legal principles proved relevant for citizens who sought to
question the legality of American policies in Vietnam. The strength of
these principles as constraints upon the war-making power of the Presi-
dent cannot be measured by the extent of the adherence on the part of
the government alone. The assimilation and acceptance of these con-
straints at the level of conventional legal wisdom may influence the
choice of tactics and policies at official decision-making levels and even-
tually build support for nuclear disarmament initiatives and a less mili-
tarized conception of national security. If we are to protect humanity
from drifting further toward nuclear catastrophe, then we in the legal
community must expose the incompatability of nuclear weapons with
all the values that the Constitution obligates us to preserve. At stake is
a democratic society and, indeed, life itself.
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International Law as Law of the Land: Another
Constitutional Constraint on Use of Nuclear
Weapons.
Martin Feinrider*
Introduction
Concern now focuses on the threat to humankind posed by nuclear
weapons to an extent not seen since the days of the Ban-the-Bomb
movement of the 1950s.1 During the past several years, millions of peo-
ple have taken to the streets in North America and Europe to express
this concern.2 Now, in the United States, physicians, scientists and law-
yers are banding together in their own professional organizations to
concentrate energies and expertise on this, the greatest problem of our
age.3
As part of the legal community's effort to address issues presented
by nuclear weapons,4 Professor Arthur S. Miller has written a thought-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. The
author is a member of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by Maria Fernandez-Valle,
a Goodwin Research Fellow at Nova Law Center, during preparation of this Article for
publication.
1. "Concern for the risks of nuclear proliferation (and for the underlying risk of
nuclear war) is the beginning of wisdom." Farley, Nuclear Proliferation, in SETrING
NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE NEXT TEN YEARS 129, 165 (H. Owen & C. L. Schultze
eds. 1976).
During November 1982 elections, Nuclear Freeze proposals were approved in 9
out of 10 state referenda and 27 out of 29 city and county referenda. Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, November llth Convocation Update, No. 8 (Nov. 5, 1982).
2. See generally Butterfield, Anatomy of the Nuclear Protest, N.Y. Times, July
11, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 14.
3. E.g., Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Union of Concerned Scientists,
the Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, and the New York-based Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy.
4. During the 1982-83 academic year symposia or law review issues dedicated to
examination of legal questions 'raised by nuclear weaponry have been or will be pro-
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ful and thought-provoking essay exploring, in a preliminary way, con-
stitutional considerations relevant to American nuclear weapons strat-
egy.5 In the process of examining implications of the President's Article
II responsibilities, Professor Miller asks, "is international law a part of
the corpus of laws that the President must faithfully execute?"' The
answer is, most assuredly, yes.7
International law is part of the law of the United States. It binds
the United States through its constitutional incorporation into domestic
law, and also in its own right, as a self-contained legal system function-
ing independently of municipal law mechanisms of implementation and
enforcement. Substantively, international law binding upon the United
States already prohibits the aggressive threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons 8 and by treaty makes illegal a significant number of other uses of
nuclear weapons.9 Additionally there are other evolving international
law limitations and prohibitions relevant to nuclear weapons, 10 and, as
they crystallize, they will similarly constrain United States nuclear op-
tions. International law thus affects the legality of United States nu-
duced at Brooklyn Law School, Georgetown University Law School, McGill University
Law School, Nova University Law Center, Harvard Law School, and the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. Additionally, at least 37 law schools held events
coinciding with November 11, 1982 Veterans' Day anti-nuclear activities cosponsored
by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the
Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control.
5. See Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21
(1982).
6. Id. at 33.
7. Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 803
n.131 (1976) ("the President is required to execute treaty and customary obligations
faithfully bbth at home and abroad"). See Paust, Is the President Bound by the Su-
preme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. - (forthcoming 1982). Contra, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (1972) ("the Constitution does not forbid the Presi-
dent (or the Congress) to violate international law"). For a well-reasoned critique of
Henkin's thesis, however, see Paust, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q., supra, at __ . For an
examination of domestic law implications for the United Kingdom of the international
illegality of nuclear weapons see Background Paper, Nuclear Weapons and the Law, 5
ST. RESEARCH BULL. (No. 31) 170 (1982).
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
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clear strategy directly and as another dimension of the constitutional
restraints outlined by Professor Miller.
I. International Law as Law of the Land: An Historical
Overview
International law was part of eighteenth century English common
law received into American law."1 State courts applied it prior to adop-
tion of the Constitution,12 and it was thoroughly familiar to partici-
11. One finds support for this proposition in the writings of that era's foremost
legal scholars, Blackstone and Lord Mansfield among them, "[W]here the individuals
of any state violate [the Law of Nations], it is then the interest as well as the duty of
the government under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming se-
verity, that the peace of the world may be maintained." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 68 (Ist ed. 1765-69) (emphasis added). For other examples of Blackstone's
writing on this subject, see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 75, 263-64 (1st ed.
1765-69); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69, 108 (1st ed. 1765-69); 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 67-73 (1st ed. 1765-69).
Lord Mansfield wrote extensively and authoritatively on this subject. See, e.g.,.
Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617, 2 Burr. 882, 887 (K.B. 1759); Lindo v. Rodney,
in LeCaux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 385, 2 Doug. 594, 613 (1782).
See also the writing of Chief Justice Holt in Mogadara v. Holt, 89 Eng. Rep. 597-
98, 1 Show. K.B. 317-19 (K.B. 1691); and the writing of Lord Stowell in The Maria,
165 Eng. Rep. 199, 1 C. Rob 340, 350 (Adm. 1799); and The Recovery, 165 Eng. Rep.
955, 958, 6 C. Rob. 341, 348 (Adm. 1807) ("this is a Court of the Law of Nations,
though sitting here under the authority of the King of Great Britain.").
The Act of Anne of 1708 recognized that arrest of an ambassador pursuant to the
suit of creditors was "contrary of the Law of Nations" and proceeded to avoid all such
suits. Blackstone wrote that the Act was "not to be considered as introductive of any
new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the king-
dom; without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world." 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (1st ed. 1765-69). Lord Chancellor Talbot, in Barbuits Case
in Chancery, 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 777 (Ch. 1735), wrote that the Act was "only declara-
tory of the antient universal jus gentium," and Lord Mansfield agreed, observing that
the Act of Anne did not vary from international law because "[tlhis privilege of foreign
ministers . . . depends upon the law of nations," Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936,
937, 3 Burr. 1478, 1480 (K.B. 1764).
See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, especially at 33 (1952) ("the Law of Nations
was part of the law of England").
12. E.g., Respublica v. DeLongschamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. Oy. & Term.
1784). "The Law of nations. . .. in its fullest extent, is a part of the law of this state."
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pants in the Constitutional Convention.'" The Framers not only knew
common law writings upon the subject, but were also well schooled, as
was normal for educated men of their times, in the treatises of such
great international law scholars as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel.' 4
What little controversy concerning international law existed dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention came from the inevitable intertwin-
ing of its incorporation with the difficulties of dividing powers between
national and state authorities, and between the various branches of the
proposed national government.15 The Constitution finally assigned ex-
clusive responsibility for international relations to the federal govern-
ment, divided it among the three branches, and specified that, in addi-
tion to the Constitution itself and federal statutes, "all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.' 6
Id. at 116.
13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (J. Jay) (Bourne ed. 1947). THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 112, 114 (A. Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1947); No. 83, at 144 (A.
Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1947); No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1947). See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 451 n.12 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); W. SOLBERG, THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (1979). The participants in the Convention
had a knowledge of contemporary legal thought .... It was axiomatic
among them that the Law of Nations, applicable to individuals and to
states was an integral part of the law which they administered or prac-
ticed .... Whenever in terms or by implication they spoke or wrote with
reference to Law of Nations, they were indulging no mere flight of hopeful
rhetoric....
Dickenson, supra note 11, at 35-36.
14. Dickenson, supra note 11, at 35. See also E. DUMBAULD, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE LAW 33 (1978); W. SOLBERG, supra note 13, at xxx.
15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1977); THE
FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 536 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1977). See M. FARRAND,
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91-123 (1918). See also
Dickenson, supra note 11, at 26-56.
16. U.S. CONST. art VI., cI. 2. Additionally, the Constitution provides that the
President
shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur;...
shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls .... [art.
II, § 2, cl. 2;] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ....
[art. II, § 3; and] shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
Nova Law Journal 7:19821
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Chief Justice John Marshall little doubted that all international
law, no matter what its source, had been incorporated into the law of
the United States."7 American judicial decisions of the last 190 years
generally confirm Marshall's understanding of the place of the law of
nations in American law.18 The simplicity and clarity of early court
the United States and of the Militia of the Several States .... [art. II, §
2, cl. 1].
[Congress has the power to] provide for the common Defense ...
[art. I, § 8, cl. 1;] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .... [art. I, §
8, cl. 3;] define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 10;]
declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 11;] raise and
support Armies .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 12;] provide and maintain a
navy. .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 13; and] make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces [art. I, § 8, cl. 14].
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, aris-
ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of ad-
miralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-. . . to Controversies. . . between a State and
the Citizens of another State;-. . . and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects. . . . [art. III, § 2, cl. 1]. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. [art. III, § 2, cl. 2].
17. "Marshall accepted the binding force of international law upon courts of the
United States with no apparent difficulty. . . " B. ZEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 5 (1939). See, e.g., the following decisions by Marshall: The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825) ("[T]he law of nations. . . which has
received the assent of all must be the law of all. . . ."); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("Until such an act be passed, the court is bound by the law
of nations, which is a part of the law of the land. . . ."); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241, 277 (1808) ("[T]he law of nations is the law of all tribunals . . .");
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n
act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains. .. ").
18. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larrsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Skiriotes v. Flor-
ida, 313 U.S. 69, 72 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); The Paquette
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Tag v.
Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959); The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); The Appam, 234 F. 389, 400 (E.D. Va. 1916); Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan. 1980); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490,
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decisions, however, has been lost as the question of the domestic role of
the law of nations became increasingly complicated by other legal is-
sues, including the allocation of competence between national and state
governments, 19 the political question doctrine,2" the self-execution doc-
trine,21 and the division of foreign affairs powers among the President
and the houses of Congress.22
The general principle that international law is part of United
States law, however, has survived even the chauvinism of manifest
destiny, the banality of American legal positivism, and the arrogance of
power that came with American twentieth century global hegemony.
Unfortunately, most of the present generation of American lawyers and
legal scholars fail to understand the role of international law within
504 (D.N.J. 1978); Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCulloch, 201
F. Supp. 82, 80 (D.D.C. 1962). See also Paust, Litigating Human Rights in U.S.
Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 137 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jenninson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840) (where despite
the absence of an effective federal extradition treaty the governor of Vermont allowed a
Canadian resident to be extradited to Canada from Vermont; the Court refused to hear
the case because the Justices were equally divided on the meaning of the "Agreement
Clause," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See
generally, L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 227-49.
20. See generally, L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 208-16; Gordon, American
Courts, International Law and "Political Questions" Which Touch Foreign Relations,
14 INT'L L. 297 (1980); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 O.S. 297, 302
(1918) ("[C]onduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative--'the political'-Departments of the
Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not sjubject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
21. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at
156-66. For a discussion of self-execution in the context of human rights treaties, see
Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions: A Newly. Developing International Standard,
14 AKRON L. REV. 27, 4:5 n.121 (1980).
22. "[T]he constitution is especially inarticulate in allocating foreign affairs pow-
ers; . . . a particular power can with equal logic and fair constitutional reading be
claimed for the president or for Congress. . . ." L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 90. See
generally T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 135-62 (1979);
Feinrider, America's Oil Pledges to Israel: Illegal But Binding Executive Agreements,
13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 525, 537-49 (1981).
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American law; unlike their predecessors and members of the legal pro-
fession of other nations, they rarely study it.2" The significance of inter-
national law is lost upon this generation for whom American interna-
tional political, economic and military power is a ready substitute.
Nevertheless, as the world grows smaller and American dominance
grows weaker, the relevance of international law may be learned anew.
II. The International Dimension
International law is a law of consent and consensus. The existence
of consent given by sovereign nations is demonstrated by treaty, custom
and general principle-the primary sources of international law.24 In
the era of the United Nations Charter, when multilateral treaties are
common,2  international debate regular, and global communication
rapid, the process of achieving agreement creating international law is
23. "[I]t is really only in the past two decades that doubt has .been cast'on the
propriety of judicial invocation of international legal norms." Gordon, supra note 20, at
309.
24. The STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, generally recog-
nized as the most authoritative contemporary statement of the sources of international
law, directs that the world court shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 38(1). Article 59 of
the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE provides that "[t]he decision
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case."
A recent International Court of Justice case (Nuclear Tests Case-Australia v.
France, 1974) and recent state practice (see infra note 41), suggest that even unilateral
statements by national representatives may be sources of international obligations.
25. During the first half of the 1960's 6,886 treaties entered into force. P. ROHN,
TREATY-PROFILES 57 (1976). One hundred forty-eight of them were multilateral. Gam-
ble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74
AM.- J. INT'L L. 372 (1980).
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potentially quicker than in times past.26 Further, the substance of inter-
national law is far greater than in times gone by, reaching nearly all
areas of concern to the law.17 At a time when the globe continues to
shrink daily, respect for and adherence to international law is the indis-
putable prerequisite for international peace and security.
International law is explored and relied upon not only in interna-
tional tribunals and fora, but also in the courts and legislative cham-
bers of the many nations of the world. This is a function of the fact
that at its present state of development international law still, for the
most part, relies upon municipal authorities for its enforcement. This,
however, does not mean that municipal determinations of the content
of international law define international obligations. To the contrary,
international law is ultimately determined according to its own
sources.28 If it were otherwise, a law of nations would be an impossibil-
ity, drowned in the parochial and often self-serving views of the world's
nations.
If a rule of international law exists, it is binding upon the United
States. International law, of course, protects against easy imposition of
obligations upon a nation without its assent. Once that assent is given,
however, or once a peremptory norm is created, binding international
obligations exist.2 9
26. See Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" Interna-
tional Customary Law, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965).
27. International agreements now deal with subjects as diverse as human rights,
exploration of the moon, uses of outer space, patents, trade and tariffs, settlement of
boundary disputes, arms limitation, protection of non-combatants and civilians during
time of international and non-international armed conflict, preservation of the environ-
ment, exploration of Antartica, assignment of radio broadcast frequencies, etc.
28. This is not to prejudge whether any particular norm has risen to the level of
a rule of international law, nor to minimize the role of the United States as an impor-
tant actor upon the global scene whose conduct is watched carefully for evidence of
relevant state practice by students of international law.
29. Treaties to which the United States is a party, according to the principle
pacta sunt servanda, are binding. Though subsequent inconsistent United States legis-
lation may negate the incorporation of treaties or customary rules of international law
into national law under the last in time doctrine, domestic law may likewise be negated
by subsequent inconsistent treaties or customs. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 135(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (and Re-
porter's notes 1 & 6); see Murphy, Customary International Law in U.S. Jurispru-
dence-A Comment on Draft Restatement II, INT'L PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK (No.
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The Judgment at Nuremberg demonstrated the extent to which
the international community ascribes individual liability to government
officials for breaches of serious international obligations. As a party to
the charter which created the Nuremberg Tribunal, the United States
commited itself to the international rule of law, a commitment reaf-
firmed by its ratification of the United Nations charter. Certainly the
rule of international law is as binding upon the United States and its
government officials as it was binding upon Nazi Germany and the
German leaders brought to trial by the Allied Powers.
III. The Limits on and Potential of Law
Before proceeding to an analysis of international legal norms con-
cerning nuclear weaponry, we should first consider of what utility inter-
national law can be in the face of nuclear weapons; that is, how might
international law affect future use or plans for future use of nuclear
weapons? Though demonstration of the illegality of nuclear weapons
will not in itself determine the nuclear weapons question or prevent
policy planners from detailing conditions of future nuclear weapons
use, doctrinal inquiry is far from mere self-delusion.
International law, it is true, has generally not had enforcement
mechanisms other than the domestic machinery provided by nation-
states, its traditional subjects. Future international criminal law pun-
ishment of nuclear weapons users, however, could occur, based on the
Nuremberg precedent, but even this would not ensure the efficacy of
international legal norms. No law, no matter what its mechanism for
enforcement, can prevent illegal behavior other than by threat of nega-
tive after-the-fact consequences. The need for post facto punishment
reflects the inherent inadequacy of all law as an absolute deterrent to
proscribed behavior. This would be as true of the international law ba-
sis of a Nuremberg-type trial of those responsible for nuclear aggres-
sion as it is of the state penal code under which a murderer is brought
before some local trial court. Moreover, the nuclear apocalypse, should
it ever come to pass, might well preempt forever all possibility of after-
20) 17 (Oct. 1982). No matter what the domestic effect of subsequent legislation, how-
ever, the international obligations of the United States emanating from treaty or cus-
tom remain in force.
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the-fact legal consequences, making resort to law futile.
All law, however, receives whatever power it has, not primarily
from its threatened enforcement, but from the normative consensus un-
derlying it. In a democracy, according to theory, policy-makers and
members of the polity alike share in this consensus;"0 in an authorita-
rian or totalitarian society the leadership can only retain power by not
straying too far from the views of those below. Consensus and law,
through an interactive process, help create and strengthen each other,
thus effectively shaping behavior. Despite the elitist assumptions nor-
mally associated with governance and the present nation-state system,
consensus and law-even on the international level-can be built from
the bottom up. In fact, given the failure of the world's leaders to re-
spond effectively to the challenge of nuclear weapons, we may have no
choice but to rely on the efforts and consciousness of the people of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and all other nations.31 International
law, and its attempted implementation through domestic legal systems
which incorporate it, can effectively assist the popular movement
against nuclear weapons.
International law can help limit or even prevent future use of nu-
clear weapons by defining considerations of policy-makers, swaying
public dialogue, providing ammunition for anti-nuclear populist move-
ments, and demonstrating to all willing to listen the complete incom-
patability of nuclear weaponry with virtually the entire thrust of the
post-World War II effort to create structures and norms supportive of
international peace and security. Should these ends be accomplished,
they could well become means to the creation of law, and no small feat
will have been done. Enforcement of international proscriptions of nu-
clear weaponry may then prove unnecessary in view of a popular anti-
nuclear consensus globally reached.
30. See generally Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understanding
of Content, Authority, and Constitutional Choice, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 226 (1980). For an
interesting view of the implications of nuclear weapons for democracy, see Falk, Nu-
clear Weapons and the End of Democracy, 2 PRAXIS INT'L 1 (1982).
31. But cf. Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELE-
VANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO GRoss 21 (K. Deutsch &
S. Hoffman eds. 1968).
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IV. International Law and Nuclear Weapons
Analysis of the international legality of nuclear weapons must take
into account the complexities of reality. Nothing in fact or law justifies
the a priori lumping together, into one neat conceptual category, of all
types of nuclear weapons and all their possible uses. Defensive surgical
use of a low-yield clean tactical weapon against a clearly military tar-
get in an isolated geographical region with low population density, for
example, must be viewed, initially at least, as different from strategic
first-use of a multi-megaton dirty bomb against a major urban popula-
tion center. 2 A complex analytic task must be undertaken before we
can conclude that all uses and types of nuclear weapons are subject to
the same proscriptive norm of international law. Here, the goal is sim-
ply to make a small contribution toward accomplishment of that task.
-At present no treaty explicitly prohibits all use of nuclear weapons.
It is also probably correct to say that, as yet, no rule of customary
international law prohibits all use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, a
variety of treaties, evidencing global disapprobation, explicitly outlaw
or limit a significant number of nuclear weapon uses. 33
By treaty, international law prohibits nuclear weapons deployment
or use in Antarctica, 34 Latin America, 35 earth orbit, outer space and on
32. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 185-218
(1971). At a recent conference on nuclear weapons held at Brooklyn Law School on
September 25, 1982, Professor John Norton Moore, a noted conservative scholar of
international law, was forced to admit that the legality of nuclear weapons per se re-
mains an open question. Nevertheless, he challenged seriously the analysis of those
arguing for illegality by raising hypothetically the odd de minimus case. See Moore,
Remarks, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.-(forthcoming 1983). Though his hypothetical did
not effectively undermine the basic argument for illegality of strategic use of nuclear
weapons, it raised questions concerning less dramatic nuclear uses that must be ad-
dressed by any purportedly comprehensive analysis. Intellectual honesty and rigor re
quire no less.
For an early attempt at doctrinal analysis of nuclear legality in light of the variety
of nuclear weapons and their possible uses, see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958).
33. See R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY and'SoCIAL EXPENDITURES 13 (1981),
quoted in BRIEFING MANUAL,OF THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SOLUTIONS
TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE 59-68 (1982>.
34. Antarctic Treaty, signed Dec. 1, 1959, enteked into force June 23,1961, 12
U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 26
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celestial bodies,3 6 and deployment on the seabed beyond the twelve-
mile limit of national territorial seas.3 7 Further, more than one hundred
nations have subjected themselves to a rule of international law prohib-
iting possessors of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology
from transferring such weapons or technology to non-nuclear weapons
nations.38 Further yet, states may not even test nuclear weapons in
outer space, under water or within the earth's atmosphere." In addi-
tion, the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded a series of
bilateral agreements designed specifically to reduce the risk of acciden-
tal or avoidable military use of nuclear weapons during any confronta-
tion between the two superpowers,40 and also to limit the number of
states).
35. Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Feb. 14,
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 24 states; Argentina and
Cuba are the only Latin American states not party to this treaty, and Argentina has
signed but not yet ratified it).
36. Outer Space Treaty, signed Jan. 27, 1967, entered into force Oct. 10, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982,
by 81 states).
37. Seabed Treaty, signed Feb. 11, 1971, entered into force June 18, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 70 states).
38. Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed July 1, 1968, entered into force March 5,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (ratified, as of Nov. 15,
1982, by 119 states: bans transfer of nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear weap-
ons states, and requires controls on "peaceful nuclear facilities" to prevent their being
turned to weapons production).
39. Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed Aug. 5, 1963, entered into force Oct. 10,
1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 110 states).
The United States and the Soviet Union have concluded agreements limiting un-
derground testing of nuclear weapons but have not yet ratified them. See, Underground
Nuclear Weapon Test Treaty, signed July 3, 1974, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PRESS RE-
LEASE No. 281 (July 3, 1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 906 (1974),
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed May 28, 1976, U.S. ARMS CONTROL
& DISARMAMENT AGENCY, PUB. No. 87 (May 1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 891 (1976). Neither treaty has yet been ratified.
40. See Hot Line Agreement, signed and entered into force June 20, 1963, 14
U.S.T. 825; T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472 U.N.T.S. 163; Hot Line Modernization Agree-
ment, signed and entered into force Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187,
806 U.N.T.S. 402; Accidents Measures Agreement, signed and entered into force Sept.
30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 57; Prevention of Nuclear
War Agreement, signed and entered into force June 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S.
No. 7654 (agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union).
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nuclear weapons allowed to each.4
In view of these substantial restrictions on nuclear weaponry ex-
plicitly imposed by conventional international law, what remains to be
explored are ways in Which uses of nuclear weapons still unaddressed
by treaty may be subject to implicit legal constraints emanating from
the structures and norms of international law generally. In the present
context, the result of such examination leads to the conclusion that a
rule of customary international law outlawing nuclear weapons per se is
currently in the process of being created.42
A. The Lawyer's Committee Analysis
In the most well-developed analysis currently available,43 members
of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy rely heavily on the laws of war,44 Nuremburg principles,45 Gen-
41. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed May 26, 1972, entered into force Oct.
23, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, and Protocol of 1974, signed July 3,
1974, entered into force May 24, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276; Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (SALT I), signed May 26, 1972, entered into force Oct. 3, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, expired Oct. 2, 1977 (after expiration, the terms of this
treaty were continued in force for the United States and the Soviet Union by means of
Parallel Unilateral Policy Declarations); SALT II, signed June 18, 1979, not yet rati-
fied, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. 8984, SALT II AGREEMENT, VIENNA (Selected Docu-
ments No. 12A, June 18, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1138 (1979)
(agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union).
42. Law, as Professor Thomas Franck has pointed out, is "congealed politics." T.
FRANCK AND M. MUNANSANGO, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING? 1 (UNITAR Policy and Efficacy Study No. 6,
1982). Unfortunately, the world social order has only begun the "congealing" neces-
sary to overcome the cultural lag between norm and technology that has thus far re-
tarded development of rules regulating the most awesome of humankind's technological
'achievements.' Examination of politics in the process of congealing, then, becomes in-
cumbent upon those seeking to understand the ways in which international law does
and can address the issues raised by nuclear weaponry.
43. See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Occasional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program,
Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1981)). See also Meyrowitz,
Nuclear Weapons Policy: The New Tyranny, 7 NOVA L.J. 93 (1982).
44. E.g., the St. Petersburg Declaration, (1868); the 1889 Hague Declaration
Respecting Asphyxiating Gases; the Hague Conventions of 1907, arts. 22, 23(a) and
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eral Assembly recommendations (resolutions),46 and a policy analysis
of international law. They convincingly argue international law now
limiting war-making by nations equally applies to nuclear war-making,
and "any threat or contemplated use of nuclear weapons is contrary to
the dictates of international law, and constitutes a crime of state...
[the continuation of which] should be enjoined by judicial bodies and
opposed by citizens and nongovernmental organizations. ' 47 Elliot L.
Meyrowitz, Vice-Chairperson of the Lawyers' Committee sets forth
this analysis in greater detail elsewhere in this issue of Nova Law Jour-
nal,48 thus obviating the need for lengthy discussion here.
On the basis of the Lawyers' Committee analysis we can conclude
that international law prohibits, at a minimum, those uses and kinds of
nuclear weapons violative of the binding principle of proportionality ap-
plicable to all warfare and weapons.49 This general principle of human-
itarian law requires that "[b]elligerents shall not inflict harm on their
adversaries out of proportion with the object of warfare, which is to
destroy or weaken the military strength of the enemy."'50 Proportional-
23(e) of the regulations annexed thereto and the famous "de Martens" preambular
clause; the Treaty of Versailles (1919), art. 171; the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925; the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949; and, the 1977 Protocol on Humanitarian law Appli-
cable to Armed Conflict, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See R. FALK,
L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 21-33.
45. See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 63-71.
46. G.A. Res. 1380, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1959); G.A. Res. 1643, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961); G.A. Res. 2162, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972); G.A. Res. 2849, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 70, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); G.A. Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A. Res. 3154, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); G.A. Res. 35/152, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N. Doc A/3548
(1980). See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 58-62.
47. R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 78.
48. See Meyrowitz, supra note 43.
49. See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 23-26;
Meyrowitz, supra note 43, at 93.
50. J. PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 30 (un-
dated; available from the International Committee of the Red Cross). See International
Committee of the Red Cross, Some International Red Cross Conference Resolutions
and ICRC Statements on the Protection of Civilian Population and on Weapons of
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ity, and its correlate providing that "[b]elligerents do not have unlim-
ited choice in the means of inflicting damage on the enemy," 51 have
spawned three binding principles of humanitarian law proper to the
rules of war:
[(1)] [b]elligerents will leave non-combatants outside the area of
operations and will refrain from attacking them deliberately[;]...
[(2)]. [a]ttacks are only legitimate when directed against military
objectives, that is to say whose total or partial destruction would
constitue a definite military advantage. . . [; and]
[(3)] [w]eapons and methods of warfare likely to cause excessive
suffering are prohibited.52
Nuclear weapons, many of which have massive destructive capabilities,
long-lasting environmental and genetic effects, and a unique capacity
for indiscriminate devastation, are more likely than other weapons to
violate proportionality and the three principles derived therefrom. To
the extent that certain uses of nuclear weapons would violate these
principles, international law, as it exists today, prohibits them.
B. Charter Restraints on Nuclear Weapons
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the preeminent
international legal document of our time, makes clear that the raison
dkre of the United Nations is, first and foremost, "to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. '5 3 The preamble of the Charter reminds us
Mass Destruction (August, 1981).
51. J. PICTET, supra note 50, at 32.
'52. Id. at 52-55.
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. Article 1, in relevant part, provides;
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in con-
formity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
117 1
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that the Organization was brought into being "to save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war,"'54 and no scourge could be greater
than the one threatened by military use of nuclear weapons.
The article 2(4) prohibition of aggressive war55 forbids use of nu-
clear weapons as part of an aggressive war just as it forbids aggressive
use of other weapons. Article 51, however, goes further and prohibits
even certain defensive uses of nuclear weapons because of their unique
.capacity for mass destruction. The Charter recognizes the inherent sov-
.ereign right of self-defense against armed attack, yet it further provides
that the right of self-defense will remain unimpaired by Charter obliga-
tions only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."5 Article 51 also requires
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ....
54. U.N. CHARTER preamble. The preamble reads as follows:
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice
in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obliga-
tions arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as
good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of meth-
ods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples,
HAVE RESOLVED To COMBINE OUR EFFORTS To ACCOMPLISH THESE
AIMS.
55. U.N. CHARTER article 2, paragraph 4 reads as follows:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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that self-defense measures taken before the Security Council becomes
seized of a conflict "shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council. . . to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security. '57 This apparently further limits the number of sit-
uations in which nuclear weapons could lawfully be used. For example,
a nuclear attack on New York City resulting in destruction of United
Nations headquarters would, to say the least, affect negatively the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council in violation of article
51. Similarly, nuclear incineration of Moscow or Washington, D.C., or
the capital of any permanent or non-permanent member of the Security
Council also would violate the letter and spirit of article 51.58
The article 51 limited right to self-defense, and the rest of the
United Nations Charter, thus tell us that though the authors of the
Charter knew the article 2(4) prohibition of aggressive war would
likely be violated, they also envisioned a bottom-line limitation on war-
making in the name of self-defense: the peace-making and peace-re-
storing machinery of the United Nations must always remain available
to serve the needs of humankind. The Charter, in article 2(3), explicitly
imposes upon states the duty to respect this bottom line.5 9 Any irrepa-
rable interference with the functioning or existence of international
structures of peace would violate criminally the very object and pur-
Article 51, in full, provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Mem-
ber of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Char-
ter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.
See also U.N. CHARTER article 2, paragraph 3 which requires that "all Members shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
58. Is there anyone who would argue, should the analysis presented in the text be
correct, that nations "merely" members of the General Assembly would remain legally
unprotected against nuclear attack?
59. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3, supra note 56.
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pose of the United Nations Charter; cynicism concerning the likelihood
of effective U.N. action would be no defense. No head of state could
violate this international law bottom-line without having need to fear a
Nuremberg-type trial.60 It is inconceivable that the United States Con-
stitution would allow the President to engage in nuclear crimes against
the international structures of peace. Consequently, both international
and United States domestic law prohibit at least strategic weapons as-
pects of United States "flexible response" strategy, which provides for
escalating first-use of nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet conven-
tional forces attacks in Europe.
C. The Human Rights/Natural Law Right to Survival
War is the ultimate, albeit irrational, act of sovereignty. It is
therefore appropriate to look to international law restraints on sover-
eignty for possible limits on the ultimate act of war-nuclear attack.
International human rights law may well serve as a fertile source for
such limits on state nuclear war-making powers; human rights law has
otherwise been responsible for the most significant limitations upon the
sovereignty of states within the world order of the United Nations era.
Since the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,1 numerous treaties of
a universal, regional or specialized character have established limita-
tions on the ways in which a national government can (mis)treat its
60. Of course, if nuclear war occurs there may well be no survivors to conduct
the trial.
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 271A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948). The Universal Declaration was originally intended as an aspirational
statement establishing a "common standard of achievement" for humankind, id.; how-
ever, many now agree that the terms of the Declaration, or at least some of them have
become binding customary international law. See, e.g., R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 7 (1979);
Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Ju-
ridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLA-
RATION 22 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1979). See also Montreal Statement of the Assembly
for Human Rights 2 (1968), reprinted in 9 J. INT'L COMM. JUR. 94, 95 (1968); Decla-
ration of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights 3, at 4,
para. 2, U.N. Dec. A.Conf. 32/41; G.A. Res. 2442, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at
49, U.N. Dec. A/7218 (1968).
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own citizenry. 2 Over the last thirty years these treaties have been the
subject of more than three hundred fifty separate acts of ratification,
changing dramatically the very conceptualization of international law
as a law only of nations.63 Now, individuals too can be subjects of, and
direct recipients of rights under international law. Inherent in this de-
velopment has been recognition that at the heart of all government and
law, whether on the international or municipal level, exists a core set of
values and rights protecting humankind which emanates from natural
law.6
4
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights both
speak of the "inherent dignity"65 of the human person and the "inalien-
able rights of all members of the human family."66 The Preamble to
62. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 72 states);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 75 states);
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (ratified
by all 21 members of the Council of Europe); American Convention on Human Rights,
signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, 36 O.A.S. T.S. No. 1, O.A.S.
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 17 states);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 117 states). For one view of the relationship between
human rights and international law, see D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982).
63. The Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties recognizes that some differ-
ence exists between international human rights treaties and other treaties. Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5), opened for signature May 27, 1969, entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980, U.N. Conf. on Law of Treaties Off. Rec., 1st & 2d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf./39/27 at 289. See Feinrider, supra note 21, at 43 n.116. The
Vienna Convention has been ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 43 states; the United
States has signed but not yet ratified it.
64. See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 62, at pre-
amble (emphasis added); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 62, at preamble (emphasis added).
66. See supra note 65.
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the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination states that the United Nations Charter "is based on the
principles of the dignity and equality inherent in all human beings," 7
and, repeating the language of the Universal Declaration, concludes
"that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." 68
The American Convention on Human Rights recognizes that "the es-
sential rights of man are not derived from one's being the national of a
certain state, but are based upon the attributes of the human personal-
ity."6 9 Language such as this indicates comprehension of a natural law
basis for human rights,70 and, when incorporated into treaties, evi-
dences both the state practice and opinio juris necessary for creating
The common preambular language of the two covenants, in relevant part, reads as
follows:
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political
freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if condi-
tions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights,
as well as his economic, social and cultural rights ...
67. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, supra note 62, at preamble (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 62, at preamble (em-
phasis added).
70. See R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 42-45 (1981). See
also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796 (D. Kan. 1980) ("The develop-
ment of international agreements containing human rights norms which purport to be
binding ... was a significant step in the transformation of natural rights into positive
legal rights."), affd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), discussed in
Note, Custom and General Principles as Sources of International law in American
Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 773-74 (1982).
The language quoted in the text at notes 65-70 is, admittedly, preambular lan-
guage. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, supra note 63,
however, provides that a preamble is to be considered part of a treaty's text -and is
among the primary sources for treaty interpretation. Cf. Miller, supra note 5, at 27-29
(analysis regarding the substantive import of the preamble to the United States
Constitution).
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customary international law.71
Surely, if individuals have inherent and inalienable natural rights
superior to the positive international law rights of sovereign states, then
so does humankind, if only as holder of the aggregate of rights belong-
ing to its individual members.72 The superiority of individual and col-
lective natural rights over positive state rights only makes sense if indi-
vidual and collective survival is assured. Individually and collectively,
then, we all have the right not to have our survival threatened by states
71. To establish that a norm has become customary international law it is neces-
sary to demonstrate the existence of a substantial number of states acting in conformity
with the norm and that those states were in conformity because of a belief on their part
that their behavior was required by law (opinio juris). Here, the norm is one providing
that individuals have natural rights limiting the sovereign rights of states. The volun-
tary subordination of sovereign rights to human rights through the ratification of trea-
ties, (see supra note 62) is state practice, and the preambular language of these treaties
is clear evidence of opinio juris, that is, that the states ratifying them were motivated
by the belief they were required to do so by certain preexisting "inherent," "inaliena-
ble" "essential" rights, "attributes of the human personality" belonging to beings "born
free and equal in dignity and rights." See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
The argument for illegality of nuclear weapons presented here should be distin-
guished from the one Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, was presumably attempting to rebut at the Panel on Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear War of the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law. Rostow, in support of his argument that international law does not
prohibit nuclear weapons per se, cited The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
See Panel on Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear War (response of Eugene Rostow to
question of Professor Burns Weston) in the Proceedings of the 76th Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Apr. 22, 1982). In The Antelope, Chief
Justice John Marshall wrote that though slavery was repugnant to natural law, its pro-
hibition had not yet been incorporated into international law and therefore was not
enforceable in United States courts. Here, the argument is that natural law, by way of
custom, has recently been incorporated into international law and the natural law right
to collective survival is therefore part of United States law. Nothing in The Antelope
contradicts this assertion.
72. A similar argument to that presented in text, but more palatable to posi-
tivists, could be based on the universally recognized "right to life" and the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature
Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) (ratified, as of
Nov. 15, 1982, by 84 states). Nuclear holocaust would be seen as murder and genocide
multiplied, just as some have suggested that Nuremberg convictions for genocide were
not based on ex-post-facto law because murder had long been a crime in all "civilized"
nations.
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acting out their sovereignty through use of nuclear weapons of mass
destruction. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Declaration can be fully real-
ized. ' ' "7 Nuclear weapons threaten that order, and even as ardent a
positivist as H.L.A. Hart has recognized that at the core of law is the
assumption that "the proper end of human activity is survival." 7' 4
D. The Right to Peace
The "right to peace" is another legal expression of humankind's
collective natural right to survive. In 1979, Karel Vasak, the chief legal
officer of UNESCO, argued that civil and political rights, and social,
economic and cultural rights, are being joined and enhanced by a
"third generation of human rights" which includes the "right to
peace. 175 Though such "group rights" or "solidarity rights," or "global
rights" as Saul Mendlovitz has called them,7 6 remain controversial
within the international human rights community,7" they have, in fact,
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 61, at art. 28.
74. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 187 (1961).
75. See Vasak, Inagural Address: Pour Les Droits de l'Homme de la Troisieme
Generation: Les Droits de Solidarit6, in International Institute of Human Rights,
Summary of Lectures-Tenth Study Session (July 1979).
76. In Mendlovitz' view, the struggle for individual civil and political rights now
typical of western liberal (capitalist) democracies marked the 19th century; the strug-
gle for group social and economic rights typical of eastern communist societies marked
the 20th century; and the struggle for global, or planetary rights such as those we are
now beginning to see develop (e.g., the right to a clean environment and the right to
peace) will mark the 21st century. See Mendlovitz, Remarks, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
_ (forthcoming 1983).
77. E.g., A. H. Robertson, one-time Acting Secretary General of the Interna-
tional Institute of Human Rights and noted specialist in international human' rights
law, consistently criticized "third generation rights" during sessions of the Institute's
Human Rights Teaching Center because, in his view, they are not susceptible to en-
forcement by law. Additionally, he wondered against whom such rights might be
enforceable.
For a thoughtful critique of the right to peace as a group or solidarity right, see
Bilder, The Right to Peace as a Human Right, Remarks made at the International
Symposium on the Morality and Legality of Nuclear Weapons, in New York City
(June 4-5, 1982). (Available in author's file at Nova University Center for the Study of
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generated substantial debate and academic inquiry in Europe.7 8 Only
very recently have they been taken up as the subject of study within
the United States.7 ' If such rights exist, or are in the process of being
created, whether reached inductively as the aggregate of all individual
civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights recognized by inter-
national law or deductively from the evolving world order of humanity
entering the twenty-first century, then the right to peace must be added
to the norms limiting nuclear options. Though "peace" may mean more
than mere absence of war, it certainly means at least absence of war
and assurance of survival. The "right to peace" may thus confirm the
integration of H.L.A. Hart's observation regarding the axiomatic rela-
tionship of law and survival" into the global legal system, meeting ef-
fectively, on a conceptual level at least, the threat of planetary eradica-
tion by nuclear holocaust.
Conclusion
As has been aptly put by Professor Saul Mendlovitz, "nuclear
weapons are disgusting."81 They are an abomination that must be out-
lawed by any civilized legal system worthy of the name.
International law already explicitly prohibits many, perhaps most
uses of nuclear weapons. The structures and norms of international law
and evolving conceptualizations of limits on state sovereignty strongly
suggest the illegality of the remaining uses. At the very least these re-
maining uses should be seen as no more than exceptions which ought
not be permitted to devour the emerging proscriptive rule. The interna-
tional illegality of so many uses of nuclear weapons shifts the burden of
persuasion to the proponents of nuclear weaponry. It is they who are on
Law).
78. See, e.g., Morehouse, The Right to Peace or the Right to Live, 6 HOLDS-
WORTH L. REV. 120 (1981); and the following articles contained in 1980 BULLETIN OF
PEACE PROPOSALS No. 4, SPECIAL ISSUE: THE RIGHT TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT:
Alston, Peace as a Human Right; Marks, The Peace-Human Rights-Development
Dialectic; Lopatka, The Right to Live in Peace as a Human Right.
79. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 77; Nanda, Nuclear Weapons and the Right to
Peace Under International Law, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.-(forthcoming 1983).
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. Mendlovitz, supra note 76.
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the defensive now, legally as well as morally, they carry the onus of
seeking legal sanction for the remaining nuclear weapons uses.
A comprehensive custom outlawing nuclear weapons per se is in
the process of being created. It is, hopefully, only a matter of time
before municipal as well as international legal systems specifically pro-
hibit all use of nuclear weapons. In the alternative, our present civiliza-
tion will vaporize in the blinding flash of nuclear explosions forever de-
stroying humankind, its legacy of achievements and its dreams for a
future of well-being and peace.
Professor Arthur S. Miller, in his seminal work, has given to
American lawyers the hope of promise and the burden of challenge. He
calls upon us to help our domestic legal system rise to the task of meet-
ing head-on the nuclear nightmare of our time, a bad dream come true
beyond the imagination of even the most pessimistic of eighteenth cen-
tury apocalypts. By probing our nearly two hundred year old constitu-
tion for checks and balances and values that could "secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"8 2 he sets a standard of
achievement we must all strive to meet.
In response to Professor Miller's challenge, international lawyers
must first turn a conservative, slow-moving discipline to face the nu-
clear challenge just as Miller has so artfully turned the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Second, they must help educate American domestic lawyers to the
fact that international law is part of the law of the land. Success in the
first will make the second all the more important: the United States
remains the most powerful nuclear arsenal on earth. Fortunately, law is
on the side of those who wish to hold the President to an international
rule of law. The Constitution, in this matter, is clear. If, as suggested
above, a norm of international law prohibits all, or at least most uses of
nuclear weaponry, to answer Professor Miller's question, that norm is
"part of the corpus of 'laws' that the President must faithfully
execute."83
82. U.S. CONST. preamble.
83. Miller, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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II
Admirable Ends-Ineffective Means
Iredell Jenkins*
I agree, of course, with the thrust of Professor Miller's paper and
with the conclusion at which he arrives. There can be no question that
nuclear weapons pose a threat not only to civilization and to all human
beings, but even to the life process itself. It follows, then, that the
proliferation of such weapons contravenes the fundamental principles of
morality, the accepted rules of international law, and any sane idea of
national interest and policy. Furthermore, I think that Professor
Miller's five arguments make out a cogent case for his conclusion that
"the manufacture, deployment, and possible - even probable - use of
nuclear weapons contravene the Constitution".' Each of these argu-
ments is closely reasoned and well supported; together they present a
persuasive defense of his claim, which might on its face appear unrea-
sonable to the point of absurdity.
One may be tempted to object that the time-honored doctrine of
raison d'etat makes these arguments and this conclusion meaningless:
for this doctrine holds that any state is justified in taking-and is cer-
tainly going to take-whatever steps it deems necessary for its own
protection. However, this argument fails for the simple reason that
when several states possess significant numbers of nuclear weapons,
then their use by any one state would quite surely lead to retaliation
and hence to its own destruction. And this goes directly against the
purpose of raison d'etat, which is to guarantee the existence of the soci-
ety of which the state is the agent.
Consequently, and as a point of departure for this response, I am
prepared to stipulate Professor Miller's conclusion that "those who
wield both formal authority and effective control in the American con-
stitutional order have a duty to take action designed to eliminate the
nuclear threat throughout the world" and that "the duty. . is of con-
* Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Alabama.
1. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution, 7 NOVA L.J. 21, 23 (1982).
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stitutional dimension."'2 However, despite all of this, I fear that the
conclusion itself will be inconsequential because it has no precise and
positive content. Stated more explicitly, the nature of this "constitu-
tional duty" is both unspecified and devoid of sanctions; it does not
impose any clearly defined obligations, either positive or negative, upon
those to whom it is addressed; and it does not suggest any ways in
which these "obligations" could be enforced and derelictions therefrom
punished. This judgment must be qualified by pointing out, as Professor
Miller stresses, that this essay is a "preliminary inquiry," not a "full-
dress exposition." 3 Its purpose is to raise an issue rather than settle it,
and so to initiate a cooperative discussion of legal (constitutional) pro-
cedures as a possible means to control the deployment and use of nu-
clear weapons. A final judgment, therefore, must be held in abeyance;
but as the case now stands, I fear that however admirable the end
sought, the means proposed will prove ineffective.
The argument that supports this judgment stands on three legs.
Each of these is itself based upon a contention or concession that is
central to Professor Miller's case and essential to its understanding and
evaluation. My purpose in developing this argument is to indicate the
difficulties I perceive in his position and thus to contribute as best I can
to the discussion he seeks. He has made an admirably provocative start,
and the undertaking is eminently worthwhile.
I take my first step with Professor Miller's statement that his pa-
per "is emphatically not a plea for unilateral disarmament. We live in
a Hobbesian world, a condition that is not at all likely to change."4
Since the nations of the world have rejected the irenic precept of live
and let live, adopting instead a policy of dog eat dog, the international
climate is poisoned by mistrust and fear. Given this atmosphere, any
suggestion of unilateral disarmament would be tantamount to putting
one's self at the mercy of one's enemies. If nuclear disarmament is to
be safe and acceptable, it must be mutual, with every nation disposing
of its entire arsenal: "every weapon of mass destruction in the world" 5
must be eliminated. This is the outcome that the Constitution is held to
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 23.
4. Id. at 24.
5. Id.
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require. This is made quite explicit in the passage quoted earlier, where
it is stated that the "constitutional duty" imposed on the government is
"to take action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world"' (Emphasis added). Since nuclear weapons anywhere clearly
pose a threat to our lives, liberties, and properties, we, as American
citizens, have a right to be free of them, and the government has the
duty to see that we are.
Standing by itself, this contention appears self-evident. If the gov-
ernment owes us protection against arbitrary -search and seizure,
double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual punishment
- not to mention such benefits as clean air, pure water, adequate diet,
and proper health care - then it would certainly seem to owe us pro-
tection against instant immolation. Therefore one is inclined to take
this first step without hesitation.
This brings me to my second step. Here I take as my text Profes-
sor Miller's statement on page 23: "At the outset, I readily concede the
jurisprudential problem of whether legal norms (rights) can exist ab-
sent a means of enforcement". It is, or course, traditional doctrine that
a right accorded to some is barren without a corresponding duty im-
posed on others. It is further recognized that both the right and the
duty are bootless unless there are sanctions to enforce the latter and
make good the former. It is difficult to see just what legal (constitu-
tional) means are available to secure to the people this right to the
worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. If the Supreme Court were
to issue orders to this effect, how is it to enforce them against this
government, let alone the governments of other sovereign states?
To this objection, Professor Miller offers two rebuttals, both sound
in principle. He first points out that there are both constitutional and
legislative duties that cannot be judicially enforced or for the neglect of
which no penalty is even provided.7 Secondly, he reminds us that the
law is instrumental and living, and that the courts are continually rec-
ognizing new rights and creating new duties as the occasion seems (to
them) to require. These points are well taken, but I do not think they
are applicable in the present context. When the courts accord rights to
privacy, abortion, racial integration, and so forth, they impose duties
6. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 23.
1 7:1982 129 1
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that are at least within the claimed and granted (albeit reluctantly)
jurisdiction of the federal government, and to enforce these rights they
can create sanctions, however ineffective and difficult to enforce they
may be. But when the courts recognize the right of American citizens
to the elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere, they impose du-
ties that are altogether beyond both the legal jurisdiction and the prac-
tical reach of the federal government. For the courts now tell the gov-
ernment of this country "to achieve certain outcomes in other countries
whose governments recognize no authority superior to themselves and
which command power commensurate with that of this country. With-
out a common sovereign which holds both ultimate authority and a mo-
nopoly of power, rights and duties become mere words. The gist of the
matter is this: the writ of the federal courts simply does not run in
other sovereign states.
I now take my third step, which raises the most concrete and prac-
tical issues. This is again based on the passage previously cited from
page 23 and also on another passage of similar import with which pro-
fessor Miller summarizes his argument. The latter runs as follows:
"My suggestion is that Supreme Court Justices should grasp the
nettle and point out to the Executive and the Congress that officials
in those branches are charged with a constitutional duty to take
action to eliminate threats to the lives, liberties, and properties of
the citizenry. Those threats emanate from nuclear weaponry."
In both of these passages, it is the phrase "take action" that I want to
emphasize: the government is to be told that it has a "constitutional
duty" to "take action" to "eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world." Even if we grant that the Supreme Court should in principle
and does in fact issue orders to this effect, the critical question remains:
What action?
Precisely what actions are the Executive and the Congress to be
ordered to take? A duty which is hopelessly vague or with which com-
pliance is impossible to determine is as empty as one that is unenforce-
able. And simply to order "action" would be the epitome of vagueness:
the government could claim compliance on the basis of virtually any
effort whatever; or it could refuse to disclose the "actions" it had taken,
8. Id. at 35.
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justifying its refusal by invoking the sacred cow of the "national secur-
ity". One could answer this objection by arguing that the Supreme
Court decision mandating this new duty would be similar to that in the
1954 school desegregation opinion: the Court would simply order the
President and the Congress to take steps to effect universal nuclear dis-
armament "with all deliberate speed". The specifics of this mandate
would then be left to be worked out in a series of suits and rulings.
But I do not believe that this argument would stand up. Mutual
nuclear disarmament by numerous sovereign states is obviously a mat-
ter of foreign policy; and the conduct of foreign policy is, by the Con-
stitution itself, conferred on the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. What actions this country could and should take in this
area are matters of high policy, involving diplomatic, political, military,
and economic dimensions: intelligent decisions require wide experience,
vast amounts of detailed information, and the cooperation of experts
from numerous esoteric fields. It seems doubtful if even those omnis-
cient legal deities, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
could muster the data and acquire the familarity that would be needed
to issue reasonable and effective orders regarding nuclear disarmament.
The Court could, of course, solicit amicus briefs from innumerable ex-
perts; and they could subpoena witnesses and documents from the sev-
eral executive departments. But much of this information is strictly
classified, hardly suitable to be aired in legal briefs, open hearings, and
the Supreme Court reports; and the advice that the Justices would re-
ceive would certainly be so diverse and contradictory that they would,
in the last analysis, have to rely upon their own judgment, untrained as
that is in this field. Even if all of these hurdles could be surmounted, it
is difficult to see what "action" the Court could order. In negotiating
the reduction of nuclear weapons with other sovereign states, there are
only two procedures this government can employ: it can threaten and it
can deal. And that is precisely what every President for at least the
past thirty years has been doing.
There are two further issues that should be considered briefly. The
first concerns Professor Miller's alternative proposal that the "first-
strike use of nuclear weapons should . . . be dropped as a policy op-
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion."10 This is a more moderate suggestion. And it is an "action" that
the Supreme Court could easily order, since it is simple and spe-
cific-enforcing the order, however, would be another matter. But quite
apart from the wisdom and practicality of such a step, I fear that it
would prove ineffective as an instrument of peace and ineffective as an
inducement to other states to take similar action, for the government
that adopted such a policy of renunciation could not bind future gover-
ments. The state is an enduring entity; but circumstances change, and
so do governments and their perceptions of these circumstances. Conse-
quently, the announcement of such a policy would have little meaning
or impact. It would offer no lasting guarantee to the society that
adopted it and even less to other states and their governments.
The second of these issues concerns the idea-suggested but not
developed in Professor Miller's paper-that a Supreme Court decision
condemning nuclear weapons on constitutional grounds and mandating
action to effect their worldwide elimination would have great moral
force and persuasive power. Even if the Court could not enforce such
an order or specify its meaning, its mere announcement might serve to
make the public more conscious of the terrible dangers and the ulti-
mate evils inherent in the proliferation of nuclear arms. This is a possi-
bility that should not be dismissed lightly. There is not the slightest
doubt that past Supreme Court decisions have had just such an impact
on this society, and even on the international order: one thinks particu-
larly of decisions on racial integration, the equality of women, access to
the political process, and human rights in general.
However, I do have serious doubts, based on two grounds, whether
a Supreme Court ruling on nuclear weapons would have a similar im-
pact. One of these grounds concerns the context of such a ruling. In-
tense suspicion of Russian policy and intentions, and hence an obsessive
fear of Russia gaining nuclear superiority, are endemic in this country.
Given this atmosphere, any such Court ruling would almost certainly
be interpreted as mandating unilateral disarmament; so it would be
greeted with outrage and dismissed with contempt.
The other ground of my doubts concerns the present public stand-
ing of the Supreme Court, for I do not think that the Court now enjoys
anything like the respect and moral authority that it once did. The
10. Miller, supra note 1, at 30.
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mystique of the Court-the sense that it was somehow above the politi-
cal process, untainted by ordinary human passions, and immune to
outside pressures-has been largely stripped from it. Once the Supreme
Court was thought to be concerned only with the Eternal Law writ
large in the Constitution, and the Justices were seen as moved only by
constitutional considerations. But now we are only too aware that the
Court is concerned with the same social issues that occupy us; and we
have learned that the justices are as much influenced by their biases
and personal backgrounds as the rest of us.
This shift in view is due partly to the greatly enhanced publicity
accorded the Court, and to an increasing public cynicism regarding all
institutions. It is also due very largely to the extreme activism of the
Supreme Court in recent decades. The Court has intervened in so many
moral and social questions that touch people deeply, and it has issued
decisions that have aroused such resentment, that it is now widely re-
garded not as a pure servant of the law, but rather as the tool of special
interests, especially those of an ultra-"liberal" persuasion. The Su-
preme Court and the federal judiciary have been extremely courageous
in intervening to correct social ills that had been neglected and ignored
by all of the governmental authorities that bore responsibility for them.
But this fact does not lessen the resentment and mistrust that have
been directed against the Supreme Court.
Be all this as it may, I doubt if a Supreme Court ruling on nuclear
disarmament would have any significant moral force or persuasive
power. When survival is thought to be in question, even the strongest
moral voice falls on deaf ears, and even the most perfect argument fails
to assuage fear.
Professor Miller made it very clear that he wanted his respondents
to offer criticisms and suggestions that could fuel a further dialogue. I
have certainly offered criticisms, though suggestions, alas, have been
sadly lacking. But I would not wish to close on this negative note, for I
think Professor Miller's proposal could be extremely important:
whether it will be, only the ensuing dialogue can tell.
If we are to consider Professor Miller's paper at all sanely and
sympathetically, we must take seriously the quotations from A. N.
Whitehead with which he introduces his proposal; these set the neces-
sary tone for his suggestion. It is precisely our fundamental and un-
questioned assumptions that most need to be brought into the open and
re-examined. And when some hardy soul does this, and proposes fresh
17:1982 133Admirable Ends-Ineffective Means
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ideas, these are apt to appear patently absurd. And so it is with this
idea that nuclear weapons pose a constitutional issue to which lawyers
and the courts should address themselves. It has long been assumed
that the conduct of foreign policy and the care and nurture of the na-
tional security were to be left to the President and his military and
diplomatic advisors. The Congress was held to have very little business
meddling in these matters, and the federal courts to have none at all:
these latter need only recognize that treaties duly ratified were part of
the law of the land.
That is no longer a safe assumption. Professor Miller's view that
judges are "timorous creatures" who "look upon requests to go beyond
the familiar and the expected as frightful occasions"11 may be sound as
a general proposition. But it seems clearly not applicable to the federal
judiciary as a whole, nor especially to the justices of the Supreme
Court. During the past thirty years or so, these men have not hesitated
to assert that they have the highest wisdom and hold the ultimate au-
thority in such matters as school integration, racial balance, abortion,
the prevention and punishment of capital crimes, reapportionment, and
the treatment of the mentally ill and prison inmates.12 All of these is-
sues were regarded as altogether beyond either the jurisdiction or the
competence of judges and courts: they were the proper and ordained
domains of other experts and authorities. But in all of these contexts,
the federal courts have intervened----"meddled"-to correct persistent
and intolerable ills. I hold no strong brief for federal judges as arbiters
of moral, social, economic, and other such problems: their reach often
exceeds their grasp, and their discretion fails to match their valor. But
these judges have, time after time, acted to repair gross injustices and
initiate significant reforms.
So despite the reservations voiced above, I am sympathetic to Pro-
fessor Miller's proposal and I am prepared to be optimistic that it
might bear fine fruit. I would anticipate two great obstacles to this
happy outcome. First, I do not see what measures-what "action"-the
11. Id. at 36.
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1960); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (1974); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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Supreme Court could mandate, aside from those that every administra-
tion has employed: to deal and to threaten. (Though I certainly ac-
knowledge that several of these administrations, and especially the pre-
sent one, could be a great deal more restrained, constructive, and
cooperative in their dealings with the Soviets instead of treating them
as avowed enemies.) Second, and more serious, is the fact that some of
the parties-sovereign states-whose agreement is essential to nuclear
disarmament, are altogether beyond not only the grasp, but even the
reach, of the Supreme Court. Judges have encountered more than
enough recalcitrance and open defiance from state legislatures and gov-
ernors. It would be interesting to be hidden behind an arras, like some
hero of a gothic romance, when some diplomat hands a Supreme Court
writ to Yuri Andropov (Brezhnev's successor), Indira Ghandi, or
Menachem Begin.
But any such event as this lies in a distant time and a different
clime. And if it ever occurs, the writ will come from a court serving as
the agent of a single world sovereign. For the foreseeable future, the
Supreme Court will have to contend itself with enhancing public con-
sciousness of the enormity of the threat and with putting incessant
pressure on the other branches of government. On first acquaintance,
Professor Miller's proposal does such violence to our political and legal
presuppositions that it has the aura of the judicial equivalent of science
fiction. But we all know how often the science fiction of one year is the
technological fact of the next. And when I recall the changes that the
federal courts have wrought in recent decades, I think that this may
well be an idea whose time has come.
1351
134
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/16
Lawyers Can, But Law May Be Unable to Contribute
to Nuclear Weapons Debate
L. Harold Levinson*
Professor Miller concludes that "law and lawyers have something
useful to contribute to the growing debate about nuclear war." I agree
that lawyers can make a useful contribution. Whether the law can
make a contribution is quite another matter, on which I have serious
doubts.
In order to evaluate the contribution that the law can make, let us
assume .that Miller has convincingly demonstrated that the United
States Constitution prohibits the manufacture, deployment and use of
nuclear weapons. Let us also assume that, in order to resolve any lin-
gering doubts, the people of the United States have added a new
amendment to the Constitution, worded as follows:
1. It is the policy of the United States that the public or private
production, ownership, deployment, use or threatened use of nu-
clear weapons, whether inside or outside the United States, violates
basic human rights in the United States and throughout the world.
2. The Congress, the President and all other officers of the United
States shall take all actions that are feasible to implement this
amendment.
What could be the effect of this constitutional message upon the con-
duct of national and international affairs?
Clearly this constitutional amendment would not oblige the United
States to disarm unilaterally while other countries continue to stockpile
and deploy nuclear weapons. Even if the amendment, when read in iso-
lation, could be interpreted as a mandate for unilateral disarmament, it
would have to be read in context of the government's basic responsibil-
ity to preserve and defend the nation. It is inconceivable that the
United States Supreme Court would order the President and Congress
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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to engage in unilateral disarmament. Even if the Court rendered such
an order, it is inconceivable that the President or Congress would obey
it.
What would happen if the United States entered into multilateral
agreements with other countries, whereby all undertook to eliminate
nuclear weapons - would the Supreme Court then order the President
and Congress to carry out the obligation of the United States to dis-
arm, and would the President or Congress obey any such court order?
Again, the answer must be negative. The Supreme Court is in no posi-
tion to monitor compliance, by other countries, with a multilateral
agreement to disarm, nor can the Court react effectively to any viola-
tion that may occur. The most that the Court could accomplish would
be to settle disputes as to whether an action taken or proposed by the
President or Congress was within the jurisdiction of that branch of gov-
ernment. But even here, the highly sensitive nature of the subject mat-
ter might discourage the Court from stepping in.
It seems, then, that the hypothetical constitutional amendment dis-
cussed above would not establish any enforceable law. It could, how-
ever, be seriously misunderstood by foreign governments, who might
interpret it as a signal that the United States was committed to dis-
armament whether or not other countries reciprocated. The security of
the United States would then be seriously endangered.
The hypothetical constitutional amendment would, of course, be a
powerful statement of public opinion, and the proceedings leading to its
ratification would provide a massive public forum for the debate on
nuclear weapons. But public opinion can be expressed very effectively
in many other ways, including the election of public officials, the con-
duct of polls, or the use of "1-900" telephone surveys at a cost of 50
cents per "vote." If the American people insist on an end to nuclear
weapons, they are quite capable of making their wishes known without
the need for an amendment to the Constitution or for a reinterpretation
of the existing constitutional language.
The preceding comments reflect my serious doubt that the adop-
tion of a constitutional amendment, or the reinterpretation of the ex-
isting constitution, could legally bind the United States government to
engage in nuclear disarmament. The constitutional arguments could be
ingredients of a public forum, but they would not be essential ingredi-
ents, and the debate could proceed on questions of national and inter-
national policy as effectively without as with the inclusion of the consti-
Nova Law Journal 7:19821
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tutional arguments. Indeed, the elimination of constitutional arguments
might speed up the debate, by preventing lengthy discussion or litiga-
tion about the jurisdiction of the courts, the standing of any potential
plaintiffs, or other technicalities.
This means that lawyers would not be able to contribute, to the
public debate, any specialized knowledge of legal rules or technicalities
pertaining to the subject matter. This does not mean, however, that
lawyers should drop out of the public debate. To the contrary, as public
citizens, lawyers have a special responsibility to address matters of pub-
lic concern, even when the matters cannot be resolved by resort to legal
rules or technicalities. Lawyers are equipped to understand the frame-
work of institutions, to engage in rational and persuasive discourse, to
sift and compare ideas, to offer and demand the presentation of facts,
to marshal the arguments from various perspectives, and to seek ac-
comodation of conflicting tendencies. Holding these skills in trust for
society, lawyers have the opportunity and obligation to use them, not
only when a legal rule or technicality is at issue, but more broadly,
whenever a matter of general social concern is ripe for debate.
In the latter situation, the lawyer does not authoritatively lay
down the law. Rather, as an articulate citizen, the lawyer participates
equally with other citizens in wrestling with a common problem.
The threat of nuclear weapons is horrendous. The burden on pub-
lic officials is staggering. The need for public debate is urgent. No
higher challenge or opportunity has faced lawyers as citizens.
139 1
137
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Letter from the Government
William H. Taft, IV*
July 15, 1982
Articles Editor
Nova Law Review
3100 S.W. 9th Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315
You have written to both Secretary Weinberger and me
inviting us to comment in your law review on the issues
raised in Professor Arthur Miller's article "Nuclear Weapons
and Constitutional Law." This letter is in response to both
invitations. We appreciate very much the opportunity thus
provided.
Professor Miller's article suggests that officers of the
federal government are under a constitutional duty to take
action to eliminate the threat to American lives, liberty,
and property posed by nuclear weapons. It is not necessary
to agree with Professor Miller's constitutional analysis,
much of which he himself characterizes as tentative and even
far-fetched, to recognize the responsibility of government
officials in this regard. Quite apart from the implicit
powers and duties derived from the doctrine of raison d' tat,
which Professor Miller evidently views with some ambivalence,**
* General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
** Profesor Miller's ambivalence arises, I believe, from a
misunderstanding of the relationship between national
security in the context of international affairs and
personal security. Professor Miller perceives a tension
between the interests of the state in maintaining its
authority and individual rights. While this tension
undoubtedly exists in a domestic context, with regard to
threats to individual rights by foreign countries,
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there is an explicit provision in the Constitution that bears
on this matter. Section 4 of Article IV provides that
"The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion. .... "
2
In addition, the Constitution requires both the President
and Members of Congress to swear that they will support the
Constitution.
These provisions together sufficiently establish the
existence of the constitutional duty to reduce and, if
possible, eliminate the threat that nuclear weapons pose to
the individual freedom and rights of Americans set out in
the Constitution. The Reagan Administration has, of course,
recognized its responsibilities in this regard. Its policy
has been and continues to be to deter the use of nuclear
weapons first by assuring that any adversary knows that we
have sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage in
retaliation against any attack that may be made on us and,
secondly, by entering into negotiations with the Soviet Union
to reduce substantially the arsenals of nuclear weapons held
by both that country and the United States.
Sincerely,
William H. Taft, IV
national security and personal security are inter-
dependent: the survival of the state is what in this
context preserves the individual rights secured by the
Constitution. Threats from nuclear weapons arise,
needless to say, only in an international context.
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Nuclear Weapons: Unconstitutional or Just Unjust?
Gary L. McDowell*
Before one can reasonably assess Professor Miller's argument in
"Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law," a fundamental distinction
needs to be drawn. That distinction is between the Constitution and
constitutional law. For Professor Miller, there is no Constitution be-
yond constitutional law; the Constitution is only what the judges say it
is - no more, no less. And what the judges say it is depends only upon
what Oliver Wendell Holmes in The Common Law called the "felt ne-
cessities of the times." 1 In Professor Miller's estimation the Constitu-
tion has no inherent political theory; its meaning depends only upon
time and circumstance - and the judge's intuition.
Professor Miller's argument concerning the constitutionality of nu-
clear weapons can only be made once the Constitution is separated
from constitutional law and discarded - or at least ignored. What
must guide our constitutional thinking, Professor Miller insists, are not
"old practices and old modes of thinking about constitutional propri-
ety" but "new doctrine."' 2 That new doctrine, apparently, is to be "dis-
covered" in the higher law that Professor Miller is sure hovers above
the Constitution itself. Professor Miller's quest is for the judicial for-
mulation of a doctrine - the creation of a new right, actually - that
postulates that "nuclear weapons are a clear and present danger both
to. survival and especially to achievement of human dignity."3 Thus,
nuclear weapons, by the enormity of their potential destructiveness -
the annihilation of human existence - violates the essence of natural
justice. But to say that someting violates natural justice is not the same
thing as saying it violates the Constitution. As James Wilson saw fit to
remind his fellow-delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787, "laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive;
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Dickinson College.
1. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution, 7 NOVA L. J. 21, 31 (1982).
3. Id. at 26.
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and yet not be ...unconstitutional."4 The same logic holds for nu-
clear weapons the procurement and accumulation of which is a matter
of public law.
Rather than examine each strand of Professor Miller's legal rea-
soning, I prefer to consider the theoretical premises from which his ar-
guments spring. For his theoretical premise-the idea of a living Con-
stitution - is ultimately at odds with the logic of the Constitution
itself.
The aim of those who framed the Constitution was to produce a
document that they hoped would "last for ages." 5 Their belief was that
safe republican government depended upon a constitution that would
be venerated by the people as "fundamental" and "paramount". 6 To
achieve such popular veneration - and to enjoy the necessary political
stability that would flow therefrom - the framers recognized, first,
that the constitution would have to be a written constitution and, sec-
ond, that there would have to be a popular presumption of textual per-
manence of the document itself. That is, as James Madison understood
it, its meaning was not to be "sought in the changeable meaning of the
words composing it" but rather in "the sense in which the Constitution
was accepted and ratified by the nation."' 7 Original intefition and origi-
nal meaning were held to be the primary means by which the written
constitution could be kept a limited constitution. In this belief men as
politically opposed as Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall could stand
united. A written constitution, Jefferson said, was our "peculiar secur-
ity";8 to Marshall, it was the "greatest of all improvements on political
institutions."9
Professor Miller's argument, then, rests on a cracked foundation;
for he makes a common error when he seizes John Marshall's dictum
4. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 73 (M. Farrand
2d ed. 1937).
5. Id. at v. 1, 422.
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 361 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1911); No. 78, at
525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1911).
7. TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 1 (G. McDowell ed. 1981) (quoting
James Madison to Henry Lee).
8. Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), quoted in THE LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 573 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
141
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Unconstitutional or Just Unjust1 7:1982
in McCulloch v. Maryland0 (a statement Professor Miller holds to be
"the most important ever uttered on the theory of constitutional inter-
pretation")11 as his authority for a living constitution. Marshall's well-
known remark that the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages
to come and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs"1 2 is taken by Professor Miller to mean that the Consti-
tution "may validly be considered to be a tacit delegation of power by
the framers to enable succeeding generations of Americans to write
their own fundamental law - to meet, that is, the exigencies of their
- not the framers' times."13 The crucial element of Professor Miller's
argument derives from the mistaken notion that Marshall was referring
to constitutional interpretation by the judiciary. He was not. The power
of adaptation Marshall was pointing to was a legislative not a judicial
power. The flexibility to meet the unforeseen exigencies of the future
lay in the legislative power to draft whatever laws Congress should
deem necessary and proper. Marshall was speaking to the necessary
flexibility of statutory law, not fundamental law. Doubters need only
look as far as his opinion in Marbury v. Madison:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most con-
duce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original
right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be fre-
quently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are
deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they pro-
ceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be
permanent. 1'
Professor Miller assumes that the changes brought about in the
instruments of war "by the scientific-technological revolution"15 have
resulted in a substantive transformation in the nature of war as it is
understood under the Constitution. This does not necessarily follow.
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11. Miller, supra note 2, at 28.
12. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis original).
13. Miller, supra note 2, at 28.
14. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
15. Miller, supra note 2, at 28.
! !
145 1
142
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/16
146 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
Constitutionally, war is war. Constitutionally, Congress is obligated to
do what it considers to be necessary and proper to give contemporary
expression to its constitutional power to prepare for and wage war.
(The constitutional power to declare war implies a constitutional power
to prepare for war, following Marshall's logic in McCulloch.) If that
means, in the deliberate judgment of Congress, procuring and stockpil-
ing nuclear armaments, then such an activity is constitutionally per-
missible. It may be imprudent and dangerous but it is not unconstitu-
tional. Further, constitutionally, the President as Commander-in-Chief,
is empowered to direct whatever forces of war Congress places at his
disposal.
Professor Miller's argument grows from a belief that the judiciary,
in Owen Fiss's words, possesses "a special kind of substantive rational-
ity"'16 that enables it to declare constitutional values and to make the
policy conform. Judges are not so much arbiters of concrete legal and
constitutional disputes as they are seers and soothsayers pondering
principles of abstract justice. Professor Miller apparently subscribes to
the dominant jurisprudential view that constitutional values - that is,
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency" 117 - are the stuff of constitutional law. The Constitution
itself cannot be allowed to get in the way of doing good.
The constitutional and political dilemmas posed by this view are
that the declaration of a constitutional or public value is a highly intui-
tive and personal judicial matter. A constitutional value depends more
upon a creative judicial imagination than upon constitutional text or
intention. This is hardly the foundation of limited constitutional
government.
Conclusion
Professor Miller, like a growing number of Americans, is rightly
concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to borrow
Jonathan Schell's phrase, the fate of the earth.1 8 But his solutidn misses
the mark. Nuclear arms and the possibility of nucler war are too im-
16. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979).
17. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
18. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
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portant to delegate to the juriciary. Like all the important and contro-
versial public debates that generally characterize a popular form of
government, they deserve to be addressed by political deliberation
not by judicial decree.
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The Constitution and Nuclear Defense
Arval A. Morris*
It is becoming common knowledge" that the combined nuclear
arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union contain more than
50,000 warheads, having a destructive power more than one million
times greater than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. In
terms of blast equivalences, these weapons represent four tons of TNT
for every living person on earth. One United States Polaris submarine
can destroy 128 Soviet sites, and carries more firepower than all the
weapons used in World War II. The new Trident submarines are still
more powerful. These new weapon systems and the underlying strategic
planning leave old notions of deterrence behind. These weapons are
building toward a capacity to fight as well as to deter nuclear war, and
some civilian and military analysts are even asserting that a nuclear
war can be fought and "won". The United States and NATO have
long expressed their policy to use nuclear weapons first - especially
"tactical" nuclear weapons - if necessary, to stop a Soviet invasion of
Europe.2
The United States is improving and developing more and more
precise missiles and anti-submarine systems, thereby affording the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. The next several pages draw heavily on the literature of the Lawyers Alliance
for Nuclear Arms Control, Inc., 11 Beacon Street, Suite 719, Boston, Mass., 02108,
but any one of dozens of contemporary sources would have done as well. This group
seeks to end lawyer apathy in the area. This is especially critical since lawyers learn
and practice the skills of conflict resolution which are the very skills that must be ap-
plied to the nuclear arms race if we are to avoid nuclear war. Lawyers separate fact
from fancy, distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, and negotiate lasting agree-
ments building upon common or compatible interests in efforts to obtain peaceful solu-
tions to problems of conflict. Nowhere are these skills more in need today than in nu-
clear arms limitation, reduction and elimination.
2. See Mossberg, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 4, col. 1, Haig and Weinberger
here confirmed this policy under the heading Nato Chief Warns of New Soviet Strat-
egy to Deny the West the Use of Its Nuclear Punch.
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United States a theoretical first-strike attack capability. It will be a
"counterforce" capability having the power to destroy all or most of the
Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. This "counterforce" capability is
claimed to be defensive only, but since the weapons can deliver a first-
strike, it can be seen as offensive as well. Military analysts expect the
Soviet Union to have this same first-strike capability sometime before
the end of this decade.3
The possibility of intentional full-scale nuclear war hangs by a
hair trigger. Such a war would last only a matter of hours. If launched
from the Atlantic Ocean, missiles from the new Trident submarine
could hit Moscow in just ten minutes. Morever, Pershing II missiles are
currently scheduled for deployment in West Germany. They could hit
targets in the Soviet Union in a mere four minutes. The Soviets have
similar capabilities. Thus, it is obvious that the White House or the
Kremlin will have only a few minutes in which to evaluate a report of
an incoming missile attack.and decide whether to launch a nuclear
strike in response. It is quite possible that technological advances will
force this decision to be delegated to computers and their "specialists".
Indeed, if a non-first-strike nuclear power is confronted by another nu-
clear power possessing a first-strike counterforce capability, it can be
considered "rational for the non-first strike power to adopt a "launch
on attack" or "launch on report" policy. It is widely feared the Soviets
may adopt such a policy if the United States maintains its present phi-
losophy. The destiny of mankind would then have been turned over to
machines.
The probability of accidental nuclear war is genuine and increas-
ing. The warning system of the United States Air Command has re-
ported hundreds of false alarms about incoming missiles, and has oth-
erwise malfunctioned. No American actually knows the reliability of
the Soviet Union's command and control systems. Yet, ironically, for
all the billions they have spent on defense, the American people must
rely every day on the Soviet systems to prevent our destruction. So far,
the Soviet systems have been sufficiently reliable to protect Americans
from a wave of nuclear weapons launched because of an accident or
malfunction. But how long will security last? Currently, six countries
3. See supra note 1.
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admit they have atomic arms." By the end of this century, an additional
two dozen countries are expected to have nuclear weapons, thereby in-
creasing dramatically the probability of accidental, or intentional, nu-
clear war.
Indeed, the existence of a "counterforce" first-strike nuclear capa-
bility that could destroy most of an opponent's nuclear weapons while
they remain on the ground, makes nuclear war appear "rational" under
certain circumstances. Suppose for example that Iran, with Soviet
backing, masses its military forces to invade Saudi Arabia and the
Arab Emerites, thereby eliminating most of Europe's and Japan's oil
supply, as well as much of our own. Irreparably crippled, the United
States, invoking the Carter Doctrine,5 declares its vital security interest
threatened and prepares to intervene. It can do so effectively only by
using American troops. The Soviet Union threatens the United States,
saying it will not tolerate U.S. troops fighting in Iran or Saudi Arabia,
which are just below its southern border. It then masses its troops on
the Iranian border. Perceiving this development as further threatening
its vital interests, the United States responds by placing its nuclear
forces on a "red" ready alert. The Soviet Union responds by placing its
nuclear forces on ready alert. Negotiations between the Soviet Union
and the United States deteriorate and finally break down. Iran's troops
begin to cross the border and invade Saudi Arabia.
IF either the United States or the Soviet Union concludes that: (1)
negotiations have irretrievably broken down and are of no further avail
and (2) war is surely coming, then, under these circumstances, voices
on both sides will be raised declaring that a nuclear first-strike is fully
"rational". It is better, it will be argued, for us to attack first and de-
stroy as many Soviet missiles as possible, thereby suffering only 25 to
30 million dead Americans from a crippled Soviet nuclear response,
than to lose fifty to eighty million or more Americans and most of our
nuclear weapons, by waiting and absorbing a full power Soviet nuclear
4. United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, China, India and al-
though she does not admit it, most people believe Israel has them as well.
5. The Carter Doctrine, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 197 (Jan. 23, 1980)
which states: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America, and such assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military force."
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first-strike attack.
Once war is perceived as inevitable in a world where the United
States and the Soviet Union each possesses a first-strike capability, it
will be declared "rational" to initiate nuclear war in a deteriorating
crisis situation in order to destroy the other side's missiles and limit
casualties. If one accepts this analysis, is there any American who
knows the Soviet mind well enough to predict the exact point at which,
in a deteriorating crisis situation, the Soviets will perceive war as inevi-
table, or vice-versa? Assuming one side or the other perceives war as
inevitable, on which side does prudence lie? Shall millions of preventa-
ble deaths be risked by not striking first, or shall it be a race between
Americans and Soviets to press the button first? A bilateral first-strike
situation is inherently unstable, especially during a deteriorating crisis.
How should a democracy like the United States respond?
In foreign and military affairs, the general will of the population
of a democracy is what the leaders determine it to be, and particularly
for nuclear war prospects, what the President determines it to be. In a
free society, no president normally would reach any momentous deci-
sion without consultation, without considering the widest scope of avail-
able opinions, without the best information he can obtain, and without
patient and deep reflection on where the common interests of the people
lie. But all of this takes time, much time, and time is precisely what is
not available in the nuclear timetable. Neither the Congress, the peo-
ple, nor any other authority, can make the decision for the President.
The decision is essentially individual, and therefore autocratic. In the
logic of nuclear war, the President, by circumstances of mutual, first-
strike capability, is condemned to be a dictator. That is contrary to our
democratic order, and a question arises, therefore, as to whether the
Constitution applies to this situation.
The War Power
The Constitutional Convention was convened on May 25, 1787,
and was concluded on September 17, less than four months later.'
6. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 649 (M. Farrand ed.
1911) [hereinafter cited as 2 RECORDS]. There is no complete or entirely reliable re-
cord of the Convention's deliberations. The Convention's delegates met in secret and
resolved to communicate nothing to non-delegates. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
1152 7:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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Fifty-five men attended in all, but the significant work was done by far
fewer. For the first two months, the Convention devoted itself mainly to
discussions, developing and perfecting resolutions. In late July, those
resolutions on which agreement had been reached were turned over to
the Committee on Detail, and on July 26, the Convention adjourned for
ten days, until August 6, to permit that Committee of five to create a
draft of the Constitution.7
The Committee's draft constitution assigned Congress the power
"to make war." Later on August 17, Charles Pinkney opposed vesting
the power to make war in Congress, saying "its proceedings were too
slow." He argued that the "Senate would be the best depository, being
more acquainted with foreign affairs and most capable of proper reso-
lution." 10 Pierce Butler countered, saying that if informed judgment
and efficiency were the standards to be applied, then the Senate suf-
fered the same disabilities as Congress; consequently, he was "for vest-
ing the power in the President. ... "l Thereafter, James Madison and
Elbridge Gerry "moved to insert 'declare', striking out 'make' war;
leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks. 12 Roger
Sherman thought it stood very well. "The Executive [should] be able to
repel and not commence war."13 Elbridge Gerry said that he "never
expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower th Executive alone
to declare war." 14 Oliver Ellsworth observed that "there is a material
VENTION OF 1787, at 10 n.4, xi (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as 1
RECORDS]. The Journal of the Convention recorded only the formal motions and the
votes thereon. Extensive, but incomplete notes were taken by several delegates - Ru-
fus King, James McHenry, William Pierce, William Paterson, Alexander Hamilton,
and George Mason. Id. at xvi-xxiv. The most important record, James Madison's notes,
was revised thirty years after the convention. Id. at vii.
7. 1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at xxii. John Rutledge of South Carolina was
Chairman, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania an important member.
8. 2 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 318: "Mr. Pinkney opposed vesting this power in
the legislature ..
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-43 (1800) where Justice
Samuel Chase wrote: "Congress is empowered to declare a general war or Congress
may wage a limited war. .. "
14. 2 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 318.
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difference between the cases of making war and making peace,"2 and
that "it should be more easy to get out of a war, than into it." ' . George
Mason "was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because
not [safely] to be trusted with it . . .he was for clogging rather than
facilitating war; but for facilitating peace; '17 thus, "he preferred 'de-
clare' to 'make." "8 Thereafter, the vote was called and "the motion to
insert 'declare' in place of 'make' passed."19
This result is not surprising because the authors of our Constitu-
tion had all been reared with the axiom, endlessly repeated before and
after the American Revolution, that standing armies and their com-
manders are always a menace to the liberties of a free people. The
dangers posed by a standing army were repeatedly dealt with during
the ratification debates, and it accounted for significant opposition to
the proposed constitution.
There is no ambiguity or uncertainty about the general intent of
the framers of the Constitution with respect to the war power.
[It] was understood by the framers - and subsequent usage con-
firmed their understanding - that the President in his capacity as
commander in chief of the armed forces would have the right, in-
deed the duty, to use the armed forces to repel sudden attacks on
the United States, even in advance of Congressional authorization
to do so. . .[and] ...that he would direct and lead the armed
forces and put them to any use specified by Congress but that this
did not extend to the initiation of hostilities....20
15. Id. at 319 (emphasis original).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis original).
19. Id. (emphasis original). By defining the issue in terms of the power to "de-
clare" war, the framers may have confused later generations. The real issue was con-
gressional authorization of hostilities, full or partial, against a foreign sovereign state.
The framers meant to vest that power as well as the power ultimately to control gen-
eral or limited war in the hands of Congress. The President was to be the commander-
in-chief, subject to Congress' ultimate control.
20. National Commitments, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957),
quoted in G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (10th
ed. 1980). In 1801, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, ruled that the
"'whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Con-
gress ... the Congress may authorize general hostilities ... or partial hostili-
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In a letter to Madison in 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "We have
already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of War by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the
Legislative body. .. .
One conclusion is clear: the so-called doctrine of a President at-
tacking first and making war as anticipatory self- defense, allegedly
justified by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter, has no historical
standing in American Constitutional law.
The United States had a puny, regular military force of less than
840 men when George Washington assumed the Presidency under the
new constitution, 22 nevertheless, the framers sorely worried about war
and the dangers posed by the military. They denied the President the
power to initiate hostilities and embroil the nation in war. Presidents in
the 19th Century interpreted their commander-in-chief powers differ-
ently, but on the whole, the basic constitutional framework was gener-
ally observed. Presidents did not initiate war. Summarizing the war
power in the 19th Century, Robert William Russell wrote:
It is not a simple matter to arrive at conclusions concerning this
period in which the constitutional interpretation was far from con-
sistent, where Grant's extreme view is sandwiched between the con-
servative views of Buchanan and Cleveland. But there was one
opinion that enjoyed wide acceptance: the President could constitu-
tionally employ American military force outside the nation as long
as he did not use it to commit "acts of war." While the term was
never precisely defined, an "act of war" in this context usually
meant the use of military force against a sovereign nation without
that nation's consent and without that nation's having declared war
upon or used force against The United States. To perform acts of
war, the President needed the authorization of Congress ....
This dividing line between the proper spheres of legislative and
executive authority was sufficiently flexible to permit the President
to use military force in unimportant cases, while preserving the role
of Congress in important decisions. The acts of war doctrine was
probably a step beyond what the framers intended when they
changed the Congressional power from "make" war to "declare"
ties. .. ." Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 1, 28 (1801).
21. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 418.
22. A. SOIFER, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 116 (1976).
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war, and was certainly a move in the direction of Presidential
power compared to the cautious stance of Washington, Adams, Jef-
ferson, and Madison. The central objective which the Constitution
sought - Congressional authority to approve the initiation of ma-
jor conflicts - was undamaged, but certain fraying of the edges
had occurred. This slight deterioration was greatly accelerated dur-
ing the following 50 years.28
The 19th Century presidents used the military forces in "hot pur-
suit" of bands of pirates or bandits or to protect American lives and
property under treaties conferring rights and obligations on the United
States. But early 20th Century presidents - Theodore Roosevelt, Taft,
and Wilson - expanded the scope of presidential power by using mili-
tary force against small sovereign states, and Congress did not resist.2 '
Later, in 1941, "President Roosevelt, on his own authority, committed
American forces to the defense of Greenland and Iceland and author-
ized American naval vessels to escort convoys to Iceland";25 thus, "by
the time Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, in the
wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had
already been committed by its president, acting on his own authority,
to an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic. ' '2e
The trend begun by Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, and
accelerated by Franklin Roosevelt, increasingly continued under Presi-
dents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, "bringing
the country to the point at which the real power to commit the country
to war is now in the hands of the president. 2  thus, the power to con-
duct foreign affiars,28 the campaign for government secrecy, and the
23. R. Russell, The United States Congress and the Power to Use Military Force
Abroad (Ph.D. thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1967) reported in NA-
TIONAL SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); quoted in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416, 418 (10th ed. 1980).
24. G. GUNTHER, supra note 23, at 419.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
where the Court seemingly affirmed an inherent superior presidential power over for-
eign affairs, not derived from constitutional or statutory sources. Compare Bestor, infra
note 28.
28. For an enlightening analysis of this power, and the meaning of the King's
Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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commander-in-chief powers were combined and used in ways that even-
tually produced the current "Imperial Presidency": 29
The imperial presidency was essentially the creation of foreign pol-
icy. A combination of doctrines and emotions - belief in perma-
nent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and
the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of
the world - had brought about the unprecedented centralization
of decisions over war and peace in the presidency. With this there
came an unprecendented exclusion of the rest of the executive
branch, of Congress, of the press and of public opinion in general
from these decisions. Prolonged war in Vietnam strengthened the
tendencies toward both centralization and exlusion. So the imperial
presidency grew at the expense of the constitutional order. Like the
cowbird, it hatched its own eggs and pushed the others out of the
nest. And, as it overwhelmed the traditional separation of powers
in foreign affairs, it began to aspire toward an equivalent centrali-
zation of power in the domestic polity.30
However, the war powers as spelled out in the Constitution and its
balances between Congress and the President are not obsolete. All that
is required is for Congress actively and continually to reassert its con-
stitutional authority over the use of American military force. Ulti-
mately, congressional action will be founded upon enlightened, press
influenced public opinion. This opinion obviously will affect the presi-
dency since that office is also highly susceptible to public influence.
A first step was taken by Congress when it passed the War Powers
Resolution in 1973, stating its purpose was
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United
States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
power of "advice and consent," see Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of
Foreign Affairs, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1974).
29. For discussion, see A. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
30. Id. at 207.
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situations.31
This legislation, however, does not fully restore the intent of the fram-
ers. The framers did not rely on the collective judgment of Congress
and President to initiate hostilities, but solely on Congressional declara-
tion to introduce military forces into hostilities, except in limited cases
of presidential repulsion of a sudden attack on the United States. Nev-
ertheless, the statute is useful, so long as it is seen as a first step to be
followed by others. It confirms the constitutional position that the doc-
trine of presidentially created war as anticipatory self-defense has no
constitutional standing, and it helps to restore part of the constitutional
balance. The rest of the balance can be restored if the American people
have the will and have the vision to do so. Alexander Hamilton was
prophetic in seeing the consequences of a people living in a garrison
state. He implied the need for continuous vigilance by the people. In a
striking passage, Hamilton observed "safety from external danger is
the most powerful director of national conduct, .. [and] . . . [e]ven
the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. 32
Hamilton prophetically concluded that the "violent destruction of life
and property incident to war-the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to
liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights." 3
31. The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.
Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1488 (H.R.J. Res. 542,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. adopted over Presidential veto on Nov. 7, 1973). (This statute is
an unusual, quasi-constitutional variety of congressional action, not setting forth sub-
stantive policy but processes and relationships. Query: is it clear, is it not, that Con-
gress did not go far enough and failed to restore the original intent?)
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 45 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
33. Id.
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Presidential Power and Nuclear War
It seems relatively straightforward to conclude that the President
has no constitutional power to initiate a nuclear war by authorizing a
preemptive nuclear first-strike. That clearly would be a functional
"declaration" of war in its most emphatic and destructive form, and
only Congress has that power under our Constitution. Moreover, as the
United Nations repeatedly has declared, the threat or use of nuclear
weapons is a "crime against mankind and civilization.'
But does the President, after receiving a radar or other report of
an incoming wave of nuclear missiles, have constitutional power to au-
thorize a responsive nuclear missile strike? The War Powers Resolution
of 1973 permits the President "to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities" 35 in the event of "a national emergency created
by attack upon the United States . . .or its armed forces."36 this pro-
vision clearly contemplates the use of military manpower and it may be
so limited, but arguably it may also include hardware, such as nuclear
missiles. Thus, the statutory situation is somewhat murky. Yet clearly,
a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union based on radar alone, or some
other report, does not come within the statute because the reports may,
like others in the past, be in error. At that moment only a report exists
and neither the United States nor its armed forces have actually been
"attacked". The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense by a President is
ruled out. Likewise, the situation would not fall within the provision of
the President's Constitutional power to repel sudden attacks because
the "attack" had not yet occurred. On the other hand, if the reports
were true and if the President waited until after the "attack" on the
United States actually occurred, he may be left with very few, if any,
missiles with which to respond. Of course, in such a situation, a ques-
tion exists concerning the good to be achieved by authorizing a re-
sponding nuclear attack with the remaining missiles, which would only
produce another nuclear attack on the United States with the Soviet
Union's remaining missiles.
34. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc A/5100
(1961). This resolution was adopted Nov. 24, 1961, by a vote of 55-20, with 26 absten-
tions. The United States voted "No". The U.S.S.R. voted "yes".
35. See supra, note 31.
36. Id.
155
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
160 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
It may be true that neither the Constitution nor the War Powers
Resolution was designed to apply to the conditions of nuclear war. Nu-
clear war is fundamentally different from warfare by tank, machine
gun, and airplane. It is a crime against humanity. But, under the Con-
stitution as it currently exists, it appears reasonably correct to conclude
(1) that the President has no constitutional power to order a pre-emp-
tive, nuclear first-strike and thereby initiate nuclear war; (2) that the
President has no constitutional power to order a nuclear attack solely in
response to reports of an incoming wave of missiles, and (3) that the
President has no emergency power to "repel" a nuclear attack already
fully completed. If the President has any power, it would only be to
repel a nuclear attack on the United States that is in process by au-
thorizing a responding nuclear attack after the United States actually
has been attacked. Of course, by then, there may be very little left with
which to respond or little reason to do so. It is difficult to see how an
American nuclear attack on the Soviet Union authorized during or fol-
lowing a nuclear attack on the United States by the Soviet Union can
be characterized as "repelling" the initial attack. Nothing is "re-
pelled", and the concept loses its meaning in a nuclear context. More-
over, the whole concept of presidential power "to repel a sudden at-
tack" on the United States presupposes (1) that the purpose of such
presidential power is to gain time sufficient for Congress to convene
and act, and (2) that things called "Congress", "the United States",
and "the American people" will continue to exist after the President
exercises his power to repel sudden attack. If neither of these two
presuppositions exist, as neither would if we absorbed a full, nuclear
strike from the Soviet Union, then the whole rationale for the concept
of presidential power "to repel sudden attack" disappears. Rather
clearly, it seems, the existence of a first-strike posture in the possible
use of nuclear weapons is unconstitutional and should be dropped as a
policy option.37
A president may act contrary to the constitutional requirements in
each of the above three situations, arguing emergency presidential pre-
rogative, 8 a doctrine dangerous to a free society. The founding fathers
37. For a recent discussion of this point solely as a matter of policy, see Bundy,
Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 753 (Spring 1982).
38. Machiavelli argued that all republics in times of crisis need a dictatorship
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did not completely deny power to use military force to the President.
They permitted him to repel a sudden attack, and this recognizes, in
part, an emergency power in the President, but the prerogative is not
unqualified. Nevertheless, some presidents have gone well beyond their
carefully circumscribed power. It appears that Lincoln acted on a the-
ory of wide presidential prerogative during the Civil War,39 as did
Roosevelt during World War II,40 and Kennedy during the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis.
So long as presidents believe they will be successful in their ac-
tions, they will continue to claim emergency prerogative. But, what
would count as "success" in any of the above three situations involving
nuclear war? Our safety may turn on the quirks of mind of a particular
president and on how he judges "success" and how he sees himself in
the annals of history. The pathway to real "success" is set forth in
Professor Arthur Miller's article.
Professor Miller's stimulating and welcome analysis, seeking to
change our modes of thinking about nuclear war, goes well beyond my
argument set forth above. He holds that the manufacture, deployment,
and use of nuclear weapons are unconstitutional. By focusing solely on
and that it was better to provide for one by law than to have power usurped.
"[R]epublics which, when in imminent danger," Machiavelli said, "have recourse
neither to a dictatorship, nor to some form of authority analagous to it, will be ruined
when grave misfortune befalls them." 1 N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSE ch. 34, 291
(Routledge ed. 1950). Two and a half centuries later, Rousseau argued that the "abil-
ity to foresee that some things cannot be foreseen is a very necessary quality;" that the
"sacrosanct nature of the laws never should be interfered with save when the safety of
the state is in question," and at that point "the People's first concern must be to see
that the State shall not perish." 4 J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT ch. 6, 415-16 (Ox-
ford ed. 1947). Even John Stuart Mill stated he was "far from condemning, in cases of
extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dicta-
torship." J. MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
JOHN STUART MILL 408 (M. Cohen ed. 1961).
39. See Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, VIII A. LINCOLN, COMPLETE
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 161 (Nicolay & Hay eds. 1894), and letter from Abra-
ham Lincoln to Secretary Chase (Sept. 2, 1863) (which appears in IX A. LINCOLN,
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108 (Nicolay & Hay eds. 1894)); E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 382 (1940).
40. See Murphy, Request of the Senate for an Opinion as to the Powers of the
President In Emergency or State of War, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 343-48 (1939); 10 F.
ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 1941, at 195 (1950).
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the limited presidential power to repel attack, my argument is narrower
but parallels his, seeking to demonstrate only that the presidential core
of our nuclear first-strike capability strategy is unconstitutional. Profes-
sor Miller broadly attacks the nuclear establishment as a whole, argu-
ing boldly that constitutional law is instrumental and that it places a
duty on government officers NOT to take any action that, on balance,
unreasonably jeopardizes the well-being of the populace or "posterity."
He argues that constitutional law imposes a duty of negative content.
Although this part of the argument is neither set forth comprehensively
nor definitively, I find Professor Miller's preliminary statement
persuasive.
Two additional arguments and a general conclusion present some
surmountable difficulties. First, Professor Miller argues that interna-
tional law partially defines the duties the Constitution places on gov-
ernmental officers because it is incorporated into our constitutional
law.41 Second, he argues that international law, as stated by Richard
Falk and his colleagues, declares that any threat or contemplated use
of nuclear weapons constitutes a crime of state.42 The duty of govern-
ment officials, he argues, then becomes clear: "to take action to help
prevent that 'crime of state.' "43 Accepting the validity of the above two
arguments for discussion purposes, the requirement that government
officials "take action" does not follow from the prior general duty of
negative content that officials take no action that unreasonably jeopar-
dizes the well-being of the American people. Another step is needed, a
constitutional judgment from the Supreme Court that the current man-
ufacture, deployment, and contemplated use of nuclear weapons unrea-
sonably jeopardizes American well-being. Once that reasonable judg-
ment is made, then Professor Miller's arguments take hold and
Congress comes under a duty to act to undo the jeopardy to the Ameri-
can people. In doing so, it prevents a "crime of state". Such judgment
from the Supreme Court of the United States is, however, most un-
likely. That prospect, though, should not deter vigorous discussion of
this vital subject.
Should international law be part of constitutional law? Professor
41. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982).
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id.
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Miller argues it should. Surely, the part of international law that con-
flicts with the Constitution cannot be. My argument above indicates,
however, that part of international law outlawing a nuclear first-strike
position does not conflict with American constitutional law. Thus, that
portion of international law could be incorporated into American con-
stitutional law. Professor Miller's preliminary, creative, result-oriented
affirmative argument is intriguing indeed. Anyone who takes law and
humankind seriously must agree with his goal to eliminate nuclear
weapons. Yet, I suspect American officials will not accept Professor
Miller's argument without also knowing it has been agreed to by the
Soviets. Nevertheless, by opening debate, Professor Miller puts us in
his debt.
Professor Miller is quite right when he states that we must invent
the legal means, whether his or others, by which the world can peace-
fully settle the issues that previously have been settled by war. Until
the necessary legal means are created and institutionalized, any reduc-
tion in the steadily increasing probability of nuclear catastrophe is un-
likely in the absence of effective negotiations on the control, reduction
and elimination of arms. The limited progress that has been made to
control nuclear arms has come as a result of direct negotiations be-
tween the nuclear powers, and, in this country, has been accompanied
by enlightened citizen demands. In the United States, citizen enlighten-
ment in the area of arms control is crucial, but, happily, as John Jay
saw long ago, citizen interest in this area endures. "Among the many
objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their
attention," Jay declared, "that of providing for their safety seems to be
first"; and that means their "security for the preservation of peace and
tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence,
as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes."" Thus,
the legal profession becomes deeply implicated because it consists of
professionals whose skills are necessary to save mankind from nuclear
war. Lawyers have skills to separate fact from fancy; they can under-
stand nuclear strategies, and they can explain to the public the dangers
and constitutional status of our current nuclear posture. Lawyers also
are negotiators and indispensible advisors to policy makers. They nego-
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 14 (Q. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis
original).
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tiate lasting agreements founded on the existence of common or com-
patible interests, including common and compatible interests of the So-
viet Union and the United States. It is these lawyerly skills, employed
in the service of Professor Miller's vision, that are sorely needed today
by the American people for their posterity. May they be forthcoming.
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A Grenville Clark Hypothetical*
Gerald T. Dunne**
In any discussion of Nuclear Weapons, Grenville Clark (1882-
1967) is an important figure. He had a long, happy, and successful life.
Born to wealth, power, and position, his historic achievements included
distinction in two wars-launching the Plattsburg training camps
which were the catalyst of the Preparedness Movement in World War
I, and in World War II virtually single-handedly securing the enact-
ment of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 which pro-
duced a minimally armed America on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Peace-
time attainments must include organization of a critical resistance to
FDR's court-packing plan of 1937 and revitalization of the Federal
Civil Rights Act. Most significant, however, was his response to Secre-
tary Stimson's post-Hiroshima charge to "go home and stop World
War III". Though racked with cancer, Clark gave the last full measure
of devotion in attempting, through proposals for disarmament, world
government, and world law, to forestall terminal nuclear holocaust.
This surely will be his enduring achievement.
Grenville Clark went to his grave in early 1967, believing that his
life and work, notwithstanding intermediate success had been an ulti-
mate failure; his sunset efforts to alarm the human race to the mortal
peril which beset it seemed to have availed nothing; if anything that
peril had only proliferated and magnified during his effort to constrain
it. Nonetheless he had striven mightily, expending personal fortune and
dwindling physical resources in writing, speaking and traveling. A mea-
sure of his concern could be glimpsed in his approach to a public rela-
tions expert (a maneuver unthinkable otherwise) to promote sales of a
landmark book, World Peace Through World Law. The expert, Ed-
ward Bernays, who had seen all manner of men in his time, expressed
an expert probatory judgment: "His personality was most aristocratic,
* Adapted and revised from the forthcoming book, GRENVILLE CLARK: PUBLIC
LIFE, PRIVATE MAN.
** Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
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and his behavior gentle and unassuming. I liked him."1
Nonetheless, the impact of personality could go just so far, and in
the scale of Grenville Clark's grand design, it was not far enough. The
nuclear danger impended and worsened with inertia, the strongest force
in human affairs deployed on the side of confrontation and potential
disaster. Then two things happened.
The Diplomat
On May 19, 1981, George F. Kennan received the Einstein
Award. In any case, an award to Kennan would have merely gilded the
lily; Kennan had already left his mark on his times; his credentials ran
from the first blueprint for Soviet containment, expressed in a famous
"Mr. X" article in Foreign Affairs in 19472 to persona non grata ex-
pulsion from the USSR in 1953. Kennan's laureate response was in a
totally different idiom than his "X" article; it denounced:
the supreme sacrilege of putting an end to the civilization out of
which we have grown, the civilization which made us what we are,
the civilization, without which our children and grandchildren can
have no chance of self-realization, possibly no chance for life
itself.,
Kennan went on to stress "the admonition to neglect nothing - no
effort, no unpleasantness, no controversy, no sacrifice - which could
conceivably help preserve us from committing this fatal folly."' 4 He
then reached the core of his argument against nuclear weaponry:
I question whether these devices are really weapons at all .... To
my mind the nuclear bomb is the most useless weapon ever in-
vented. It can be employed to no rational purpose. It is not even an
effective defense against itself. It is only something with which, in a
moment of petulance or panic, you commit such fearful acts of de-
1. Letter from Edward Bernays to Gerald Dunne (May 19, 1981).
2. Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947).
3. Address by George Kennan, Albert Einstein Peace Prize Foundation (May 19,
1981) (condensed in The Illusion of Security, St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 31, 1981,
at E2, col. 4).
4. Id.
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struction as no sane person would ever wish to have on his
conscience.5
Kennan admitted that his admonitions were not new but rather
restatements of what "wise and far-seeing people" had been asserting
for "over thirty years." He named names, beginning with Albert Ein-
stein and concluding with every president of the United States from
Dwight Eisenhower to Jimmy Carter."
He did not name Grenville Clark, whose book World Peace
Through World Law expressed his thesis in extended and systematic
form. Perhaps the omission was deliberate, for in 1948 (in Clark's view
at least) the laureate was an integral part of the "Truman-Leahy-Mar-
shall-Levett (sic)-Kennan-Harriman combination" whose "fixed ideas"
were frozen into an icy Cold War carapate.7
In a subsequent New Yorker article, 8 Kennan edged close to Clark
in several planes of encounter. One was a plea for a less demonic per-
ception of the Soviet adversary. A second insisted on the quantum dif-
ference separating nuclear arms from conventional ones. The third
could have been vintage Clark, as far as it went:
there are many people who consider it useless, or even undesirable
to try to get rid of these weapons entirely, and that a satisfactory
solution can somehow be found . . . . I believe that until we con-
sent to recognize that the nuclear weapons we hold in our own
hands are as much a danger to us as those that repose in the hands
of our supposed adversaries there will be no escape from the confu-
sions and dilemmas to which such weapons have now brought us
9
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Letter from Grenville Clark to Cord Meyer (Feb. 28, 1948), quoted in J.
Bantell, Perpetual Through World Law 217 (1979) (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Connecticut).
8. Kennan, Reflection on the Soviet Union, The New Yorker, Nov. 2, 1981, at
54, 62; cf. 6 G. CLARK, A PLAN FOR PEACE 16-18 (1954 condensation).
9. Kennan, supra note 8, at 62.
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The President
In his article Kennan turned to the subject of nuclear weapons
"with a sigh and a sinking of the heart."10 However, before type was
set, Ronald Reagan, in a thoughtless and casual response at a mid-
October 1981 press conference, asserted a belief that a tactical ex-
change of battlefield weapons could occur between NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces "without bringing either one of the major powers to push-
ing the button."11
The President hardly bargained for the reponse he got. The follow-
ing weekend, hundreds of thousands of people, finally comprehending
the possibilities of atomic war involving them, marched in protest
through the streets of London, Paris, Brussels and Rome. Clark had
indeed foreseen the possibility, and remarkably George Kennan, his old
adversary, cited that prophetic vision accepting the Grenville Clark
Prize at Dartmouth College on November 16, 1981:
if the various governments did not find a way to put a stop to this
insanity, the awareness of the indescribable dangers it presented
would some day, as [Clark] put it "penetrate the general masses of
the people in all nations" with the result that these masses would
begin to put increasing and indeed finally irresistable pressure on
their governments to abandon the policies that were creating this
danger.1 2
Kennan called the recent growth of the anti-nuclear war move-
ment the most striking phenomenon of the early 1980s. Within twenty-
four hours his appraisal was vindicated; President Reagan in a hastily
arranged speech at the national Press Club, eschewed all talk of push-
ing buttons, but rather offered the Soviets a reciprocal pull-back of all
tactical nuclear weapons from actual or proposed deployment.
It remained an open question whether the presidential proposal
would be accepted at all, or if accepted would provide merely the con-
tinuation of an uneasy truce or offer an actual threshold to a genuine
peace. Nonetheless, the mere fact of enunciation represented the tri-
10. Id.
11. Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1981, at A1, col. 1.
12. Address by George Kennan, Dartmouth College (Nov. 16, 1981).
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umph of an idea as well as the extension of the moral and intellectual
force of one man-a man dead now fourteen years and born almost a
century earlier-whose life and achievement exemplified the reiterated
assertion of a long time friend that the only certainty of history was
that men would make it.
Men make history far more by ideas than by actions, and Arthur
Selwynn Miller's four incisive constitutional propositions for planetary
survival may be truly seminal. As a lifelong man of law, Grenville
Clark would have been arrested by them.
Indeed to the Miller quadrilateral, Clark could well add three core
propositions of his own. One would be a thesis from the preamble of his
Declaration of the Second Dartmouth Conference on peace, disarma-
ment, and world survival, which, mutatis mutandis, might itself serve
as Miller's lietmotif:
The highest sovereignty on earth resides in the peoples who inhabit
the plant. National sovereignty is justified only as it safeguards the
basic sovereignty of the peoples themselves. Since in a nuclear age,
national sovereignty alone cannot serve its highest obligation, it
must be buttressed.... 13
Second, and especially apposite here would be Clark's talent for
persuasively extrapolating values implicit in the constitutional design to
the necessities of the hour, a process involving a mutational change in
the document itself. Here would stand his landmark Supreme Court
briefs. The first, submitted in Hague v. C1014 was a critical component
of the process which rescued the Federal Civil Rights Act from atrophy
and made the statute a vital force in American life.1 5 The other, in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,1 6 drew on language, logic, and
history for an eventually dominant constitutional constraint against col-
lective ritualism violative of conscience. Such intrusions were to be sub-
jected to the strictest of judicial scrutiny.
13. Declaration of the Second Dartmouth Conference, Dublin, N.H. (Oct. 5,
1965).
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
15. For a discussion of the case see Gibbons, Hague v. CIO: A Retrospect, 52
N.Y.U. L. REv. 738 (1977).
16. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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In the third place, or perhaps in the first, would be Clark's hard-
bitten realization that notwithstanding formularies and institutional ar-
rangements, public opinion was the dominant force in bringing results
to pass in the domain of policy. More than this, the existing procedures
of the law could well afford the ideal vehicle for placing the Miller
quadrilateral in appropriate posture for adversary scrutiny, public de-
bate, and eventual judicial declaration. More than that, under the
touchstone of declaratory judgment, it can go forward to eventual reso-
lution galvanizing and shaping the sentiment which will in due course
afford it vitality.
166
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/16
In Brief Rejoinder
Arthur S. Miller
The editors of the Nova Law Journal have invited me to comment
upon the responses that were received to my preliminary foray into the
applicability of constitutional norms to nuclear weapons. I am happy to
do so.1 At the outset, I should like to express my deep appreciation to
those who took time from their busy schedules to write responses, as
well as the editors of this Journal for making the symposium possible.
It is, I believe, the first attempt by a legal periodical to tackle from a
constitutional standpoint what by all odds is the overriding moral and
political (and thus constitutional) question of the day.
Lawyers of whatever specialty have until quite recent times ig-
nored the problems attendant to the manufacture, storage, deployment
and possible-even probable-use of weapons that threaten the very
fabric of civilization as we know it. Now, however, two groups of law-
yers have been formed--one with Boston headquarters and the other
centered in New York City; members of the American Bar Associa-
tion, as well as other bar associations, are beginning to focus upon the
growing peril. That is all to the good: lawyers, as Professor Levinson
suggests, can play an important role in the developing dialogue. They
exemplify in modern version what Samuel Johnson said long ago: "De-
pend upon it, Sir, when any man knows he is to be hanged in a fort-
night, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." 2 For the first time since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were all but obliterated in August, 1945, the
minds of lawyers-some but far from all of them-are beginning to
concentrate upon what Jonathan Schell has called "the fate of the
earth."
1. Although mention will be made of several responses, this rejoinder is general
in nature. It seeks to extend the argument, rather than to comment upon each of the
responses in detail.
2. 6 J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 309 (W. Crocker ed. 1846)
(1st ed. London 1791).
3. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
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The need, as Professor Dunne adumbrates, is for a "mutational
change"4 in our modes of thinking about constitutions and constitution-
alism. If, as Paul Freund once observed, the Supreme Court is a theme
that forces lawyers to become philosophers,5 the very existence of nu-
clear weapons forces everyone, including lawyers, to think deeply about
the nature of American constitutionalism. Professor Ball tells us that
when Congress was delegated the "power to declare war," it did not
include "the power to declare Armageddon."' Indeed, it does not. Nor
does the President have such a power, now that he, because of long-
standing Congressional ineptitude and pusillanimity, has become the
person who can precipitate a nuclear holocaust. True enough, the Presi-
dent has the ability to engage in nuclear war, either by responding to
external attack or by use of a first strike, but if constitutionalism means
anything it must be taken to mean that such an ability cannot be
equated with constitutional propriety. As Professor Jenkins reminds us,
the central concept of raison d'etat becomes irrelevant and inapplicable
with nuclear weaponry, simply because the survival of the nation-the
fundamental purpose of that silent constitutional principle--cannot be
guaranteed.7
When the deep-thinkers of the national security establishment
speak about nuclear war, they mention sooner or later what would be
an "acceptable" number of Americans killed in such a war. The figure
usually runs into tens of millions. Of course, the nuclear planners are
making provision for the safety of key figures in government. A com-
mand center has been hollowed out of a hillside in Virginia, furnished
with equipment and supplies and suitably protected. For ordinary
Americans a "civil defense" program is envisaged (some $4.3 billion is
allocated to it in the current budget). Cities will be evacuated, but no
one quite seems to know how, say, the residents of New York or any
other major city will survive. An official in the Pentagon has suggested
that everyone should get a shovel, dig a hole, cover it with a couple of
doors and throw three feet of dirt on top of it-after which a person or
a family presumably will huddle in the hole until danger ceases. The
4. Dunne, A Grenville Clark Hypothetical, 7 NOVA L.J. 167, 171 (1982).
5. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 1 (1949).
6. Ball, Nuclear War: The End of Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 53, 61 (1982).
7. Jenkins, Admirable Ends - Ineffective Means, 7 NOVA L.J. 127 (1982).
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absurdity of such a view requires no comment: It bespeaks a mind so
dulled by computerized war games and thinking about the unthinkable
that the person wallows in a swamp of consummate nonsense. Let no
one fail to see the point: there is no escape for most Americans should
nuclear war break out.
That does not mean, of course, that those who sit in positions of
political power do not today and did not in the past toy with the use of
nuclear weapons. To take the latter first, recently revealed documents
tell us how very close the United States was to using atomic bombs in
Indo-China as long ago as 1954-at the time when the French were
being defeated at Dienbienphu. 8 That they were not used, either by
American forces or by the French (who had obtained them from the
United States), came from a decision taken not on humanitarian
grounds but because of a fear of a worldwide public uproar. As for
today, in August, 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was
busily engaged in trying to stifle-through representations to the me-
dia-the fact that the Reagan administration was prepared to fight a
"protracted nuclear war."9 Small wonder, therefore, that the "dooms-
day clock" on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has
moved from seven to four minutes to midnight.
Professor McDowell believes that the idea of a living Constitution
"is ultimately at odds with the logic of the Contitution itself."10 He of
course has a full first amendment right to such a view. The fact that it
runs contrary to the vast majority of constitutional scholars will not,
and perhaps should not, deter him. How he can square his position with
the development of constitutional law in the almost two centures since
1789 remains completely mysterious. He misreads McCulloch v. Mary-
land,11 and seems to think that Chief Justice Marshall's allusion to
popular sovereignty in Marbury v. Madison12 is the ne plus ultra of
8. See Marder, When Ike Was Asked to Nuke Vietnam, Wash. Post, Aug. 22,
1982, at Cl, col. 1.
9. See Halloran, Weinberger Angered by Reports on War Strategy, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 1982, at B8, col. 3; Wilson, Weinberger Lobbies Editors on War Policy,
Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
10. McDowell, Nuclear Weapons: Unconstitutional or Just Unjust?, 7 NOVA.
L.J. 145, 146 (1982).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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understanding about "the" Constitution.13 That just ain't so. The ines-
capable point, it seems to me, is that the meaning of the Constitution
alters with the exigencies faced by succeeding generations of Ameri-
cans-but the words remain the same. Each generation of Americans
must undertake the task of writing its own constitution; that, at least, is
the clear and unmistakable teaching of history. Professor McDowell
does not like that; but he cannot gainsay it. The Constitution has al-
ways been relative to circumstances. To repeat Franz Neumann's point:
No society in recorded history has even been able to dispense with
political power. This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as
true of laissez-faire as of an interventionist state. No greater disser-
vice has been rendered to political science than the statement that
the liberal state was a "weak" state. It was precisely as strong as it
needed to be in the circumstances. It acquired substantial colonial
empires, waged wars, held down internal disorders, and stablilzed
itself over long periods of time. 4
The relevant "circumstance" today is the imminence of nuclear
holocaust. Those circumstances call, not for an expansion of govern-
mental power but for the development of means by which government,
in Madison's words, can be obliged "to control itself.1 5 Professor Mor-
ris suggests that a constitutional judgment should be made that nuclear
weapons "unreasonably jeopardize American well-being."' 6 That is the
language of due process, and opens still another argument for the ap-
plicability of constitutional norms to the circumstances that confront
US.
Professor Alfange asserts that the Duke Power7 case is relevant to
the nuclear weapon issue.' 8 I cannot agree with his conclusion; but
13. McDowell, supra note 10, at 147. For a preliminary inquiry into the meaning
of what the Constitution is, see Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, -
U. DAYTON L. REV. - (1983).
14. F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 8 (1957)
(emphasis added).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
16. Morris, The Constitution and Nuclear Defense, 7 NOVA L.J. 151, 164
(1982).
17. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
18. Alfange, Wisdom, Constitutionality, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 7 NOVA
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would like to draw upon that Supreme Court decision, and particularly
the opinion of Judge McMillan in Carolina Environmental Study
Group v. United States Atomic Energy Commission9 which was re-
versed by the Court. Environmentalists in North Carolina challenged
the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, setting monetary limits
on the liability for damage resulting from a nuclear power plant. Judge
McMillan ruled the statute unconstitutional, stating that "the destruc-
tion of the property or the lives of those affected by nuclear catastrophe
without reasonable certainty that the victims will be justly compen-
sated" 20 violated the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed-unanimously. Where, then, does
that leave us? I maintain that we are left exactly where the plaintiffs
were on March 31, 1977 when Judge McMillan issued his opinion. The
two situations are not analogous. Chief Justice Warren Burger, speak-
ing for the Court, employed a limited standard of review in what he
perceived to be an economic regulation. He found that the Act was
neither arbitrary nor irrational; thus it "passe[d] constitutional mus-
ter."' 21 Burger also relied upon "an explicit congressional commitment
to take further action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event
that the $560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded."2 2 Surely Burger's
alleged "reasoning" is inapplicable to nuclear weapons. The point, as
Professor Morris tells us, is that the danger created by nuclear weap-
onry is of such enormity that Americans are being deprived of their
right to personal and psychic well-being.23
Nuclear weapons, accordingly, constitute an "anticipatory taking"
contrary to the fifth amendment and an "anticipatory" deprivation of
life, liberty and property without due process of law. Due process, Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter stated in 1950, "is that which comports with the
L.J. 75 (1982).
19. 431 F. Supp. 203 (1977). For further discussion of "anticipatory" depriva-
tion of life, liberty and property see Miller, The Constitutional Challenge of Nuclear
Weapons: A Note on the Obligation to Ward off Extinction, - BROOKLYN INT'L L. J.
-(1983).
20. Carolina Envtl. Study, Group, 431 F. Supp. at 222.
21. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 84.
22. Id. at 93.
23. Morris, supra note 16.
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deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. '24 It means, in cur-
rent context and to adopt Judge McMillan's classification, that Ameri-
cans have a right to be free from both the immediate and the the po-
tential effects of nuclear weaponry. 5
The immediate effects are bad enough. Storage of bombs and nu-
clear waste present as yet insoluble problems of safety. Furthermore, as
Ruth Leger Sivard has concluded, increasingly vast sums are being
spent to purchase what may be an illusory sense of security at the price
of economic stagnation, repression, and poverty.28 I have elsewhere
sought to draw attention to the emergence of a new "constitution of
control";2 7 surely, nuclear weapons contribute to that development.
The potential effects are far worse. Drawing upon Judge McMil-
lan's opinion, the following conclusions seem to be beyond argument.
First, there is a high probability of nuclear war, coming either by
design or by accident.
Second, there is no escape from the impact of nuclear war.
Third, civil defense measures cannot possibly protect the residents
of any city in the United States.
Fourth, the risks involved in nuclear weaponry are not the types
that a responsible government places upon its citizens.
Fifth, there is no way that Americans can be compensated for
losses of life, liberty, or property.
Sixth, nuclear war will be the "last epidemic." There is no way
that the health services of the nation could take care of the casualties
of such a war.
Given those effects, the conclusion of an anticipatory violation of
the fifth amendment is unanswerable.
I do not, it is emphasized, wish to be placed in the position of one
who uses constitutional argumentation as "desperate legal acrobat-
24. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissentiIig). As
was his practice, Frankfurter did not divulge how he determined those "deepest notions
of what is fair and right and just." Id. Compare his concurring opinion in Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947).
25. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 431 F. Supp. at 209.
26. R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1981 (1982).
27. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL (1981).
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ics. ''28 The ideas presented may be new, but I do not think they are
foolish. If our modes of thiiking about constitutions and constitutional-
ism are to be changed, the basic requirement, in the words of Alexan-
der Pekelis, is to have
the will to discover the will to enlarge the tiny segment of the
world we know, the will to learn and to do better, the firm and
deepseated conviction that men may, again and again, in everyone's
lifetime, see "thin with distance, thin but dead ahead, the line of
unimaginable coasts.129
There may well be an "arrogance of humanism" 3°--the belief that hu-
mankind through the exercise of reason can control the future. Surely,
however, we have to act as if what humans do can make a difference,
as if they have the intelligence, the will, and the stamina to ward off
extinction.
A final note: calling nuclear weapons a constitutional problem does
not, of course, mean that they are ipsofacto not a political problem. As
Professors Alfange and McDowell note, those weapons should be dealt
with by the political process.31 My belief is that the courts, and specifi-
cally the Supreme Court, are deeply immersed in politics and, indeed,
would be quite meaningless unless seen as part of the political process.
Judges are important political actors-now, in the past, and certainly
in the future. Professor Judith Shklar has observed that the prevailing
ideology of lawyers is "legalism"-the notion that law is somthing sep-
arate and apart from the remainder of society.3 2 But, as any sociologist
of law knows, law and the state are closely intertwined. To call for a
political solution to the nuclear threat does not foreclose action by
courts. Quite the contrary. The Supreme Court sits as an authoritative
faculty of political theory and of social ethics. It can, should the Jus-
tices so wish, set standards toward which all Americans can aspire.33
28. Levinson, Book Review, Self-Evident Truths in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, 57 TEx. L. REv. 847, 858 (1979).
29. Pekelis, The Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare, in LAW AND SOCIAL Ac-
TION I (M. Konvitz ed. 1950).
30. See D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM (1978).
31. See Alfange, supra note 18; McDowell, supra note 10.
32. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
33. It is worth special mention that the General Counsel of the Department of
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On the other hand, as Professor Gerhard Casper has cogently ob-
served, "constitutional rules are authoritative regardless of whether
courts are able to interpret and enforce them.3 4 Congress and the Presi-
dent, Casper continues, ''must be ready to reconsider fundamental con-
stitutional policies and basic propositions of political theory. '3 5 So they
do. The Constitution is not d mere lawyers' document, not a plaything
(or workthing) of lawyers only. It is the vehicle of the nation's life. And
government officers, including the President, swear to "preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution of the United States." 36 If that means
anything, and surely it is not mere brutumfulmen, it means cognizance
of and adherence to a constitutional duty to insure the preservation of
the nation and the values that they are embedded in the Constitution.
In the age of thermonuclear bombs, that can only mean the total elimi-
nation of such weapons wherever they may be. In sum, no useful pur-
pose is served by calling nuclear weaponry a "policy" question or a
problem of "politics," for all branches of government deal with policy
and politics. 37
Defense, William H. Taft, IV, acknowledges "the existence of the constitutional duty
to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the individ-
ual freedom and rights of Americans set out in the Constitutions." Taft, Letter from
the Government, 7 NOVA. L.J. 141, 143 (1982). One hopes that Mr. Taft's recognition
of such a constitutional duty is communicated to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the President - and that they agree that such a duty rests upon
their shoulders. I am, of course pleased to learn that my view on the existence of a
constitutional duty has drawn the approbation of a high government officer - who,
indeed, advances even more constitutional arguments than do I in support of such a
position. Mr. Taft's letter merits wide circulation.
34. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy; A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 473 (1976).
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
37. For discussion, see A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIvIsM:
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982); M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COM-
PARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, (1981); J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDI-
CIARY (1977); Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1979); Miller,
Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1104 (1982).
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